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Abstract
This study analyzes the conception of gharar , which is generally translated as either risk or uncertainty, in
post-formative Islamic commercial law. According to Muslim jurists, gharar arises from uncertainty in
commercial transactions. However, unlike other areas of the Islamic intellectual tradition in which uncertainty
engenders errors, the uncertainty associated with gharar enables jurists and counterparties to make informed
legal and financial decisions. Nevertheless, gharar is not structurally a form of certainty. In order to understand
this interesting paradox and reach a better understanding of representation in general, this study employs
discourse analysis to trace the concepts, reasoning methods, and descriptive techniques that Ibn Hazm (d.
1064), Baji (d. 1081), Shirazi (d. 1083), Sarakhsi (d. 1090), Ibn Qudama (d.1223), and Ibn Rushd (d. 1261)
use in order to represent gharar . First, this study details how jurists conceptualize the types of uncertainty that
engender gharar in commercial transactions. Second, it examines the ways that jurists employ these forms of
uncertainty to analyze commercial transactions. This study demonstrates that gharar arises from a privation of
thought. This privation mimics the relationship between the identity of thought and referent that produces certainty.




Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)
Graduate Group




gharar, Islamic law, uncertainty
Subject Categories
Near Eastern Languages and Societies
This dissertation is available at ScholarlyCommons: http://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/1418
 
GHARAR IN POST-FORMATIVE  
ISLAMIC COMMERCIAL LAW: 
A STUDY OF THE REPRESENTATION OF 
UNCERTAINTY IN ISLAMIC LEGAL THOUGHT 
 
Ryan M. Rittenberg 
A DISSERTATION 
in 
Near Eastern Languages & Civilizations 
Presented to the Faculties of the University of Pennsylvania 
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the 
Degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
2014 
 
Supervisor of Dissertation      
______________      
Joseph E. Lowry        
Associate Professor, Near East Languages & Civilizations     
  
Graduate Group Chairperson 
______________ 
Paul M. Cobb 
Professor, Near Eastern Languages and Civilizations 
 
Dissertation Committee  
Paul M. Cobb, Professor, Near Eastern Languages & Civilizations 
Jessica Goldberg, Associate Professor, History, University of California, LA  
  
	  	   ii	  
Acknowledgements 
 
Over the years, I have benefitted greatly from the friendship, support, and 
guidance of a number of individuals whom I would like to recognize and thank.  At 
Cornell University, I am grateful for my time with Professors Shawkat Toorawa, David 
Powers, and Munther Younes, who introduced me to the study of Islam and Arabic. At 
the University of Pennsylvania, I would like to thank Professor Roger Allen, who taught 
me the beauty of Arabic literature and supported me over the years in innumerable ways. 
I am also thankful for Professor Richard Zettler’s assistance, which helped me finish the 
program. I would like to thank Dr. Sue Webber of CWiC for giving me the chance to 
teach my own course and mentoring me. I would also like to express my gratitude to my 
committee members–Professors Paul Cobb, Jessica Goldberg, and Joseph Lowry. They 
offered me invaluable feedback and support throughout the dissertation process. I also 
owe Professor Joseph Lowry, my advisor, a special debt of gratitude that words cannot 
hope to repay. Besides reading over several drafts of my dissertation and offering 
excellent comments, he has provided me with wonderful training, invaluable guidance, 
and support even when I doubted myself. I am indebted to Linda Greene, Peggy Guinan, 
and Diane Moderski who made NELC a home and helped me over the years in ways 
large and small. I would also like to thank Jeffery Arsenault, Nick Harris, Rose 
Muravchick, Elias Saba, and Kelly Tuttle for many great conversations over fine food 
and drink. I would not have finished without the love and support of Kameliya 
Atanasova. Finally, I cannot thank my parents enough for their love and support over the 
years.  My success is largely due to these people and any failings of this study are mine.  
 
	  	   iii	  
ABSTRACT 
 
GHARAR IN POST-FORMATIVE  
ISLAMIC COMMERCIAL LAW: 
A STUDY OF THE REPRESENTATION OF 
UNCERTAINTY IN ISLAMIC LEGAL THOUGHT 
 
Ryan M. Rittenberg 
 
Joseph E. Lowry 
 
 This study analyzes the conception of gharar, which is generally translated as 
either risk or uncertainty, in post-formative Islamic commercial law. According to 
Muslim jurists, gharar arises from uncertainty in commercial transactions. However, 
unlike other areas of the Islamic intellectual tradition in which uncertainty engenders 
errors, the uncertainty associated with gharar enables jurists and counterparties to make 
informed legal and financial decisions. Nevertheless, gharar is not structurally a form of 
certainty. In order to understand this interesting paradox and reach a better understanding 
of representation in general, this study employs discourse analysis to trace the concepts, 
reasoning methods, and descriptive techniques that Ibn Ḥazm (d. 1064), Bājī (d. 1081), 
Shīrāzī (d. 1083), Sarakhsī (d. 1090), Ibn Qudāma (d.1223), and Ibn Rushd (d. 1261) use 
in order to represent gharar. First, this study details how jurists conceptualize the types of 
uncertainty that engender gharar in commercial transactions. Second, it examines the 
ways that jurists employ these forms of uncertainty to analyze commercial transactions. 
This study demonstrates that gharar arises from a privation of thought. This privation 
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mimics the relationship between the identity of thought and referent that produces 
certainty. Gharar thus indicates how knowledge creates and subsumes uncertainty.  
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Introduction 
The Certainty of Uncertainty 
I. Aims of This Study 
In this study, I analyze the conception of gharar, which contemporary Western 
scholars of Islamic law generally translate as either risk or uncertainty.1 Gharar along 
with ribā, which is generally translated as either usury or interest, are two central terms 
that pre-modern Muslim jurists employ to discuss the legality of commercial 
transactions.2 Although modern scholars of Islamic law have examined ribā in order to 
identify the ethical influence of Islam on pre-modern commerce, they have largely 
ignored gharar.3 The lack of scholarship on gharar probably reflects the fact that legal 
discussions of gharar tend to be scattered more widely throughout works of fiqh than 
comparable discussions of ribā.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 For examples of the translation of the term gharar as risk, see Frank Vogel and Samuel 
L. Hayes III, Islamic Law and Finance: Religion, Risk, and Return (Boston: Kluwer Law 
International, 1998), 87; Mahmoud A. El-Gamal, Islamic Finance: Law, Economics, and Practice 
(Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 47-49, 58-62. For examples of the translation of the term 
as uncertainty, see N.J, Coulson, A History of Islamic Law (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University 
Press, 1964), pp. 45, 138. For examples of the translation of the term as risk and uncertainty, see 
Hiroyuki Yanagihashi, A History of the Early Law of Property: Reconstructing the Legal 
Developments (Boston: Brill, 2004), p. 276; Joseph Schacht, An Introduction to Islamic Law 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), pp. 135, 146-147. 
  
 2 For reasons that will emerge in the course of this introduction, I will leave the Arabic 
term gharar untranslated throughout this study in order to distinguish it from contemporary 
notions of financial risk.   
 
3 For general discussions of ribā, see EI2, s.v. Ribā; Encyclopedia of the Qur’ān, s.v. 
Usury; Vogel, Finance, 71-95. For a study of the historical development of ribā, see Yanagihashi, 
History, 212-297.  
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The oversight in the study of gharar seems regrettable since gharar relates in 
important and interesting ways to the larger and exceedingly rich discussions of 
epistemology and representation that dominate so many fields of Islamic and Arabic 
learning, such as Islamic theology, legal theory, grammar, Sufism, and Arabic 
philosophy. Notwithstanding the fact that modern Western scholars of Islamic intellectual 
history have devoted several excellent studies to epistemology and representation in the 
aforementioned fields of Islamic learning, they have largely neglected the study of 
epistemology and representation as they relate to furū‘ al-fiqh, Islamic positive law.4  
This study of gharar, however, aims to do more than simply add another field of 
Islamic learning to our understanding of representation and epistemology within Islamic 
and Arabic intellectual history. Rather, this study employs gharar as a starting point for 
analyzing uncertainty in contrast to the previous studies of the Islamic and Arabic 
intellectual tradition, which focused on analyzing certainty. Just as importantly, gharar 
presents a new avenue for the examination of the models of representation that continue 
to implicitly and explicitly organize modern thought. Discussions about gharar along 
with those about uncertainty in other fields of Islamic learning thus offer a rich and 
nuanced set of texts with which to examine and theorize about the structure and 
functioning of uncertainty in general.  
This study thus uses the analysis of gharar to make four contributions to Islamic 
Studies and research on representation in general. First, it elucidates a conceptually rich, 
important, and hitherto unexamined topic that is central to Islamic commercial law–
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 See footnote 16 for a list of secondary scholarship on representation and epistemology 
in these fields of Islamic learning.  
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gharar. Second, this study reassesses the relationship between the different madhhabs, or 
schools of Islamic law, in terms of the reasoning techniques that jurists employ and their 
legal positions with respect to gharar. Third, it offers new insights into epistemology and 
representation through the exploration of uncertainty. Fourth, this study examines the 
discursive techniques that jurists employ to imagine and solve the problems associated 
with uncertainty and gharar. These discursive techniques have important implications for 
the study of the development and transmission of Islamic law.  
 
II. Representation  
  To situate gharar within a larger discussion of representation requires a basic 
understanding of representation. Such a basic understanding will provide both a 
terminological and conceptual starting point for the study of gharar. It is, however, easier 
said than done to provide such a brief outline of representation due to its diverse 
conceptions.  Representation has been and remains a perennial concern of scholars in the 
humanities in such fields as philosophy, literature, history, and the arts to name only a 
few examples. Notwithstanding the material and formal diversity of these fields, scholars 
have in general used representation as a means to examine, articulate, and critique 
theories of language, epistemology, and ontology.  
Prior to modern discussions of representation in the humanities, theologians, 
metaphysicians, and mystics had implicitly and explicitly elaborated theories about the 
relationships between these three fields of learning. Contemporary discussions of 
representation, however, are not simply a modern and secular continuation of earlier 
religious and metaphysical elaborations about the same topics.  Rather, modern scholars 
	  	   4	  
have delineated a new set of questions and answers, and in so doing they have created an 
important rupture with metaphysics and theology. Most importantly, the studies of these 
modern scholars have offered a number of important insights into and critiques of 
theories of representation. In particular, these studies reveal how different models of 
representation articulate a relationship between reality, thought, and language through 1) 
a notion of identity and 2) a schema that relates individual representations.5     
In the introduction to his study of the Western epistemological tradition, Richard 
Rorty, a philosopher, offers the following insight into the role of identity in theories of 
representation;  
To know is to represent accurately what is outside the mind; so 
to understand the possibility and nature of knowledge is to 
understand the way in which the mind is able to construct such 
representations. Philosophy’s central concern is to be a general 
theory of representation, a theory which will divide culture up 
into the areas which represent reality well, those which represent 
it less well, and those which do not represent it at all (despite 
their pretense of doing so).6 
 
According to Rorty, the Western intellectual tradition arose upon and remains shackled to 
a metaphor of Aristotle, who conceived of knowledge as a picture in one’s mind of a 
specific referent. Knowledge is supposed to mirror a referent that exists in-itself in reality 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Although not exhaustive, for different discussions of representation that touch on the 
role of identity and schema, see Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, tr. Paul Patton (New 
York: The Columbia University Press, 1994); Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology, tr. Gayatri 
Chakravorty Spivak (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976); Ludwig 
Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, tr. D.F. Pears and B.F. McGuinness (London: 
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1961), esp. ¶¶ 1-3.5; Nelson Goodman, Languages of Art 
(Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1968); Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of 
Nature (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979); Roland Barthes, Elements of Semiology, tr. 
Anette Lavers and Colin Smith (London: Jonathan Cape Ltd., 1967), esp. 35-88; Theodor W. 
Adorno, Negative Dialectics, tr. E.B. Ashton (New York: Seabury Press; 1979).   
 
 6  Rorty, Mirror (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), 3.   
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beyond the effects of thought or communication. Furthermore, knowledge enables one to 
perfectly communicate this mental picture to another person who will then have this same 
mental picture in his or her mind. The better the picture the greater one’s knowledge and 
ability to communicate it to others.7  Representation thus results from an identity that 
equates the information found in reality, thought, and communication. 
 The second feature of representation, a schema, relates the individual 
representations to each other within a larger and more complex system of representation. 
A schema relies on identity, but it also invokes oppositions, resemblances, and analogies 
to relate individual representations to each other within a web of ever increasing 
representational complexity. Taken together, these four types of relationship–identity, 
opposition, resemblance and analogy–enable the categorization of representations that 
forms the sine qua non of rational thought.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 7 Rorty, Mirror, 38-44. Unfortunately, Rorty does not analyze why thought was not 
analogized to the other senses in the Aristotelian tradition. However, in his Middle Commentary 
on Aristotle’s De Anima, Ibn Rushd sheds some light on the potential reasons that thought was 
not analogized to touch. Within a larger conversation about the movement of the soul, Ibn Rushd 
argues that the soul must be noncorporeal since otherwise thought would be a form of touch. In 
that case, either all or part of the intellect would think by touching intelligibles. If only part of the 
intellect touches intellgibiles, this part must be either an indivisible point which touches the 
intelligible an infinite number of times since a point has no dimension, or it touches the 
intelligible with a divisible and finite part but it does so an infinite number of times by going over 
the same places. On the other hand, if all parts of the intellect touch all parts of the intelligible 
there is no guarantee that each part of the intellect would perceive a part of the intelligible. In 
other words, the whole mind could not unify the perceptions into a concept so that the problem of 
the infinite returns. Ultimately, a corporeal intellect that touches intelligibles could not form a 
finite identity since it would require an infinite amount of time and effort. Ironically, matter and 
touch introduce the infinite into thought and threaten its ability to form an identity. For Aristotle, 
the infinite eludes definition and syllogistic reasoning which form the basis of all rational 
thought. Aristotle resolves these issues by positing a non-corporeal intellect, which transcends the 
corporeal, and the common sense that unites the perceptions of the five senses into one. Abū al-
Walīd Muḥammad b. Aḥmad b. Rushd, Talkhiṣ kitāb al-nafs [tr. Middle Commentary on 
Aristotle’s De Anima], tr. Alfred L. Ivry (Provo, Utah: Brigham Young University Press, 2002), 
pp. 23-25, ¶¶. 62-66. 
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 The analysis and critique of this paradigm of representation has provided a fertile 
ground for scholarship. Returning to Rorty, he critiques this model of representation 
because it weds metaphysics and ethics so as to legitimize the seeming naturalness of 
various forms of domination. To be precise, this model of representation gives rise to a 
matrix of opposing terms, such as objectivity, subjectivity, error, correct, interior, 
exterior, knowledge, and ignorance, that validate systems of authority. That is, according 
to the Aristotelian model of representation, each question has one objectively correct 
answer that is independent of our thoughts and statements about it. To stray from this 
answer is not merely epistemologically wrong, but amoral too since it undermines reality.  
To address the alignment of notions of representation with their potential 
exploitation for large and small forms of oppression, Rorty argues for a nominalist notion 
of representation that would abandon traditional epistemology in favor of his notion of 
hermeneutics, which recognizes the contingency of all claims of truth upon the discursive 
practices of a community of speakers. Although parasitic on epistemology, Rorty’s 
hermeneutics rejects identitarian thought that assesses all positions against a supposedly 
objective and singular viewpoint.8 Hermeneutics would thus open discourse to the 
recognition and validation of multiple viewpoints.    
There are other ways to frame the study and critique of representation. 
Undoubtedly, Jacques Derrida’s deconstruction, which examines the fundamental 
contradictions in a system of representation in order to thereby reveal the impossibility of 
stable meanings, is the most famous modern critique of traditional theories of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 8 For further details on hermeneutics, see Rorty, Mirror, chs. 7-8. 
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representation. Beyond deconstruction, however, there still remain virgin terrains for the 
exploration of representation.  In particular, the relation of representation of uncertainty 
deserves attention for what it might tell us about certainty. Returning to Rorty’s 
statement, “To know is to represent accurately what is outside the mind,” what does it 
mean to be uncertain? Is it simply, “To be uncertain is to represent inaccurately what is 
outside the mind?” Although this is one way to define uncertainty, it does not reveal the 
complex and generally unequal relationship between certainty and uncertainty. 
Furthermore, there are other ways to define uncertainty.    
Most fields of scholarship meticulously analyze and categorize their forms of 
knowledge and the reasoning methods that engender certainty. Unfortunately, these fields 
seldom discuss uncertainty with the same analytical zeal.  The two important modern 
exceptions to this disinterest in the exploration of uncertainty are finance and quantum 
mechanics, in which uncertainty is irresoluble phenomenon that structures these fields.9  
This disinterest in the study of uncertainty is not accidental. Rather, it reflects the 
seldom articulated, yet dominant belief that uncertainty is a subjective state that arises 
from either an innate naïveté or a momentary error. To be sure, there are moments of 
thought that range somewhere between pure uncertainty and certainty, such as doubt and 
probabilistic knowledge. However, these moments are not supposed to essentially link 
uncertainty and certainty in such a manner that certainty and uncertainty would overlap.10 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 This overlap in the role of uncertainty in physics and contemporary finance is not that 
surprising considering the fact that many involved in finance have training in mathematics and 
physics. In both finance and physics, uncertainty is described through statistics.   
 
10 For example, the Muslim scholar Alī b. Muḥammad al-Āmidī (d. 631/1233) classifies 
uncertainty with doubt, probabilistic knowledge, heedlessness, death, sleep, and speculation 
(naẓar) in order to differentiate the epistemological value of these forms of thought from that of 
	  	   8	  
At best, the types of thought that fall short of reaching the level of certainty may form the 
stepping-stones that eventually lead to the way to one obtaining certainty. Nevertheless, 
certainty must be objective truth whereas uncertainty must be subjective error and 
ignorance according to the common view.   
If certainty and uncertainty were not self-contained contraries on some basic level 
this would lead to the breakdown in the fundamental categories, like truth and falsehood, 
that organize systems of authority. The moments in between uncertainty and certainty 
merely reflect the ways that one situates oneself in relation to certainty and uncertainty. 
Whether as a kind of conceptual innocence or inadvertent error, most fields of 
scholarship tolerate uncertainty in order to appropriate it and to thereby produce the 
certainty that ultimately legitimizes these fields. Furthermore, as Theodor Adorno 
reminds us, epistemological categories are often aligned with moral categories; an 
alignment that furthers the marginalization of uncertainty as a topic unworthy of critical 
study.11  
As stated earlier, Aristotle conception of knowledge plays a large role in pre-
modern and modern theories of representation.  In the introduction to Muḥammad Ibn 
Rushd’s commentary of the Metaphysics of Aristotle, one encounters the elements that 
ensure the marginalization of uncertainty as a temporary state that is unworthy of study. 
These remarks offer important insight into why uncertainty remains a marginal topic of 
scholarly interest. According to Aristotle, humans can in principle know anything in-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
certainty. Alī b. Muḥammad al-Āmidī, Abkār al-afkār fī uṣūl al-dīn, ed. Aḥmad Farīd al-Mazīdī, 
3 vols. (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-‘Ilmīya, 2003), vol. 1, pp. 52-61. 
 
11  Theodor W. Adorno, Dialectics, 35.   
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itself, but our subjective thought processes, emotions, and failings complicate the 
acquisition of the knowledge of things as they truly are. Nevertheless, humans can 
overcome their individual limitations by working together to study the world and 
combine their knowledge to ultimately reach a perfect and objective understanding of 
reality. In fact, what ultimately distinguishes man from everything else in the world is 
man’s thirst for certainty and truth.12  Thus, the attainment of certainty regarding 
everything is part of the essence and destiny of mankind for Aristotle.   
Ibn Rushd adds the moral argument that if something cannot be known then this 
would point to a mistake in the design of Nature–a word that is probably a 
circumlocution for God. 13 The remarks of Aristotle and Ibn Rushd hold out the promise– 
a promise whose influence continues to animate modern society–that man is destined to 
know reality as it truly exists. If this promise were not true, reality would be irrational 
and amoral from the perspective of these two scholars. 
Undoubtedly, it is easy and seemingly unproblematic to dismiss the uncertainty of 
the naive or erroneous varieties as subjective and transitory moments of thought that are 
unworthy of critical study. However, Umberto Eco notes that, “In order to understand a 
philosophical system… it is often necessary to approach it from the margins rather than 
the center. From the center, a system always seems well defined and hardly changeable; it 
is at the periphery that it gets put to the test.”14  If there were varieties of uncertainty that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12  Muḥammad Ibn Rushd [=Averroes], Tafsīr mā ba‘d al-ṭabī‘a, ed. Maurice Bouyges, 3 
vols. (Beirut: Imprimerie Catholique, 1938), vol. 1; pp. 3-4.  
 
13  Ibn Rushd, Tafsīr, vol. 1, p. 8.   
 
14 Umberto Eco, R. Lambertini, C. Marmo and A. Tabarroni, “On Animal Language in 
the Medieval Classification of Signs,” in On the Medieval Theory of Signs, ed. Umberto Eco and 
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enabled conscious and correct judgments it would be harder to dismiss them. In other 
words, if one could find a form of uncertainty that would enable one, “to represent 
accurately what is outside the mind,” this uncertainty would raise important questions 
about the basic concepts and terms, like truth and error, that organize systems of 
authority. Indeed, by standing at the margins of discussions of epistemology and 
representation, we would actually reach a deeper understanding of how the center 
structures the relation between the world, mind, and language.    
 
III. Islamic Epistemology and Uncertainty 
 To pursue these issues about representation and uncertainty, I will examine some 
works of post-formative Islamic law, theology, and Arabic philosophy. This selection 
reflects my training and personal interests. More importantly, pre-modern Muslim 
scholars have devoted an immense amount of thought and energy to the elaboration of 
theories of representation in works of Sufism, uṣūl al-fiqh (legal theory), kalām 
(speculative theology), Arabic philosophy, and logic. These discussions of representation 
all share a commitment to articulating a relationship among theories of ontology, 
epistemology, and language.  This commitment, nevertheless, articulates itself in a 
variety of ways that make the Islamic intellectual tradition so rich and complex.  
Typically, in the introductions of works of uṣūl al-fiqh and kalām, Muslim 
scholars present their theories of representation by defining the terms ‘ilm, certainty, and 
jahl, uncertainty. These two terms circumscribe the bounds of their epistemological 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Constantino Marmo (Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Company, 1989), p. 3. James 
Montgomery offers a similar approach in his study of Abū Nuwās. James E. Montgomery, “Abū 
Nuwās, The Justified Sinner?,” Oriens 39 (2011): pp.  77-78.  
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systems and in between them is probabilistic knowledge and doubt, or ẓann and shakk 
respectively. It is important to note that Muslim scholars do not consider jahl to be doubt, 
shakk. According to Muslim scholars, doubt occurs when one cannot decide between 
several competing opinions regarding an issue. Rather, uncertainty, which is generally 
elaborated in works of uṣūl al-fiqh and kalām along an Aristotelian line, refers to an 
incorrect identity between a referent and thought of it.15 
 Pre-modern Muslim scholars and modern Western scholars of Islam have detailed 
certain knowledge and probabilistic knowledge in minute detail. These analyses present 
certain knowledge as both the foundation and goal of the Islamic sciences.16 On the other 
hand, uncertainty does not garner the same level of treatment. Whereas pre-modern 
Muslims scholars define certainty first, they define uncertainty last if they do so at all.  
They then discuss in minute detail the forms of certainty and reasoning techniques that 
serve as the foundation for the constellation of the Islamic and Arabic sciences. Scholars 
from both groups seldom analyze and describe more than three forms of uncertainty at 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 15 I will examine the definitions and functions of the epistemological terms certainty and 
uncertainty in works of uṣūl al-fiqh and kalām more detail in chapter two.  
  
16  For a general study of epistemology in Islam, see Franz Rosenthal, Knowledge 
Triumphant: The Concept of Knowledge in Medieval Islam (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1970). For studies 
of epistemology in works of kalām and philosophy, see Josef Van Ess, Die Erkenntnislehre des 
‘Aḍudaddīn al-Īcī: Übersetzung und Kommentar des Ersten Buches Seiner Mawāqif (Wiesbaden: 
Steiner, 1966); Marie Bernand, “Le Notion de ‘Ilm Chez les Premiers Mu‘tazilites,” Studia 
Islamica, no. 36 (1972): 23-45; Marie Bernand, “Le Notion de ‘Ilm Chez les Premiers 
Mu‘tazilites: suite,” Studia Islamica, no. 37 (1973): 27-56; Marie Bernand, Le Problème de la 
Connaisance d’Après le Mugnī du Cadi ‘Abd al-Ğabbār (Alger: Société National d’Edition et de 
Difussion, 1982); Oliver Leaman, A Brief Introduction to Islamic Philosophy (Malden, Mass; 
Blackwell Publishers Inc., 1999), 52-72. For discussions of epistemology in law, see Aron 
Zysow, The Economy of Certainty: An Introduction to the Typology of Islamic Legal Theory 
(Atlanta: Lockwood Press, 2013); Joseph E. Lowry, Early Islamic Legal Theory: The Risāla of 
Muḥammad ibn Idrīs al-Shāfi‘ī  (Boston: Brill, 2007), 239-274; Norman Calder, “ Ikhtilāf and 
Ijmā‘ in Shāfi‘ī’s Risāla,” Studia Islamica, no. 58 (1983), 55-81.  
 
	  	   12	  
the most rudimentary level of detail— complete uncertainty (al-jahl al-muṭlaq), simple 
uncertainty (al-jahl al-basīṭ) and complex uncertainty (al-jahl al-murakkab) — as we 
will see in chapter two.    
 Like most generalizations, this one has a notable and perhaps surprising exception 
that offers a fruitful starting point for the analysis of uncertainty in different Islamic 
discourses—gharar. Jurists prohibit specific commercial transactions that have excessive 
uncertainty, which they refer to as gharar. However, the uncertainty associated with 
gharar is neither an undifferentiated and thus unthinkable phenomenon nor the infinite 
number of potential problems that might befall a transaction. Such an all-consuming 
conception of uncertainty would make trade and life impossible. Rather, jurists 
differentiate the uncertainty associated with gharar into several discrete forms on the 
basis of which they analyze and describe the legality of commercial transactions. The 
forms of uncertainty associated with gharar thus function as concepts and judgments— 
terms that I will use loosely throughout this study—in order to represent the legality of 
transactions. These forms of uncertainty thus enable jurists to make specific and valid 
statements about these transactions. Furthermore, gharar has a schema that relates the 
representation of individual transactions to each other so as to permit the analysis of more 
complex transactions.  Gharar is thus not uncertainty as the term is commonly 
understood. 
 Nevertheless, gharar is not certainty masquerading as uncertainty through 
semantic games. Structurally, it occupies an interesting liminal space between certainty 
and uncertainty as these terms are commonly understood. Gharar does not signal an 
identity between thought and referent, but rather a privation of identity between these two 
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elements. This privation is nonetheless still bound to identity so as to enable valid 
judgments. Identity thus must discursively precede and subsume the negation that 
engenders its privation. In other words, privation is relative to identity but the opposite– 
the dependence of identity upon privation–is not true.  
Ibn Ḥazm, whose views on gharar I will examine in this study, summarizes this 
surprising and asymmetrical relationship between identity and privation in his 
introductory work on Aristotelian logic.17 While discussing the affirmation and negation 
of a logical identity, which is formed between a subject and its predicate, Ibn Ḥazm 
remarks that, 
As for the opposition of the acquisition of a property and its 
privation (al-qunyah wa’l-‘adam), this is like sight and the 
privation of sight, which is called blindness. One of these terms 
revolves around (yadūr ‘alā) the second, but the second does not 
revolve around the first. The meaning of “revolves” here refers 
to the relativity of terms. Although we can say blindness of sight, 
we cannot say the sight of blindness. Know that the acquisition 
of a property does not revolve around its privation, which is to 
say that the affirmation is not relative to the privation. However, 
the privation revolves around the acquisition, which is to say that 
the privation is relative to the acquisition. The privation is not a 
concept but rather it is the termination and cessation of it 
(dhahāb al-shay’ wa-buṭlānuhu) such that something is only 
considered to have a privation when its existence is possible.”18  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Although the terms identity and privation differ in discussions of epistemology and 
logic, Adorno notes that epistemology and logic have a conceptual and terminological complicity, 
which I would attribute to their role in theories of representation. Throughout this study, I will 
attempt to exploit, albeit judiciously, this complicity to obtain a better understanding of gharar 
and representation. Adorno, Dialectics, p. 103. 
 
18 ‘Alī b. Aḥmad Ibn Ḥazm, Al-Taqrīb li-ḥadd al-manṭiq, ed. Aḥmad Farīd al-Mazīdī 
(Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-‘Ilmīya, 2003), p. 72. Lā yu‘add ‘ādiman illā man yaḥtamil wujūd mā 
huwa ‘ādim lahu. Ibn Ḥazm then distinguishes between Greek notions of privation, which he 
claims require the ontological existence of a referent at some point in time, and Arabic notions of 
privation, which he claims do not require the ontological existence of a referent. Although this 
distinction has interesting implications for the notion of referentiality, Ibn Ḥazm still agrees that 
privation must work on some identity between a finite referent, thought of it, and communication 
of it.  Although not as explicit as Ibn Ḥazm, Ibn Rushd also states that the privation is not equal 
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For Ibn Ḥazm, statements can only be true or false in so far as they relate to existence.  
Thus for a statement to have a sense, it must describe something that can possibly exist 
such that the affirmation of the statement must precede its negation.   
This hierarchical relationship between identity and privation enables the informed 
decisions and valid representations that characterize legal discussions and analyses of 
gharar. Considering the facts that identity is the sine qua non of certain knowledge and 
that privation can only exist in relation to identity, it would not be incorrect to say that 
certainty creates uncertainty in the context of gharar. The uncertainty associated with 
gharar is thus the product of identity and schema of certain knowledge and valid 
representations.   
  Although the uncertainty associated with gharar arises from a privation, there are 
other forms of uncertainty that have different causes according to the Islamic intellectual 
tradition. For example, works of uṣūl al-fiqh and kalām detail a form of uncertainty that 
arises when a mismatch occurs between a referent and thought of it. This form of 
uncertainty, which is how people generally conceive of uncertainty, is a mistake. At the 
moment that a person makes this mistake, he or she cannot recognize it otherwise he or 
she would not have made it. It is only after the mistake occurs that time offers him or her 
the possibility of finding the correct identity to obtain certainty. True, one might make 
numerous mistakes and potentially never find the correct identity, but the truth still 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
to the affirmation of identity. Ibn Rushd, Kitāb al-‘ibāra, in Talkhīs manṭiq arisṭū, ed. Jīrār 
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objectively exists from the perspective of the authors of works uṣūl al-fiqh and kalām. On 
the other hand, another individual might come to right identity immediately without any 
intervening error such that uncertainty is not an essential aspect of thought. 
According to Muslims scholars, the certainty and this type of uncertainty are 
contraries, which means that they must be equal and mutually exclusive when applied to 
the same subject. Thus, at some fundamental level, there must exist a form of uncertainty 
that stands outside of certainty as its equal.  Nevertheless, in the case of uṣūl al-fiqh and 
kalām, certainty is always primary and subsumes uncertainty as in the case of the 
uncertainty associated with gharar. More specifically, in the case of works of uṣūl al-fiqh 
and kalām, the correct identity that engenders certainty serves as a reference point that 
invalidates all other thoughts. On the other hand, if one can obtain certainty right away it 
does not seem that uncertainty plays an essential role in the validation of or engendering 
certainty.  
In both discussions of gharar and the uncertainty found in works of uṣūl al-fiqh 
and kalām, uncertainty does not exist outside of and as an equal contrary to certainty. Or 
to put it differently, there is not a form uncertainty that can be represented and also stand 
outside of certainty. As stated earlier, a theory of representation gives rise to a matrix of 
contrary terms, such as certainty and uncertainty, that play an important role in validating 
the claims systems of authority as being objective and thus natural. The fact that certainty 
always creates and subsumes uncertainty, however, undermines this matrix and reveals 
the role of representation in constituting a given system of authority. To be precise, the 
way that certainty creates and subsumes uncertainty depends on how a particular field of 
discourse configures its system representation. This configuration determines what counts 
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as knowledge, but just as importantly what does not count as knowledge according to the 
accepted standards.  
Uncertainty thus unsurprisingly plays important but varied roles in claims of 
authority of Muslim scholars. Admittedly, works of uṣūl al-fiqh and kalām have a wider 
set of epistemological concerns than works of furū‘ al-fiqh. Nevertheless, both sets of 
works claim that there are objectively correct answers to relevant questions of belief and 
action. In the case of uṣūl al-fiqh and kalām, God has these answers even when humans 
cannot access them. The uncertainty discussed in uṣūl al-fiqh and kalām explains why 
humans can make unconsciously mistakes. In the realm of intense debates, such an 
explanation for cause of errors seems particularly important for justifying further debate, 
examination, and research.  
On the other hand, in discussions of gharar, jurists claim that God has 
circumscribed the aspects of a contract that Muslim must know in order for a specific 
transaction to be valid. True, a transaction may have other aspects that counterparties 
want to know about, but these aspects do not affect the legality of the transaction 
according to jurists. Thus, jurists and counterparties need a form of uncertainty that will 
alert them to its presence so that they can obtain certainty.   
 
IV. Methodology  
 The study of uncertainty within the context of representation raises seemingly 
paradoxical and important methodological questions about the ability to write a study 
such as this at all. Ideally, uncertainty should be both the object and narrator of this study. 
Knowledge, the goal of all research, however, ineluctably converts each unknown into a 
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known even if this conversion leads merely to a known-unknown. Thus, my argument 
about the way that certainty subsumes uncertainty in discussions of gharar may just be 
the inevitable outcome of representation. The goal with the study of uncertainty would be 
to locate a pure form of uncertainty in its habitat and give it a voice without implicating it 
in any system of representation and certainty.  
 There is no Archimedean point that would enable a presentation of uncertainty 
outside of the identity and schema of representation. Identity and schema are inherent to 
representation, but this does not mean that identity and schema operate in a univocal or 
objective manner so as ensure objective truths.  Rather, each field configures its notion of 
identity and schema differently so that the spheres of certainty and uncertainty vary from 
one system to another. To put it differently, certainty and uncertainty are contingent upon 
the discursive practices that a community employs to represent things.  By analyzing how 
a particular field of scholarship configures its notions of identity and schema one can 
understand how it circumscribes and re-appropriates uncertainty.  
 In order to examine how Muslims jurists develop their concepts of identity and 
schema with respect to the representation of gharar, I have adopted the discourse analysis 
of Michel Foucault. Generally, people associate Foucault with the sustained analysis and 
critique of issues of hegemony and domination. To be sure, he is interested in the relation 
between discourse and non-discursive systems of authority. However, discourse analysis 
offers a nuanced approach to analyzing the conception of representation. Or within the 
terms of this study, it reveals the configuration of the elements of a system of 
representation: its referents, concepts, modes of analysis, and the role of the subject.  
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 Discourse analysis does not treat these elements as static and univocal givens that 
perdure across time, space, and different fields of learning. In fact, discourse analysis 
rejects notions like tradition and oeuvre that serve as black boxes to homogenize 
discourses. Furthermore, discourse analysis does not claim to provide an objective 
viewpoint outside of discourse. Rather, the scholar dives into discourse in order to define 
the contours of a particular field through its recurring elements. In turn, these recurring 
elements form the points where differences can be elaborated among participants of a 
particular community.19        
My study begins within a number of inherited unities like gharar, madhhab, and 
the genres of Islamic law and their supposed hierarchical relationships. In this study, I 
rely on the works of Ibn Ḥazm, Bājī, Sarakhsī, Shīrāzī, Ibn Rushd, and Ibn Qudāma to 
examine gharar and more general formulations of uncertainty. Nevertheless, as Aron 
Zysow notes in his study of uṣūl al-fiqh, the study of Islamic law along school lines has 
nothing to recommend it except ease.20 My analysis localizes the discursive unity that 
enables debates about gharar across boundaries of the madhhabs, or schools of law. Even 
when a jurist rejects an element of the discursive unity that constitutes gharar, he must 
tacitly acknowledge it in order to formulate his critique. For example, below we will see 
that Ibn Ḥazm denies that uncertainty with respect to the ability to deliver a good causes 
gharar. However, due to the importance of this form of uncertainty for all other jurists in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19  For his clearest articulation of discourse analysis, see Michel Foucault, The 
Archaeology of Knowledge, tr. A.M Sheridan Smith (New York: Vintage Books, 1972).  
 
 20 Zysow, Economy, p 196. 
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their analyses of gharar, he cannot simply fail to mention this form of uncertainty as a 
cause of gharar. Rather, he must offer a strident critique of it.  
Similarly, my study cuts across the hierarchical relationship generally posited to 
govern the association of uṣūl al-fiqh and fiqh. Throughout this study, I will have 
recourse to works of uṣūl al-fiqh, Islamic theology, logic and Arabic philosophy to shed 
light on my larger questions about the representation of uncertainty. The scholars whose 
works I examine are some of the most celebrated thinkers in Islamic intellectual history. 
They detail their notions of representation along Aristotelian lines in their works of the 
aforementioned genres as we will see in later chapters. Admittedly, these scholars never 
explicitly state that they adopt this model of representation to discuss gharar or other 
areas of fiqh.  
One thus might criticize the use of this Aristotelian model to examine gharar as a 
forced and contrived reading of my sources. However, as I have already noted, there is no 
objective vantage point outside of discourse. Models of representation mediate all 
research. The best that one can do is to be explicit about the model employed, justify its 
use, and employ it to come to a more nuanced and systematic understanding of a topic. 
The fact that discussions of gharar do not follow this Aristotelian model perfectly is not a 
failing on the parts of our jurists to organize all of their scholarship into a flawless unity. 
Furthermore, this Aristotelian model of representation provides an important 
terminological and conceptual framework with which to begin the analysis of the 
representation of uncertainty in discussions of gharar.21   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21  In a thought provoking article, Drucilla Cornell argues that scholars of Common Law 
should know Continental philosophy since it often provides the most “sophisticated” means to 
	  	   20	  
More generally, gharar touches on issues of ontology and language. Although 
pre-modern Muslim scholars elaborate theories of ontology and language in works of 
kalām, uṣūl al-fiqh, logic, and philosophy, this does not guarantee that these theoretical 
fields directly influence the elaboration of gharar. By the post-formative period of law, 
most Sunnī scholars, such as those examined in this study, subscribed to a position of 
theological occasionalism that argued against the ontological contingency of events and 
determinacy of reality. Nevertheless, when it comes to discussions of Islamic commercial 
law, jurists generally argue for a high level of determinacy and contingency in goods and 
transactions. Islamic commercial law thus has its own unique views on reality, thought, 
and language which this study will attempt to uncover and analyze.   
The question inevitably arises as to why the same scholars would have a 
particular view on reality and representation when it comes to theology and a contrary 
view on these issues when it comes to commercial law. Although a thorough examination 
of this question is beyond the scope of this study, the general answer might invoke terms 
like pragmatism and ideology to thereby argue that as jurists, scholars must be 
pragmatists or at most social engineers trying to make a better society, but as theologians, 
they must be strident ideologues who police the borders of orthodoxy.  Admittedly, 
Islamic law does interact and mold society in ways that theology does not. Discussions of 
gharar attempt to shape the contours of commerce, which would affect society at large. 
Furthermore, some forms of legal reasoning, such as istiṣlāḥ, explicitly forgo textually 
based legal rulings in favor of rulings that address some pragmatic good. Thus, scholars 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
analyze a contemporary legal problem. Drucilla Cornell, “Institutionalization of Meaning, 
Recollective Imagination and the Potential for Transformative Legal Interpretation,” The 
University of Pennsylvania Law Review 136, no. 4 (April 1988), pp. 1135-1137.  
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would need one view of reality when they were acting as jurists trying to shape society, 
and another view of reality when they were propounding theology.  
Although the distinction between ideology and pragmatism as a means to 
differentiate the intellectual pursuits of scholars undoubtedly has a great deal of 
explicative power in many areas of scholarship, it is not completely satisfactory in the 
context of Islam. The line between pragmatism and ideology is not clear-cut. In fact, 
pragmatism must have its own ideology to classify the values and goals that will be 
pursued. As theologians, scholars probably think that their work has the ultimate 
pragmatic goal–salvation. On the other hand, as jurists, scholars probably would 
recognize certain larger ideological commitments in their elaboration of something as 
seemingly worldly and mundane as gharar and commercial law.   
 As stated above, the views on representation that jurists propound in their 
discussions of gharar differentiate commercial law from other fields of their scholarship. 
More specifically, the dissonances between the model of representation that grounds 
discussions of gharar and the Aristotelian model of representation points to the unique 
discursive practices that individuate gharar and Islamic commercial law from other areas 
of Islamic scholarship. Although the representation of gharar forms the focus of this 
study, scholars of Islamic intellectual history would undoubtedly benefit from a similar 
study of areas of Islamic scholarship to find new parallels and dissonances. 
 
V. Secondary Scholarship 
 In general, Islamic commercial law suffers from an interesting poverty and 
richness of scholarship. On the one hand, its poverty reflects a general disinterest among 
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contemporary Western scholars of Islam for the study of commercial law. To be sure, 
scholars like Baber Johansen, Abraham Udovitch, and Hiroyuki Yanagihashi have 
produced a number of excellent and thoughtful studies on aspects of Islamic commercial 
law. However, the quantitative interest in the study of Islamic commercial law pales in 
comparison to the quantity of scholarship devoted to topics like the origins of Islamic 
law, ḥadīth, uṣūl al-fiqh, issues of ritual purity, and prayer.  The current patterns of 
secondary scholarship reflect—either implicitly or explicitly—notions about the 
essence(s) of Islam and Islamic law.22 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 22 For example, Joseph Schacht remarks, “Islamic law is the epitome of Islamic thought, 
the most typical manifestation of the Islamic way of life the core and kernel of Islam itself. The 
very term fiqh, “knowledge,” shows that early Islam regarded knowledge of the sacred Law as the 
knowledge par excellence… it is impossible to understand Islam without understanding Islamic 
law.” Admittedly, Schacht acknowledges that Sufism has challenged the dominance of Islamic 
law at various points, but he claims that all other Islamic discourses are ultimately grounded and 
deciphered through law. Schacht, “Introduction,” 1. Hallaq employs this quotation to not only 
essentialize the link between Islamic law and Islam, but to also essentialize the West, 
Christianity, modernity, and “Semitic” piety. Hallaq, “‘Muslim Rage’ and Islamic Law,” 
Hastings Law Journal 54 (2003), 1706-1708, 1715-1716. Similarly, Richard Bulliet remarks that, 
“It cannot be said too often that the law, the sharī‘a, is the fullest expression of Islam. The heart 
of Islam is the Qur’ān, God’s word, and the messenger through whom it was transmitted to 
mankind, Muḥammad. The sharī ‘a is the interpretation of the Qur’ān and Muḥammad’s personal 
statements.” He then states that the Sharī‘a corresponds to the Western notion of law with the 
addition of religious ritual. Explicitly this passage argues for the supremacy of Islamic law on the 
basis of the sources it employs. However, that reason is insufficient in itself since a number of 
other discourses employ the same sources. Implicit in this statement, however, is the notion that 
law has political authority, which ensures its supremacy. Furthermore, the passage divides law 
into a Western analog, which implicitly Western scholars of Islamic law can ignore, and ritual 
where one finds the essence of Islam and Islamic law. Richard Bulliet, The Patricians of 
Nishapur: A Study in Medieval Islamic Social History (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1972), 28-29. For critiques of this irenic construction and study of Islam and Islamic law, see 
Lama Abu-Odeh, “The Politics of (Mis)recognition: Islamic Law Pedagogy in American 
Academy,” The American Journal of Comparative Law 52, no. 4 (2004), 789-824; Lena 
Salaymeh, “Commodifying “Islamic Law” in the U.S. Legal Academy,” Journal of Legal 
Education (May 2014). In an introduction to his recent study, Hallaq has attempted to critique 
discourse on Islamic law, but the rest of the work is reflective of his earlier scholarship that 
reveals an essentializing understanding of Islam and Islamic law. Hallaq, Sharī‘a: Theory, 
Practice, Transformations  (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009),1-23.  
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 On the other hand, Islamic commercial law has attracted an abundance of interest 
from another group—bankers, economists, lawyers, and contemporary Muslim scholars 
who are concerned with finance, commercial ethics, apologetics, and polemics. Over the 
past several decades, this heterogeneous group of scholars and financial professionals has 
produced a large amount of scholarship about Islamic commercial law, regularly holds 
conferences, and has a number of trade groups. They have even produced several very 
thought provoking studies on gharar.   
 Notwithstanding the interest and importance of this group’s contribution to the 
study of Islamic commercial law, my study sidesteps their contributions due to 
methodological considerations. In large measure, these are practitioners engaged in 
regulatory arbitrage, which engineers pre-modern Islamic commercial contracts to 
conform to currently accepted financial contracts and investment vehicles.23 This 
scholarship thus creates a new discursive formation that subsumes Islamic commercial 
law to contemporary conceptions and institutions of conventional finance. The 
reconfiguration of Islamic commercial law merits attention due to the interesting ways 
that it relates to the economic development of the Middle East, rise of a middle class of 
Muslim investors, and contemporary discourses about modernity, religious identity, and 
economics.24 However, those projects fall outside of the scope of the research questions 
elaborated for this study.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 23  Mahmoud el-Gamal has analyzed and critiqued this phenomenon. For further details, 
Mahmoud el-Gamal, Islamic Finance pp. 35-45.  
 
24 For examples of discussions of gharar within the discursive framework of 
contemporary finance, see Hennie Van Greuning and Zamir Iqbal, Risk Analysis for Islamic 
Banks (Washington D.C.: The World Bank, 2008); Muhammad al-Bashir Muhammad al-Amine, 
Risk Management in Islamic Finance: An Analysis of Derivatives Instruments in Commodity 
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In this study, I avoid a teleological analysis of gharar, which would dissipate the 
differences between discourses through a variety of black boxes. Gharar does not convey 
the secret intentions of the earliest jurists or a Weltanschauung that animates them. At the 
same time, gharar does not conform to contemporary notions of financial risk or 
conversely reveal a fundamental gap between modern and pre-modern legal and financial 
systems. Although I discuss contemporary notions of financial risk and their relation to 
gharar at various points in this study, gharar and contemporary notions of financial risk 
are two extremely different discourses.   
Finally, my generalization about the lack of academic scholarship on gharar has 
one important exception that still conforms to many of my preceding generalizations 
about research on Islamic commercial law. Recently, Siddīq Muḥammad al-Amīn al-
Ḍarīr, the former Head of the Islamic Sharī‘a Department at the University of Khartoum 
and former Chairman of the Sharī‘a Board of the al-Baraka Bank of Sudan, translated and 
published his 1967 dissertation entitled, Gharar: Impact on Contract in Islamic Fiqh. 
The work situates itself at an interesting intersection between academic research and 
modern Islamic finance. It presents pre-modern and modern discussions of gharar across 
all of the schools of law with extensive translations of relevant primary sources. The 
preface to the book states that it was translated and published to be a reference work for 
Muslim and non-Muslim researchers of Islamic finance.25 Although its highly systematic 
organization and survey of a wide number of sources make it an invaluable starting point 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Markets (Boston: Leiden, 2008); Simon Archer, Rifaat Ahmed and Abdel Karim, Islamic 
Finance and the New Regulatory Challenge, 2nd ed. (Singapore: John Wiley and Sons, 2013).  
 
25 Siddīq Muḥammad al-Amīn al-Ḍarīr, Gharar: Impact on Contract in Islamic Fiqh 
(Riyad: Al-Baraka Bank Group, 2012), p. 3.  
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for research on gharar, this work does not relate gharar and uncertainty to the larger 
issues of representation that interest me. In fact, the work’s style along with the fact that 
the author occasionally indicates his legal preferences makes this work seem more 
reminiscent of work of furū‘ al-fiqh, a handbook of positive law, than an academic study.  
 
VI. Jurists and Merchants  
 One would like to know the extent to which gharar maps onto the notions of risk 
that pre-modern merchants relied on in their actual commercial practices. An answer to 
this question would offer important insight into the wider relationship of jurists to other 
segments of society. It is tempting to segment some points of jurists’ discussions on 
topics like value and credit risk and then map those topics onto the concerns of merchants 
to the extent that they can be identified. One might even justify this approach with the 
claim that many jurists came from families involved in commerce so that jurists were 
aware of the commercial needs and practices of traders.   
 Such an approach would, however, impoverish our understanding of both Islamic 
law and the practices of merchants from a number of perspectives. First, notwithstanding 
the fact that both groups share certain concerns, like whether a counterparty will deliver a 
good or make a payment in the future, it would be incorrect to assume that the discourse 
of each group is the same. As we will see, jurists primarily correlate the potential delivery 
of a good with its fungibility on the assumption that fungible goods can be easily 
acquired to settle a contract. In their discussions about the requirements for a legally valid 
contract, jurists do not discuss the creditworthiness of counterparties to the contracts. 
Jurists discuss and analyze the solvency of a counterparty only in cases of bankruptcy. 
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On the other hand, merchants probably thought about the risk of delivery or payment 
primarily in terms of a counterparty’s creditworthiness.  
 Second, there are important differences in the kinds of risks that each group 
analyzes. My jurists have almost no interest in the market risk that merchants face. Due 
to a paucity of sources, we do not know how pre-modern Muslim merchants conceived of 
the risks that they faced is largely unknown. Fortunately, the Cairo Geniza has provided 
some illuminating insight into the actual business practices of pre-modern Jewish 
merchants. Although one cannot assume that the discursive practices of Jewish merchants 
and Muslim merchants were identical, it seems reasonable to assume that there was 
considerable overlap between the conceptions of risk between the two groups of 
merchants. In her recent study of Geniza documents of Jewish traders in the eleventh 
century, Jessica Goldberg demonstrates that most letters between merchants list prices of 
goods. Notwithstanding the fact that merchants seldom lost money due to the volatility of 
market prices, they monitored prices to determine how to allocate their capital. More 
importantly, these letters offer important insight into the logistical risks that traders faced 
to acquire, process, transport, and sell goods.26 Although jurists recognize these logistical 
risks to varying degrees during their discussions of the salam contract, which I will 
discuss in the second chapter, these risks do not constitute a focus of legal discussion.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 26 Jessica Goldberg, Trade and Institutions in the Medieval Mediterranean: The Geniza 
Merchants and Their Business World (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 84-85; 99-
118.  
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Ultimately, jurists are not pre-modern financial advisors elaborating a theory of 
capital allocation according to some ethical norms.27 Undoubtedly, discussions of gharar 
have implications for any understanding of capital allocation. Nevertheless, gharar is 
primarily a tool used in the fashioning of a theory of the legal validity of contracts. 
Furthermore, in so far as obeying or disobeying laws serves as an index of someone’s 
moral standing, discussions about gharar are ethical.  However, the forms of uncertainty 
that Muslim jurists proscribe do not seem to reveal the particularly unique moral and 
religious character of Islamic commercial law. It would be surprising to find a legal or 
commercial system that does not concern itself with delineating the forms of knowledge 
that counterparties need with respect to the good. Rather, the discursive practices that 
Muslims jurists use to define gharar reveal the unique character of Muslims jurists’ 
notions of commercial risk.   
 
VII. Outline of This Study 
 In the first chapter, I briefly contextualize the post-formative jurists and their 
various writings that I use in this study. In the remaining chapters, I will pursue the 
analysis of gharar in expanding concentric circles to reveal how certainty creates and 
subsumes uncertainty. In the second chapter, I analyze the discursive systems that jurists 
employ in order to conceptualize the finite forms of uncertainty associated with gharar.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27  Ibn Qudāma makes one of the few overt statements that I could find about the relation 
of gharar to capital allocation. Ibn Qudāma advises guardians to invest the funds of orphan in 
real-estate since it has less gharar than trade. He then suggests that they should invest in 
buildings made of baked bricks rather than mud brick since the latter are sturdier. ‘Abd Allāh b. 
Aḥmad b. Muḥammad b. Qudāma, Al-Mughnī, ed. Ṭaha Muḥammad al-Zaynī, 10 vols. (Cairo: 
Maktabat al-Qāhira, 1968), vol. 4, p. 181, ¶. 3106. 
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In the remaining chapters, I examine how jurists employ these forms of uncertainty to 
analyze specific transactions. The third chapter discusses a small constellation of 
transactions that involve gharar in order to underscore the role of privation in the 
representation of gharar. In the fourth chapter, I examine the ways that jurists employ 
analogical reasoning to represent and analyze the gharar associated with transactions. 
Finally, in the fifth chapter, I examine the hermeneutics of gharar, which creates a form 
of uncertainty that I call aporetic uncertainty. This aporetic uncertainty points to the 
contradictions in notions of representation that organize Islamic commercial law. More 
importantly, this aporetic uncertainty undermines any fixed point that would ensure a 
stable distribution of terms like objectivity, subjectivity, certainty, and uncertainty.    
 Finally, my general question about the relationship of certainty, uncertainty, and 
representation has profound consequences for any understanding of representation. This 
study draws into question any view that uncertainty and the unknown are the passive 
givens from which we advance in a linear and teleological path to certainty.  
Uncertainty—whether associated with gharar or other fields of learning— is not a simple 
contrary to certainty or a given that can simply be overcome to reach complete 
knowledge. Discursive knowledge actively creates uncertainty by explicitly and 
implicitly setting the parameters on how representation functions.  
Nevertheless, the fact that discursive knowledge creates uncertainty does not 
mean that uncertainty and gharar lack an objective quality. Indeed, gharar allows 
counterparties to make certain accurate and objective statements and judgments as 
mentioned previously. In a more interesting sense, the discourse of gharar has an 
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objective quality that one can only begin to appreciate after analyzing the various 
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Chapter One 
The Role of Uncertainty in the Construction of the Identity of Jurists 
 
Like other studies of Islamic intellectual history, I begin my study of gharar by 
briefly contextualizing the scholars whose works I will examine. I have selected the 
works of Ibn Ḥazm, Bājī, Sarakhsī, Shīrāzī, Ibn Rushd, and Ibn Qudāma since each of 
them is an important post-formative representative of one of the major madhhabs, or 
schools of law. Each of these jurists wrote least one work of furū‘ al-fiqh, or positive law, 
and one work of uṣūl al-fiqh, or legal theory. In fact, for most of these jurists, their works 
of furū‘ al-fiqh became major touchstones for the commentaries and digests of later 
jurists.   
This chapter, however, aims to provide more than an overview of the scholars and 
works employed in this study. In terms of the topic and methodology of this study– a 
discursive analysis of uncertainty– this chapter will examine the role that uncertainty 
plays in the formation of the institutional identity of jurists. Modern Western scholars of 
Islam have devoted the majority of their research to examining the role of certainty and 
more broadly knowledge in the formation of the identity of Muslim scholars. Their 
analyses rely primarily on biographical dictionaries; the genre par excellence for the 
claims of knowledge that legitimize the authority of jurists. 
 Modern Western scholars of Islam, however, generally neglect the role that 
uncertainty played in the formation of the identities of jurists and other groups of 
scholars. At most, modern Western scholars discuss the role that uncertainty in terms of 
the elaboration of several important theological and legal platforms, like abstaining from 
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declaring fellow Muslims infidels (takfīr) and explaining God and His workings (bi-lā 
kayf) as non-cognitivism. In these cases, pre-modern Muslim scholars invoked 
uncertainty as both a pragmatic and pious means to avoid making statements that 
encouraged and led to divisive behavior among jurists and non-jurists. Modern Western 
scholars of Islam also discuss uncertainty in its more extreme and negative form of 
ignorance as a means to examine how a group differentiates itself from other groups. For 
example, both Muslims and Western scholars employ the term “ignorance” to 
differentiate the Pre-Islamic and Islamic periods. In this case, the term ignorance serves 
to differentiate Muslims and non-Muslims. 
In this chapter, I will examine how uncertainty structures and legitimizes the 
identity and intellectual production of Muslim scholars. Admittedly, uncertainty may take 
the form of a naïve innocence or momentary error that serves as starting point for the 
eventual acquisition of certainty, such as in the case of students. In more interesting 
cases, jurists also acknowledge that uncertainty is an irresoluble product and a driving 
force of their intellectual production due to indeterminacy inherent to language. Indeed, 
like the uncertainty associated with gharar, jurists indicate that discourse gives rise to 
forms of uncertainty that are an indissoluble product of representation.   
Below, I will first briefly examine how the biographical tradition portrays the 
post-formative jurists of this study as masters of a largely certain intellectual tradition. 
The certainty that legitimizes the institutional authority of jurists has several important 
qualities that in part structure the narrative techniques that biographical dictionaries 
employ. Then, I will examine the works of furū‘ al-fiqh and uṣūl al-fiqh to detail the 
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different roles that uncertainty plays in the formation of jurists’ institutional identity and 
intellectual production.  
 
I. The Post-Formative Period and Institutionalization of Law 
 By the middle of the fifth/eleventh century, or post-formative period in the 
formation of Islamic law, the major Sunnī schools of legal thought had become 
institutionalized such that a jurist had to affiliate with one. Even Ibn Ḥazm, whose 
affiliation with the largely defunct Ẓāhirīs is problematic for reasons that I will explore 
below, was the product of the schools of law and invested in their institutionalization on 
some level. The schools of law developed and employed standardized curricula for the 
training of jurists in the schools’ sizeable bodies of positive law and legal theory. Each 
school also had local leaders who oversaw the members of the school and represented the 
school in its official interactions with rulers.28  
Due to the institutionalization of the schools of law, a jurist had to ground his 
legal positions within the discursive practices of his school’s legal thought. This meant 
not merely knowing the school’s positions on cases, but also its methods of reasoning and 
argumentation, the concepts that the school employed, and the intellectual and literary 
history of the school. Through the configuration of these different elements, a jurist 
created and legitimized his legal positions. The need to master these different discursive 
elements led to the development of a number of important legal genres, like the ṭabaqāt, 
jadl, uṣūl al-fiqh, khilāf, mukhtaṣar and mabsūṭ, or respectively biographical dictionaries, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 28 Wael Hallaq, The Origins and Evolution of Islamic Law (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005), pp. 1-3. 
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dialectics, jurisprudence, disputed case, digests of works of positive law, and expansive 
works of positive law.29 I will examine the last four of these genres below in more detail 
due to their importance in this study and the legal tradition as a whole. 
 The process of institutionalization, however, did not merely turn these schools 
into the official ivory towers of Islam. The schools of law also became important vehicles 
for social and economic mobility such as in the case of Shīrāzī and Bājī. On the other 
hand, the schools enabled elite families to pass on their status over generations such as in 
the case of Ibn Rushd and Ibn Ḥazm. Furthermore, jurists interacted with and in many 
cases formed part of the political elite as we will see with Ibn Ḥazm, Ibn Rushd, and 
Shīrāzī.30 By the mid-tenth century, there was a complete judicial system, and the law 
schools trained the professionals who staffed its various judicial positions. The authority 
of the law schools become so entrenched that one could not hold a position of judicial 
authority without membership in a major law school.31  
During the beginning of the post-formative period of law, the political elite also 
began to patronize the schools of law by endowing madrasas, libraries, salaried positions 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 29 Christopher Melchert, The Formation of the Sunni Schools of Law, 9th-10th Centuries 
C.E. (New York: Brill, 1997), pp.  60-67, 87.  For a discussion of these genres and their role in 
the institutionalization of the schools of law, see George Makdisi, The Rise of Colleges: 
Institutions of Learning in Islam and the West (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1981), 
pp. 107-122.  
 
30 For a further discussion of the role that law schools played in the formation of elite 
families, see Michael Chamberlain, “The Production of Knowledge and the Reproduction of the 
A‘yān in Medieval Damascus,” in Madrasas: La Transmission du Savoir dans le Monde 
Musulman. ed. M. Gaborieau and N. Grandin (Paris: Arguments, 1997),pp. 1-36. Bulliet notes the 
importance of education for the formation of the elite, but on the whole thinks that social mobility 
through learning was more unusual in Nishapur. Richard Bulliet, The Patricians, pp. 56-58.  	   31	  Wael Hallaq, Sharī’a: Theory, Practice, Transformations (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2009), pp. 60-71; 146-158. 	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for teachers, and stipends and accommodations for students. Although the establishment 
of an endowment was typically framed as an act of piety, it also ensured the consolidation 
of the patronized schools and created a web of bonds between jurists and other elite. Just 
as importantly, the same elite culture bound both jurists and political elite. Generally 
when thinking about the culture of the ruling elite, belletristic prose and poetry come to 
mind. Nevertheless, many of the doyens of Arabic belletristic were deeply invested in the 
elaboration and defense of particular religious values. For example, James Montgomery 
reads Jāhiẓ’s (255/868 or 869) Kitāb al-Bayān wa’l-Tabyīn as a theological polemic 
rather than merely as an early work of literary criticism. 32 Similarly, Joseph Lowry reads 
the oeuvre Ibn Qutayba (d. 276/889) as an attempt to unite many fields of learning into 
Arabo-Islamic intellectual tradition that would appeal to elite and religious scholars with 
a more traditionalist leaning.33 To varying degrees, the jurists and ruling elite were 
invested in the elaboration and preservation of various aspects of this elite culture, which 
bound them together across time and space. Admittedly, under earlier rulers, who were 
native speakers of Arabic, patronage of Arabic belles-lettres was stronger. Nevertheless, 
even non-Arab rulers remained indirectly invested in this elite culture by patronizing the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Generally speaking, Montgomery rejects the distinction between literature and 
religious discourse that structures much contemporary Western scholarship on Islam and Arabic. 
James Montgomery, “Al-Jāhiẓ’s Kitāb al-Bayān wa’l-tabyīn,” in Writing and Representation in 
Medieval Islam: Muslim Horizons, ed. Julia Bray (New York: Routledge, 2006), pp. 91-94. On 
the other hand, Thomas Bauer argues that during early Islam, religious scholars and littérateurs 
were more differentiated groups, but by the post-Seljuq era that these two groups identities and 
intellectual interests merged. Thomas Bauer, “Mamluk Literature: Misunderstandings and New 
Approaches,” in Mamluk Studies Review 9:2 (2005), pp. 108-111.       	  	   33	  Joseph Lowry, “The Legal Hermeneutics of al-Shāfi‘ī and Ibn Qutayba: A 
Reconsideration,” Islamic Law and Society 11:1 (2004), pp. 5-6.  
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religious scholars who continued to write in Arabic and transmit the Arabic intellectual 
tradition.     
 This is not to say that jurists and leaders had a totally unproblematic and peaceful 
relationship. Sarakhsī spent years in prison after incurring the ire of a local leader, as we 
will see. Nevertheless, the occasional cases of bad relations generally affirm the 
importance that each group had for the other. Indeed, even jurists who avoided judicial 
positions could wield immense authority among both the ruling elite and general 
population on the basis of these jurists’ reputations for learning and piety. Although the 
extent to which the government imposed the legal views of jurists as the official law of 
the land is debated among modern scholars of Islamic law, what seems less ambiguous is 
the fact that rulers acknowledged the religious authority of jurists with policies that 
ranged from the conciliatory, such as with the establishment of endowments, to the 
draconian with imprisonment.       
 
II. The Jurists, Biography, and Institutional Authority 
 In large measure, biographical dictionaries, or ṭabaqāt, inform our understanding 
of individual jurists and schools of law.34 At first glance, this genre appears to be simply 
collections of formulaic biographical notices about members of specific groups, like 
jurists, doctors, and Sufis. However, in the hands of a scholar with a sensitive eye and 
creative mind, these biographical dictionaries have offered important insights into many 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Chase Robinson distinguishes between biographies proper, such as with the genre of 
the sīra, and biographical dictionaries, which he refers to as prosopography. For further details 
about these genres and their relations, see, Chase F. Robinson, Islamic Historiography (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 55-74.   
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of the intellectual trends and social institutions that formed the fabric of the pre-modern 
Islamic world. For example, Christopher Melchert skillfully employs numerous 
biographical dictionaries to reconstruct the development and institutional structure of the 
major schools of law.35 Furthermore, the formulaic nature of this genre has made it fertile 
ground for statistical and computer-based methods of analysis.36  
Biographical dictionaries often portray people in highly formulaic terms.37 
Michael Cooperson argues that the biography dictionary schematizes the portrayal of 
people in order to suggest interchangeability of all members of a group. The 
interchangeability of all members of a group ensures the continuity of a school’s 
knowledge and authority.38 In the cases of jurists and those who worked within the wider 
constellation of the Islamic religious sciences, a biographical dictionary demonstrates that 
a particular group is heir to the Prophet through the group’s knowledge.39  Furthermore, 
although most biographical dictionaries rely upon and cite earlier biographical works 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Melchert, Formation. More generally, Richard Bulliet has used biographical 
dictionaries to analyze the patterns of conversion and spread of Islam.  
 
36 For an examples of this method of analysis, see, Monique Bernards, “Grammarians’ 
Circles of Learning: Social Network Analysis,” in ‘Abbasid Studies II: Occasional Papers of the 
School of ‘Abbasid Studies Leuven 28 June-1July 2004, ed. John Nawas (Leuven: Peeters, 2010), 
pp. 142-164; Richard Bulliet, Conversion to Islam in the Medieval Period: An Essay in 
Quantitative History (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979).   
 
37 Earlier scholars of Islam and Arabic have claimed these dictionaries for their formulaic 
style. For an overview of this criticism as it relates to autobiographies, see Dwight Reynolds et. 
al, Interpreting the Self: Autobiography in the Arabic Literary Tradition (Los Angeles: University 
of California Press, 2001), 20-31. Likewise, Robinson argues that biographical dictionaries 
attempt to portray someone as a member of group. Robinson, Historiography, p. 62 
 
38 Reynolds, Interpreting, pp. 40-42; Michael Cooperson, Classical Arabic Biography: 
The Heirs of the Prophets in the Age of al-Ma’mūn (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2000), p. 8. 
 
39  Cooperson, Biography, pp. 6-18. 
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extensively, a sensitive literary analysis of a biographical dictionary often reveals the 
complex literary techniques that authors shape and redeploy earlier sources in order to 
support and develop their ideological commitments.40  
This is not to say that biographical dictionaries do not acknowledge and celebrate 
exceptional intellects or the differences of opinion among scholars. Each generation has 
its luminaries who legitimize the continuing relevance and authority of a school or some 
other group. The exceptional standing of a particular jurist– especially of post-formative 
jurists–derives from the depth and breadth of his mastery over a body of recognized 
knowledge, which was at least probabilistic if not certain. Often when discussing a 
prominent scholar, biographical dictionaries will mention contentious debates about 
unsettled and complex points of law and theology in which the scholar participated and 
generally is claimed to have won. The anecdotes about such debates, however, serve to 
prove the mastery of a scholar over a large and complex body of certain knowledge that 
he draws upon in order to craft his response to a debated point.  
On the other hand, a biographical dictionary may mention variant opinions 
(ikhtilāf) with respect of a case. However, by not dismissing these variant opinions, the 
biographical dictionary and school of law accord these variants opinions a certain validity 
and thus an epistemological status of probabilistic knowledge. Nevertheless, even in this 
situation, jurists still claim that each case has an objectively correct verdict, which is 
synonymous with God’s knowledge and will of the law.  Ultimately, it is certainty that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40  For examples of literary analyses of biographical dictionaries, see Fedwa Malti-
Douglas, “Controversy and Its Effects in the Biographical Traditions of al-Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī, in 
Studia Islamica 46 (1977): 115-131; Hilary Kilpatrick, “Time and Death in Compiled Adāb 
‘Biographies,’” in Al-Qanṭara 25, no. 2 (2004): pp. 387-412; Julia Bray, “Literary Approaches to 
Medieval and Early Modern Arabic Biography,” in Journal of the Royal Asiatic of Great Britain 
and Ireland 20, no. 3 (2010): pp. 237-253.  
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defines a jurists and school within biographical dictionaries. This certainty in turn 
legitimizes the authority of jurists within their schools and sometimes also political and 
judicial authority as we will see below.     
  
a. Ibn Ḥazm   
 The earliest and most eclectic scholar whose works I will examine in this study is 
the Andalusian jurist Abū Muḥammad ‘Alī b Aḥmad b. Sa‘īd Ibn Ḥazm (384/994-
456/1064). In his Mu‘jam al-Udabā‘, Yāqūt states that Ibn Ḥazm was as prolific and his 
interests as varied as those of Abū Ja‘far Muḥammad b. Jarīr al-Ṭabarī (224/839-
310/923), the great historian, jurist, and exegete.41  Besides writing works of law, Ibn 
Ḥazm wrote works of logic, heresiography, ethics, belles-lettres, history, and 
intrareligious and interreligious polemic.42 As a jurist, he started as a Shāfi‘ī jurist, 
migrated to the Mālikīs, and finally became a Ẓāhirī. 43 What it means for Ibn Ḥazm to 
refer to himself as a Ẓāhirī is ambiguous as I will explain below in more detail. 
  No less fascinating than his intellectual affiliations are his political affiliations. 
Ibn Ḥazm came from a prominent Cordovan family. His father served as the vizier for the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 Yāqūt b. ‘Abd Allāh al-Rūmī al-Ḥamawī, Mu‘jam al-udabā’, 5 vols. (Beirut: Dār al-
Kutub al-‘Ilmīya, 1991), vol. 3, p. 548. For further biographical details on al-Ṭabarī, see EI2, s.v. 
al-Ṭabarī.  
 
 42 Sa‘īd b. Aḥmad remarks that Ibn Ḥazm’s work on logic, al-Taqrīb li’l-ḥadd al-manṭiq, 
makes mistakes in the presentation of Aristotelian logic due to Ibn Ḥazm’s insistence on 
discussing legal topics in logic. Abū al-Qāsim Sa‘īd b. Aḥmad, Ṭabaqāt al-umam, ed. Maḥmūd 
‘Alī Ṣabīḥ (Cairo: al-Maktaba al-Maḥmudīya, 1900), pp. 101-102.  
 
 43 Abū ‘Abbās Shams al-Dīn Aḥmad b. Muḥammad b. Khallikān, Wafayāt al-a‘yān, ed. 
Iḥsan ‘Abbās, 8 vols. (Beirut: Dār al-Thaqāfa, 1968), vol. 3, pp. 325-326; Carl Brockelmann, 
Geschichte der Arabischen Litteratur, 2 vols. and supplement (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1937), sup. 1, 
pp. 692-694; EI2, s.v. Ibn Ḥazm; Yāqūt, Mu‘jam, vol. 3, pp. 547-548. 
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Andalusian Umayyads, but died in one of the court intrigues. Nevertheless, as a young 
man, Ibn Ḥazm remained an Umayyad loyalist. He joined ‘Abd al-Raḥmān IV al-
Murtaḍā (d. 408/ 1017) in Valencia and became his vizier. However, in 409/1019, Ibn 
Ḥazm was taken prisoner in a battle outside of Granada.  He was later released and  ‘Abd 
al-Raḥmān V al-Mustaẓhir (d. 414/1023) appointed him vizier in 414/1023. Roughly 
seven weeks after this appointment, ‘Abd al-Raḥmān V was assassinated.  In 418/1027, 
Hishām al-Mu‘tadd (r. 418/1027-422/1031) appointed Ibn Ḥazm as vizier.44  
The intellectual and political interests of Ibn Ḥazm did not form discrete domains. 
According to the biographical tradition, Ibn Ḥazm enjoyed debating jurists from other 
schools. Although debates were a common effect of the institutionalization of the schools 
of law and need to gain patronage, Ibn Ḥazm frequently broke with the spoken and 
unspoken rules of professional decorum to insult his opponents in the most scurrilous of 
terms–as one can see in his works of law. His abrasive personality earned him the ire of 
his opponents and supposedly led to his exile. In 430/1038, Ibn Ḥazm found his way to 




 My next jurist, the Mālikī Abū al-Walīd Sulaymān b. Khalaf al-Bājī (403/1012-
474/1081), supposedly single-handedly defeated Ibn Ḥazm in several debates that ended 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 44  Ibn Khallikān, Wafayāt, vol. 3, pp. 328-329; Brockelmann, Geschichte, sup. 1, p. 693; 
EI2, s.v. Ibn Ḥazm; Yāqūt, Mu‘jam, vol. 3, p. 547. 
 
 45 Brockelmann, Geschichte, sup. 1, p. 694; EI2, s.v. Ibn Ḥazm. 
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Ibn Ḥazm’s plans for an Andalusian Ẓāhirī school. According to Mālikī biographers, 
Bājī’s performance was so withering that Ibn Ḥazm retired from public life and his books 
were burnt throughout Andalus.46 By the time he retreated to Majorca, however, it seems 
questionable whether Ibn Ḥazm posed a substantial threat to the Mālikīs of Andalus. 
Nevertheless, considering how important Ibn Ḥazm’s intellectual contributions remained 
after his death, later Mālikīs may have exaggerated the importance of these debates in 
order to enhance the prestige of the Mālikī school and of Bājī.  
 Whatever the case, Bājī came from humble origins in Andalus. At the age of 
twenty-six, an impoverished Bājī left Andalus for the east where he spent the next 
thirteen years traveling around the Islamic heartlands. Besides studying with some of the 
most important Mālikī jurists of the East, he studied with the Shāfi‘ī jurist Shīrāzī, whose 
works I also use in this study.47 Although Bājī cites Shīrāzī’s views on legal theory, in 
Bājī’s discussions of gharar, he does not mention Shāfi‘ī views. 
 During his travels, Bājī was appointed as a judge, or qāḍī, of Aleppo. The sources 
unfortunately do not indicate what happened there and why he returned to Andalus.  
According to tradition, Bājī returned to Andalus as poor as when he left it. Initially he 
earned a living hammering gold, but over time his reputation spread among the elites who 
employed him for diplomatic missions to the various rulers of Andalus. Although 
biographers state that he became head of the Mālikīs of Andalus and died a wealthy and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 46 EI2, s.v. al-Bājī; Ibrāhīm b. ‘Alī b. Farḥūn,  Al-Dībāj al-mudhabbab fī ma‘rifat a‘yān 
ulamā’ al-madhhab, ed. Ma’mūn b. Muḥyī al-Dīn al-Jannān (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-‘Ilmīya, 
1996), pp. 198-199, no. 240; Muḥammad b. Muḥammad Makhlūf, Shajarat Al-Nūr al-zakīya fī 
ṭabaqāt al-mālikīya, 2 vols. in 1 (Beirut: Dār al-Kitāb al-‘Arabī, 1970), vol. 1, pp. 120-121, no. 
341.  
47  EI2, s.v. al-Bājī; Ibn Farḥūn,  Dībāj, p. 197, no. 240; Ibn Makhlūf, Shajara, vol. 1, pp. 
120-121, no. 341. 
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famous scholar, he supposedly held judgeships only in small towns.48 The insignificance 
of these judgeships raises questions about the actual political and legal influence that Bājī 
wielded during his lifetime. It is possible that later biographers embellished their 
descriptions of him in order to provide a suitable pedigree for one of the most important 
jurists of the school.   
 
c. Shīrāzī 
 As mentioned previously, Bājī studied with the eminent Shāfi‘ī jurist, ascetic, and 
theologian Abū Isḥāq Ibrāhīm b. ‘Alī b. Yusūf al-Firūzābādī al-Shīrāzī (393/1003-
476/1083). Like Bājī, Shīrāzī came from humble origins, but unlike Bājī, Shīrāzī 
assuredly become one of the most important jurists of the Shāfi‘ī school during his own 
lifetime. Shīrāzī was a prolific scholar who wrote some of the most important works to be 
produced in the Shāfi‘ī school. Besides writing works of uṣūl al-fiqh and fiqh, he also 
wrote one of the most important biographical dictionaries of the Shāfi‘īs, a work of 
dialectics, or jadal, and a work on the disputed points of law, or ikhtilāf. This 
constellation of genres forms the foundation of the scholastic method, which trained 
jurists to define and defend legal positions of their school.49 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 48 EI2, s.v. al-Bājī; Ibn Farḥūn, Dībāj, p. 198, no. 240; Ibn Khallikān, Wafayāt, vol. 3, pp. 
328-329; Ibn Makhlūf, Shajara, vol. 1, pp. 120-121, no. 341. 
 
 49 EI2, s.v. al-Shīrāzī; Tāj al-Dīn al-Subkī, Ṭabaqāt al-Shāfi‘īya al-kubrā, ed. A.M al-
Ḥilw and M.M. al-Ṭinnāḥī, 10 vols. (Cairo: Al-Ḥalabī, 1964), vol. 4, pp. 215-229. It is not that 
surprising that Ibn ‘Aqīl and Shīrāzī have similar literary outputs considering the fact that Shīrāzī 
was the teacher of Ibn ‘Aqīl and both lived in Baghdad. For further details on scholasticism and 
its rise in the schools of law, see George Makdisi, Colleges, pp. 105-140. For a critique of 
Makdisi’s theory of role and function of the madrasa, see Michael Chamberlain, “Production,” 
pp. 28-62. For a list of Shīrāzī’s works and a partial chronology of them, see  Brockelmann, 
Geschichte, sup. 1, p. 670.  
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 The fact that Shīrāzī devoted so much energy to elaborating and defending the 
Shāfi‘ī school is unsurprising. The biographical tradition portrays him as one of the most 
important Shāfi‘ī teachers during his own lifetime. Niẓām al-Mulk (d. 485/1092), the 
famous Saljūqid vizier, built and endowed the Niẓāmīya Madrasa in Baghdad specifically 
for Shīrāzī. Notwithstanding the fact that Shīrāzī initially rejected the appointment, he 
accepted it in 459/1066 and held the position until his death. Although it is a common 
topos in biographical literature for early jurists to eschew rulers and the entanglements of 
official appointments, in the case of Shīrāzī this should be taken with a grain of salt.  By 
this period, jurists were judges, courtiers, and their biographers discuss these 
relationships with rulers in order to illustrate the legitimacy of the school. Indeed, 
Mathieu Tillier argues that these refusals played an important social role in establishing 
the independence and legitimacy of a jurist as a judge.50  Furthermore, in the case of 
Shīrāzī, the great Shāfi‘ī biographer Subkī (d. 1370) goes so far as to say that Shīrāzī 
played a pivotal role in the ascension of the ‘Abbāsid Caliph al-Muqtaḍī (r. 467-
487/1075-1094).51 
 
d. Ibn Rushd 
 Abū al-Walīd Muḥammad b. Aḥmad b. Muḥammad b. Rushd al-Ḥafīd (520/1198-
595/1261), also called Averroës, is best known in the West for his major contributions to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 Mathieu Tillier, Les Cadis d’Iraq et l’État Abbasside (Damascus: Institut Français du 
Proche-Orient, 2009), pp. 252-282.  
 
 51 EI2, s.v. al-Shīrāzī; Subkī, Ṭabaqāt, vol. 4, pp. 215-229.   
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medicine and Aristotelian philosophy.52 In addition to being a philosopher, he was an 
important Mālikī jurist who came from a family of prominent Cordovan jurists. In 1169, 
through the intercession of Ibn Ṭufayl (d. 581/ 1185-6), the author of the philosophical 
novel Ḥayy b. Yaqẓān and court physician of the Almohads, Ibn Rushd obtained an 
interview with the Almohad ruler Abū Ya‘qūb Yūsuf (r. 558/1163-580/1184).53 This 
interview blossomed into a long-term relationship between Ibn Rushd and the Almohad 
ruler, who was interested in philosophy. In 1169, Ibn Rushd was appointed as a qāḍī in 
Seville and in 1171 he became one in Cordoba.  In 1182, he succeeded Ibn Ṭufayl as the 
court physician to Abū Ya‘qūb Yūsuf and later became the Chief Qāḍī of Cordoba.   
 Notwithstanding this success, in 1195, the Almohad Caliph al-Manṣūr (r. 580-
595/1184-1199) denounced the teachings of Ibn Rushd and issued an edict in which he 
ordered the burning of his books. Ibn Rushd stood trial in Cordoba and was later exiled. 
Nevertheless, when the Caliph returned to Marrakash, he rescinded this edict and 
reinstated Ibn Rushd as his personal physician. Ibn Abī Uṣaybi‘a’s entry on Ibn Rushd 
implies that this incident occurred largely due to a personality conflict between Ibn 
Rushd and Manṣūr. However, Duncan Macdonald argues that the Caliph turned on Ibn 
Rushd in order to win the support of the ‘ulamā’ of Cordoba while he conducted military 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 52 Interestingly, Ibn Abbār, Makhlūf, and Ibn Farḥūn do not mention Ibn Rushd’s 
numerous contributions to philosophy. It appears that they tried to suppress these contributions 
while focusing on his legal and political contributions. According to them, he studied speculative 
theology, kalām. Ibn Farḥūn uses the word ḥikma to describe Ibn Rushd in the phrase, “wa-
kāna… ma‘a al-ḥaẓẓ al-wāfir min al-i'rāb wa’l-ādāb wa’l-ḥikma,” but in this context the phrase 
probably means he had an ample amount of eloquence, refinement, and wisdom. Ibn Farḥūn, 
Dībāj, pp. 378-379, no. 510; Ibn Makhlūf, Shajara, vol. 1, pp. 146-147, no. 439; Muḥammad b. 
‘Abd Allāh b. al-Abbār, Kitāb al-Takmila li-kitāb al-ṣila, 2 vols. (Madrid: Bibliotheca Arabico-
Hispana,1886), vol. 1, pp. 269-271, no. 853.  
 
 53 EI2, s.v. Ibn Ṭufayl. 
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operations against the Christian kingdoms of the Iberian Peninsula.54 If Macdonald is 
correct, it appears that the biographers and historians suppressed the political reasons 
behind this event and focused on Ibn Rushd’s personality and orthodox contributions to 
religious scholarship. Whatever the case may be, Ibn Rushd’s career reflects another 
important union between political and religious authority.  
 
e. Sarakhsī 
 Muḥammad b. Aḥmad b. Abī Sahl Abū Bakr al-Sarakhsī (d. 483/1090) was a 
Central Asian Ḥanafī jurist who is equally enigmatic to both his school and modern 
historians of Islamic law. Notwithstanding the importance of his works of law, the school 
knew little about his personal life. The lacuna is so great that the biographer Qurashī 
(696/1297-775/1373) reconstructs Sarakhsī’s life on the basis of autobiographical 
remarks that Sarakhsī makes in his works.55  
 His relationship with the ruling elite may explain the lacuna in the biographical 
information about him. Unlike the previously mentioned scholars who had generally 
wielded political authority and had cordial relationships with the ruling elite, Sarakhsī 
spent ten years in the prison of the Qarakhānids in Uzjand. According to Ibn Quṭlūbughā, 
Sarakhsī was imprisoned after he refused to recognize the legitimacy of the marriage of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 54Aḥmad b. al-Qāsim b. Abī Uṣaybi‘a, ‘Uyūn al-anbā’ fī ṭabaqāt al-aṭibbā’ (Beirut: 
Manshūrāt Dār Maktabat al-Ḥayā,1965), pp. 531-532; Duncan Macdonald, Development of 
Muslim Theology, Jurisprudence, and Constitutional Theory (New York: Charles Scribner’s 
Sons, 1903), pp. 255-256. For a list of his works, see Brockelmann, Geschichte, sup. 1, pp. 833-
836 
 
55  ‘Abd al-Qādir b. Muḥammad Qurashī, Al-Jawāhir al-muḍīya fī ṭabaqāt al-ḥanafīya, 2 
vols. (Hayderabad: Majlis Dā’irat al-Ma‘ārif al-Niẓamīya, 1914), vol. 2, pp. 28-29, no. 85; EI2, 
s.v. Sarakhsī. For further biographical details, see EI2, s.v. Abd al-Ḳādir al-Ḳurashī.  
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Qarakhānid Khaqān who had married his manumitted umm al-walad without observing 
the ‘idda.56 Nevertheless, during his incarceration, Sarakhsī managed to compose the 
Mabsūṭ, his massive “expansive” commentary on the fiqh of the eponym of the Ḥanafī 
school and his students. Supposedly, Sarakhsī’s students smuggled the work out.57 After 
he was released from prison, he spent the rest of his life in Farghāna at the court of Amīr 
Ḥasan with whom he enjoyed a more amicable relationship.58   
 
f. Ibn Qudāma 
 The final jurist whose writing I will analyze in this study is the prominent Ḥanbalī 
Muwaffaq al-Dīn Abū Muḥammad ‘Abd Allāh b. Aḥmad b. Qudāma al-Maqdisī 
(541/1147-620/1223). He was born near Jerusalem and spent the majority of his life in 
Damascus. Unlike our other famous jurists, who often interacted with the ruling elite and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 56 An umm al-walad is a concubine who has given birth to the child of her owner. 
According to all of the law schools, neither she nor the child can be sold if the owner legally 
acknowledges his paternity of the child. Upon the death of her master, the concubine gains her 
freedom and the child is always considered a free and full heir to his or her father. For further 
details, see EI2, s.v. umm al-walad. The ‘idda is a period of seclusion a female must observe 
before a divorce or sale of a concubine takes affect. The purpose of the waiting period is to 
determine if she is pregnant. The period of time is regulated by variety of complex rules. For 
further details, see EI2, s.v. ‘idda. 
  
 57 EI2, s.v. Sarakhsī; al-Qāsim b. ‘Abd Allāh b. Quṭlūbughā, Tāj al-tarājim, (Baghdad: 
Maṭba‘at al-Ma‘ānī, 1962), pp. 52-53, no. 157. 
 
 58 EI2, s.v. Sarakhsī; Ibn Quṭlūbughā, Tāj, p. 52, no. 157; Muḥammad ‘Abd al-Ḥayy al-
Laknawī, Al-Fawā’id al-bahīya fī tarājim al-ḥanafīya, ed. Aḥmad al-Zu‘bī (Beirut: Dār al-
Arqam, 1998), pp. 261-262, no. 328. The ruler is most likely Ḥasan b. ‘Alī who ruled some time 
during the latter half of the eleventh century to the early part of the twelfth century. For a brief 
outline of the Qarakhānid rulers and their different centers of power, see Clifford Edmund 
Bosworth, The New Islamic Dynasties (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), no. 90, pp. 
181-184.  
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enjoyed official appointments, Ibn Qudāma appears to have avoided such overt political 
and judicial entanglements.  
Nevertheless, Ibn Rajab’s (d. 795/1392) biography of Ibn Qudāma paints a picture 
of a jurist who commanded an immense amount of respect in Damascus due to his 
reputation for exceptional learning and asceticism.59 While in Baghdad, he studied with 
‘Abd al-Qādir al-Jīlānī (470-561/ 1077-1166) who founded the Qādirīya Sufi order.60 
While with Jīlānī, Ibn Qudāma started to study the legal compendium of the Ḥanbalī 
jurist al-Khiraqī (d. 334/945), upon which he would later write his famous legal 
commentary.61 Ultimately, Ibn Rajab’s portrayal indicates that Ibn Qudāma’s legitimacy 
and authority stemmed from his ability to combine his exceptional legal knowledge and 
asceticism with a fair level of respect for Sufism. During this period in the Islamic world, 
other jurists commonly combined legal erudition with Sufism.62 Thus, Ibn Qudāma is 
representative of wider notions of piety and legitimacy among the scholarly elite of this 
period. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 59 Abd al-Raḥmān b. Aḥmād b. Rajab was Ḥanbalī jurist whose biographical  dictionary 
is a continuation of Ibn Abī Ya‘lā’s. For further biographical details, see EI2, s.v. Ibn Radjab. 
  
60 For further biographical information, see EI2, s.v. ‘Abd al-Qādir al-Djīlānī.   
 
61 Studied under the sons of Ibn Ḥanbal and was instrumental in the institutionalization of 
the school. For further details, see Fuat Sezgin, Geschichte des Arabischen Schrifttums (Leiden: 
E.J. Brill, 1967), bd. 1, pp. 512-513, no. 11. 
   
 62 ‘Abd al-Raḥmān b. Aḥmād b. Rajab, Kitāb al-Dhayl ‘ala ṭabaqāt al-ḥanābila, 2 vols. 
(Cairo: Maṭba‘at al-Sunna al-Muḥammadīya, 1953), vol. 2, pp. 133-149, no. 272; Brockelmann, 
Geschichte, sup. 1, pp. 688-689; EI2, s.v. Ibn Ḳudāma al-Maḳdīsī; Henri Laoust, Le Précis de 
Droit d’Ibn Qudāma (Beirut: Institut Fraçais de Damas, 1950), pp. ix-lviii. For further 
information on the relationship between Sufism and Islamic law, see David Powers, Law, Society, 
and Culture in the Maghrib, 1300-1500  (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 15-
17, 167-205; Vincent Cornell, Realm of the Saint: Power and Authority in Moroccan Sufism 
(Austin: University of Texas Press, 1998). 
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III. Continuity and Uncertainty 
 The previous section employed biographical dictionaries to contextualize the 
jurists examined in this study. As stated above, this genre has a formulaic style in order to 
demonstrate the continuity of the school’s mastery over a body of at least probabilistic if 
not certain knowledge. In biographical dictionaries knowledge and more specifically 
certainty are both the starting and end points for the construction of the identity of jurists. 
Even anecdotes about great scholars who were indolent or forgetful students in their 
adolescences affirm the ability of the school to make great scholars out of the seemingly 
most unassuming of people. In the case of the wayward youth, it is the truth of the 
school’s knowledge that makes his formation into a great scholar possible. After all, one 
cannot hope to make a great scholar from uncertainty and errors.63  
This genre’s portrayal of knowledge implicitly rests on the following three traits:  
1) the organic unity of Arabic creates a stable relationship between words and their 
meanings; 2) the subject knows this unity such that he or she has mastery over it so that 
there is no ambiguity in his use or interpretation of Arabic; and 3) history occurs only 
when both the meaning and the subject change. According to these premises, knowledge 
has fixed and stable form that enables its repetition, whereas change and difference are 
the mark of uncertainty, the inessential, and error. These premises ensure not merely that 
a fixed relationship exists between words and their meanings, but also that the meanings 
of words are fixed and discrete. True, a word without a context may possess several 
meanings, but the perfect subject can determine the intended and thus singularly correct 
interpretation of a word within a statement on the basis of number of hermeneutic tools. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 For an analysis of this topos in autobiographies, see, Reynolds, Interpreting, pp. 81-87.  
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Given these premises, scholars can move seamlessly from one discourse to another while 
always claiming to find the one objectively correct meaning. Although Julia Kristeva 
outlines these traits with respect to the earliest works of European philology, these traits 
also inform the narrative structure of these biographical dictionaries.64  
For the biographical dictionary, the knowledge that jurists possess must be 
objective and enduring truth.  Both Muslim and Western scholars frequently cite the 
famous ḥadīth that, “Each mujtahid gets one reward and each correct mujtahid gets two 
rewards,” as an endorsement of legal interpretation, but in fact, this ḥadīth does not give 
an unrestricted endorsement for interpretation. Rather, it indicates that all interpretation 
must seek to obtain the objectively correct answers. True, jurists acknowledge that words 
and phrases may at first glance seem ambiguous notwithstanding the fact that each word 
has conventional meanings.65 Nevertheless, they claim that the speaker intends a meaning 
that the listener or reader can often if not always obtain on the basis of contextual 
indicators. The stability of meaning makes knowledge a fixed point that stands above the 
effects of form and can be transferred from one field and integrated into another so as to 
form a unity. This unity explains both the importance and ability of jurists to claim that 
they had mastery over so many fields of learning, which form parts of a much larger 
unity.    	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 Julia Kristeva, “From One Identity to an Other,” Desire in Language: A Semiotic 
Approach to Literature and Art, tr. Thomas Gora, Alice Jardine, and Leon S. Roudiez (New 
York: Columbia Press, 1980), 126-127.  
 
65 Muslims scholars agree that words have conventional meanings in what they refer to as 
waḍ‘, but they disagree about whether God or humans created these conventions. For discussions 
of conventional meanings and interpretation in Arabic, see, Bernard Weiss, “Language in 
Orthodox Muslim Thought: A Study of “Waḍ‘ al-Lughah” and its Development,” (Ph.D. diss., 
Princeton University, 1966); Mohamed M. Yunis Ali, Medieval Islamic Pragmatics (Richmond: 
Curzon, 2000), esp. pp. 15-37.  
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The meanings that engender knowledge require a special vessel to bear them. The 
jurists – especially the exceptional ones–whom biographical dictionaries mention are the 
bearers of this knowledge through their command of the stable relationship between word 
and meaning. This conception of knowledge as encapsulated and transmitted in stable 
meanings so that jurists can act as faithful transmitters of the knowledge of the earliest 
scholars and more importantly of the Prophet. Admittedly, one finds some biographical 
dictionaries and jurists claim that a qualitative and quantitative decline had occurred in 
legal thought. Nevertheless, these remarks still presume that certainty has an objective 
and stable existence that transcends human failings.66 These qualities ensure a stable 
reference point against which to array terms like objective, subjective, certainty, 
uncertainty, correct, and incorrect. In turn, the distribution of these terms becomes a 
powerful tool that legitimizes the institutional authority of jurists. 
However, jurists also contextualize their knowledge, intellectual output, and 
schools’ in their own works of law. To be sure, modern Western scholars of Islamic law 
have used works of uṣūl al-fiqh and fiqh to examine how jurists depict their relations to 
their schools of law. Nevertheless, most modern Western scholars of Islamic law frame 
this relationship as one of the repetition of certain knowledge by invoking the terms 
ijtihād and taqlīd. In many ways, the binary of ijtihād and taqlīd relies on and affirms the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 In his thought provoking study of the biographical dictionary of the Shāfi‘ī jurist Ibn 
Qāḍī Shuhba (d. 851/1448), R Kevin Jacques states that knowledge has an objective existence for 
Muslim jurists since it is really God’s knowledge that jurists are attempting obtain when they 
derive law. Notwithstanding his occasional comments to the contrary, Jacques adopts a similar 
position that knowledge and more specifically words have stable meanings. This position enables 
him to suppress any development or ambiguity in the meaning of terms that form the basis of his 
statistical analysis. R. Kevin Jacques, Authority, Conflict, and Transmissions of Diversity in 
Medieval Islamic Law (Boston: Brill, 2006), pp. 89-90, 120-122, 152-152.     
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philological conception of knowledge. According to the standard narrative of the 
development of Islamic held by modern Western scholars, Islamic jurists had a relatively 
short burst of intellectual creativity when they employed ijtihād, or their legal reasoning, 
to confront the sources of law and derive laws seemingly ex nihilo. Later jurists 
employed taqlīd, or submitted to the authority of earlier jurists. With taqlīd, Islamic law 
entered a phase of intellectual stasis when jurists transmitted a corpus of certain or at 
least probabilistic knowledge.67  
Although one finds this narrative in works of Islamic law, Western scholars have 
enthusiastically adopted it in order to detail the development and role of Islamic law in 
society.68 In a number of recent articles, several scholars have attempted to rehabilitate 
the portrayal of taqlīd by arguing that it ensures the stability and commensurability of all 
works of law within the bounds of a given school of law.69 This approach has the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 For examples of this narrative, see A.S. Tritton, Materials on Muslim Education in the 
Middle Ages (London: Luzaz & Co. Ltd., 1957), p. 163; Coulson, History, pp. 75-85; H.A.R. 
Gibb, Mohammedanism: An Historical Survey (New York: Oxford University Press, 1962), pp. 
98-104; Norman Anderson, Law Reform in the Muslim World (London: Athlone Press, 1976), p. 
7.  Schacht, An Introduction, pp. 69-75; N.J.   
 
 68 There are some notable exceptions to this generalization. Jonathan Brockopp examines 
the discursive techniques that early Mālikī legal texts employ to suggest that all law derives from 
Mālik in what Brockopp refers to as the “Great Shaykh,” theory of law. Jonathan Brockopp, 
“Competing Theories of Authority in Early Mālikī Texts,” in Studies in Islamic Legal Theory, ed. 
Bernard Weiss (Boston: Brill, 2002), pp. 3-22. David Powers analyzes the techniques that muftīs 
employ to construct their authority and situate the litigants. David Powers, Law, Society, and 
Culture in the Maghrib, 1300-1500 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 167-205. 
A number of scholars have shown the important discursive differences among works of uṣūl al-
fiqh that thereby draw into question a linear relationship between formative and post-formative 
law. For examples, see David R. Vishanoff, The Formation of Islamic Hermeneutics: How Sunni 
Theorists Imagined a Revealed Law (Ann Arbor, Mich.: American Oriental Society, 2010); 
Lowry, Theory, pp. 359-368.  
 
 69  Admittedly and somewhat inevitably, I have condensed a number of complex analyses 
on the topic. For further details, see Ahmed al-Shamsy, “Rethinking Taqlīd in the Early Shāfi‘ī 
School,” Journal of the American Oriental Society 128, no. 1 (2008): pp. 1-23; Mohammed 
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advantage of relating the discursive practices of jurists to non-discursive issues of 
institutional authority. On the other hand, Wael Hallaq argues for the continuous 
development of Islamic law.70  Nevertheless, he limits any development to the application 
of qiyās to solve a small number of “new” cases, which jurists added to a stable “canon” 
of accepted law.71 Ultimately, he has not strayed far from the philological suppositions 
that he criticizes so vigorously.72   
This conception tends to downplay differences among jurists as insignificant 
issues of form or style. Indeed, this conception of form and content allows scholars to 
mine a work of law for “facts” and project these facts on a group of jurists as their 
unchanging conception of law.  However, this static conception of knowledge in 
biographical dictionaries and earlier Western scholarship fails to explain the causes and 
contours of intellectual production. If all sources simply repeat the already said, it is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Fadel, “The Social Logic of Taqlīd and the Rise of the Mukhtaṣar,” Islamic Law and Society 3, 
no. 2 (1996): pp. 193-233; Sherman Jackson, “Taqlīd, Legal Scaffolding and the Scope of Legal 
Injunctions in Post-Formative Theory Muṭlaq and ‘Āmm in the Jurisprudence of the Shihāb al-Dīn 
al-Qarāfī,” Islamic Law and Society 3, no. 2 (1996): 165-192.  
 
 70 Wael Hallaq, “Was the Gate of Ijtihād Closed,” The International Journal of Middle 
East Studies 16, no. 1 (March 1984): pp. 3-41. In fact, this article inaugurated a series of seminal 
articles that Hallaq wrote to show the creativity of Islamic law and interconnected relationship 
between different genres of legal literature. See Hallaq, “From Fatwās to Furū‘, Growth and 
Change in Islamic Substantive Law,” Islamic Law and Society 1, no. 1 (1994): pp. 29-65; Hallaq, 
“Model Shurūṭ Works and the Dialectic of Doctrine and Practice,” Islamic Law and Society 2, no. 
2 (1995):109-134.  
 
 71 Hallaq, “Fatwās,” 39, 51-52. For a critique of Hallaq’s understanding of ijtihād, 
method of diachronic analysis, and the aforementioned articles, see Norman Calder, “Al-
Nawawī’s Typology of Muftis and Its Significance for a General Theory of Islamic Law,” Islamic 
Law and Society 3, no. 2 (1996): pp. 157-162.   
  
  72 For a more general analysis of this phenomenon in Hallaq’s research, see David S. 
Powers, “Wael B. Hallaq on the Origins of Islamic Law: A Review Essay,” Islamic Law and 
Society 17, no 1 (2010): 126-157.  
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unclear why people would continue to write new works. The typical answer that Western 
scholars of Islamic law give to this question argues that later works like digests and 
commentaries merely refine the technical vocabulary and organization of previous works.  
Although there are undoubtedly changes and refinements in later works, this view 
fails to explain nearly a thousand years of intellectual production by thousands of 
scholars. Either the earliest works were so muddled that they required such a huge 
amount of labor, or the idea of updating earlier works through a system of editions never 
occurred to anyone. The explanation that piety motivated scholars to keep writing is even 
worse since it is a blackbox that treats piety as a monolithic force in Islamic thought and 
life.    
Not surprisingly, contemporary Western scholars of Arabic literature have been 
the first to reassess the relationship between form and content in the Islamic and Arabic 
intellectual traditions when it comes to production and reception of commentaries and 
digests. 73 Beyond the biographical dictionaries and narratives about ijtihād and taqlīd, 
jurists describe their intellectual production in ways that suggest a more dynamic 
conception and role for certainty and uncertainty. To be precise, the jurists examined in 
this study make statements that break with the three features of knowledge that Kristeva 
outlines with respect to philology: 1) the organic unity of language articulated through 
the stable relationship between words and meanings; 2) the perfect subject who bears this 
unity; and 3) the lack of historical development. This break suggests a less stable 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 For examples, see Kelly Tuttle, “Expansion and Digression: A Study in Mamlūk 
Literary Commentary.” (Ph.D. Diss., University of Pennsylvania, 2013); Bauer, “Mamluk,” pp. 
112-116.  Julia Bray criticizes scholars who ignore issues of literary form and its relation to 
content miss a great deal of the significance of the text. Bray, “Approaches,” pp. 243-244.   
 
	  	   53	  
conception of the meanings that engender knowledge. Consequently, the distinction 
between form and content becomes less stable.  
The break with these philological premises opens jurists and their intellectual 
production to two forms of uncertainty. The first form, which is generally how people 
think of uncertainty, arises from a naïveté or a momentary error. This form of uncertainty 
functions as starting point for the acquisition of the forms of certainty that ultimately 
validate the writing of works of law or the authority of a school of law. The second form 
of uncertainty that arises from rejecting these aforementioned philological premises 
reflects a systemic and irresoluble instability in communication.  
Although the two forms of uncertainty have different functions and causes, they 
both operate at different discursive levels. More importantly, these two forms of 
uncertainty provide the impetus and justification in the eyes of jurists for their continued 
intellectual production. Finally, much like gharar as we will see in the following 
chapters, the uncertainty that structures works of law is not a given, but something that 
knowledge creates. Below, I will analyze the statements that jurists make that draw into 
question the stability of meaning at the level of genres, legal opinions, and finally 
individual words. 
 
a. The Commensurability of Meaning at the Level of Genre 
 According to the standard narrative about the development of Islamic law and the 
distinction between ijtihād and taqlīd, knowledge is contingent upon meaning being 
stable and transparent across time and space. Language can convey meaning in a number 
	  	   54	  
of ways, but these ways must be essentially equivalent.74 The jurists examined in this 
study certainly hold this position when they divide language into words and meanings.  
Nevertheless, scattered throughout their writings, they point to the instability of this 
division in important ways that open the intellectual tradition to interpretation and 
disagreement.    
Starting at the level of genres, the jurists examined in this study employ several 
different genres. Ibn Qudāma, Shīrāzī, Bājī, Ibn Ḥazm, and Sarakhsī write either 
commentaries (sharḥ) or digests (mukhtaṣar) on earlier works of law. Shīrāzī states 
without much ado in the introduction to the Muhadhdhab that his work presents “the 
principles of the Shāfi‘ī school with their proofs and the problematic cases with their 
policy reasons that derive from these principles.” 75 Sarakhsī’s work is a commentary on 
the digest by Muḥammad b. Muḥammad al-Marwazī (d. 334/945) on the works of 
Shaybānī (132-189/750-805).76 Ibn Qudāma’s work is a commentary on the digest by 
Abū Qāsim ‘Umar b. al-Ḥusayn b. ‘Abd Allāh al-Khiraqī of the legal views of Aḥmad 
Ibn Ḥanbal (164-241/780-855).77 Both Ibn Ḥazm and Bājī frame their works as digests of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 74 The major exception to this claim is the view that the Qur’ān cannot be translated. 
Nevertheless, Muslims did think that its meaning could be explained and commented upon, which 
requires words to have commensurable and stable meanings.  
 
75 Abū Isḥāq Ibrāhīm al-Shīrāzī, Al-Muhadhdhab fī fiqh al-imām al-Shāfi‘ī, ed. 
Muḥammad al-Zuḥaylī, 6 vols. (Damascus: Dār al-Qalam, 1992), vol. 1, p. 38. 
 
76 Muḥammad b. Aḥmad al-Sarakhsī, Kitāb al-Mabsūṭ, 30 vols. in 10 (Cairo: Maṭba‘at al-
Sa‘āda, 1906-1913), vol. 1:1, pp. 2-4. Abū Abd Allāh Muḥammad b. al-Ḥasan was a student Abū 
Ḥanifā and one of the early founders of the Ḥanafī school. For further biographical details, see 
EI2, s.v. Muḥammad al-Shaybānī.  
 
 77 ‘Abd Allāh b. Aḥmad b. Muḥammad b. Qudāma, Al-Mughnī. ed. Ṭaha Muḥammad al-
Zaynī. 10 vols. (Cairo: Maktabat al-Qāhira, 1968), vol. 1, p. 3-6. Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal is the eponym 
of the Ḥanbalī school. Although he did not write a work of fiqh, he is best known for his Musnad, 
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previous works that they wrote themselves. In the case of Bājī, his work is a digest of his 
Istīfā’, which is a commentary on the Muwaṭṭā’ of Mālik (d. 179/795).78 As for Ibn 
Ḥazm, one of the last Ẓāhirīs, he claims that his Muḥallā is a digest of his earlier work, 
the Mujallā.79 With the exception of Ibn Ḥazm whom I will discuss in more detail below, 
the other jurists examined here thus frame their works as a continuation of their schools’ 
legal tradition notwithstanding the different genres that they employ. To be precise, they 
frame their words as commentaries and digests of earlier important works of law in their 
respective schools of law.   
 Finally, Ibn Rushd frames his work as a study of the legal disagreements among 
the major schools of law.80 Although works of khilāf, or disputed legal points, are 
common, Ibn Rushd’s work is not an example of this genre. Typically, a jurist uses this 
genre to champion his school’s positions while pointing out the inconsistencies of other 
schools. However, Ibn Rushd’s work neither stridently defends the Mālikī school nor 
champions a grand synthesis of the other schools.81 Ibn Rushd generally cites the opinion 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
a collection of Prophetic ḥadīth. For further biographical details, see EI2, s.v. Aḥmad al-Ḥanbal; 
Cooperson, Biography, pp. 107-153.      
 
78 Abū al-Walīd Sulaymān b. Khalaf al-Bājī, Al-Muntaqā: sharḥ Muwaṭṭa’ Mālik. ed. 
Muḥammad ‘Abd al-Qādir Aḥmad ‘Atā. 9 vols. (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-‘Ilmīya, 1996) vol. 1, 
pp. 201-202. Mālik b. Anas was the epoynm of the Mālikīs and best known for his Muwaṭṭā’, an 
important collection of early traditions, which his students transmitted in several recensions. For 
further biograhpical details, see EI2, s.v.  Mālik b. Anas.   
 
 79 ‘Alī b. Aḥmad b. Sa‘īd b. Ḥazm, Muḥallā. ed. Muḥammad Munīr al-Dimashqī. 11 vols. 
(Cairo: Idārat al-Ṭibā‘a al-Munīra, 1928), vol. 1, p. 2. 
 
80 Abū al-Walīd Muḥammad b. Aḥmad b. Muḥammad b. Aḥmad b. Rushd, Bidāyat al-
mujtahid wa-nihāyāt al-muqtaṣid, ed. Mājid al-Ḥamawī, 4 vols (Beirut: Dār Ibn Ḥazm, 1995), 
vol. 1, p. 15.   
 
81 Maribel Fiero argues that this work was an attempt to synthesize the views of the major 
schools and relativize the authority of the Mālikīs so that the Almohad Caliph could make a final 
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of Mālik and his early students. When he cites the views of other schools he typically 
sides with the Mālikī view on cases.  
Generally, both pre-modern Muslim jurists and modern Western scholars of 
Islamic law distinguish between the form and content of works. Both groups of scholars 
value the content over the form since content is supposed to be stable and ensures the 
commensurability of different texts and genres. Indeed, the conceptual distinction 
between form and content must be stable for Bājī and Ibn Qudāma to able to affirm that 
both the digest and commentary are equivalent in terms of the content.82 Regardless of 
what work one reads from a given school, the same content conveys the essence of the 
school. This means that only the meaningless differentiates these genres. Or to put it 
differently, whatever is added or subtracted from these works does not affect their 
meaning.  
However, a brief analysis of other areas of Islamic learning and the statements of 
jurists themselves suggest a more complex picture in which form and content are neither 
stable nor clearly differentiated. In the introduction to his al-Taqrīb li-ḥadd al-manṭiq, a 
work of logic, Ibn Ḥazm presents the following typology of genres:  
The previously mentioned types of books are only seven: 
1. Something (shay’) no one has previously deduced (istikhrājihi) so 
we do, 
2. Something that was incomplete so we complete it, 
3. Something that was wrong so we correct it, 
4. Something that was obscure so we comment on it, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
selection on disputed points of law. Unfortunately, Fiero provides very little textual evidence to 
support this argument. For the most part, Ibn Rushd focuses on Mālikī and his early students. 
Maribel Fiero, “The Legal Policies of the Almohad Caliphs and Ibn Rushd’s Bidayāt al-
Mujtahid,” Journal of Islamic Studies 10, no. 3 (1999), pp. 226-248.  
 
 82 Bājī, Muntaqā, vol. 1, pp. 201-202; Ibn Qudāma, Mughnī, vol. 1, p. 6. 
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5. Something that was prolix so we abridge it without removing any of 
its intended message (bi-gharaḍihi),  
6. Something that was dispersed so we gather it, and 
7. Something that was poorly organized so we properly organize it.83 
 
Although the term “something” links each category, Ibn Ḥazm does not use the word 
“something” in its pregnant philosophical sense to mean the most general ontological 
category that subsumes all other existents. Rather, only the word “gharaḍ”, or the 
intended message, in the fifth category, suggests that the content of the work is a stable 
referent that links each genre.    
 The distinction between genres is, however, not purely one of content. Ibn Ḥazm 
remarks that the value of each work depends on its presentation of a given topic. A book 
that presents one topic better than previous works would thus be a meaningful 
contribution. On the other hand, a work that fails to improve the arrangement of material, 
removes necessary material, adds unnecessary material, or does not improve the wording 
performs an intellectual disservice.84 Form and content thus both determine the value of 
books in such a manner that the content cannot simply exist in a disembodied form 
notwithstanding his earlier comments to this effect. Indeed, form modifies content either 
for the better or worse.       
 With respect to works of law, Ibn Ḥazm, Bājī, and Ibn Qudāma elaborate on this 
insight when they distinguish between the form and content digests and commentaries in 
terms of their functions and audiences. The digest eases the memorization and study of 
law for young students whereas the commentary facilitates the increased understanding 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 83 Ibn Ḥazm, Taqrīb, p. 16. 
  
 84 Ibn Ḥazm, Taqrīb, 16.  
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for more advanced students and full-fledged jurists. The digest eliminates isnāds, which 
are the chain of transmitters of a specific ḥadīth, and proofs for legal positions—
especially those positions attributed to opponents of the school. It also reduces the 
number of cases examined and overall wording.85  On the other hand, the commentary 
employs contrary operations.  
 Although jurists claim that a digest may excise the isnād without excising 
meaning, one needs to look no further than the adjacent fields of ḥadīth criticism and uṣūl 
al-fiqh where scholars invest the isnād with a great deal of epistemological import. In 
works of fiqh, jurists may, however, denude it of significance. In fact, in the field of fiqh, 
the isnād is not entirely insignificant since jurists often use it to dismiss a position with 
which they disagree. The significance of the isnād is thus not a platonic ideal. Rather, 
discursive and non-discursive practices configure the canons of significance and 
insignificance.  
 In the case of the isnād, several discursive techniques and institutional 
apparatuses enable authors to modulate the significance of the isnād in works of law. In 
particular, the canonical collections of ḥadīth allow jurists to forgo an examination of the 
isnād. It suffices to promise that all of the ḥadīths employed are ṣaḥīḥ.86 However, works 
of fiqh implicitly recognize its significance in the field of ḥadīth criticism and uṣūl al-
fiqh. Ultimately, this brief discussion indicates the complex way that different genres—
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 85 Bājī, Muntaqā, vol. 1, pp. 201-202; Ibn Ḥazm, Muḥallā, vol. 1, p. 2; Ibn Qudāma, 
Mughnī, vol. 1, pp. 3-6. 
 
 86 For example, in the introduction to his work, Ibn Ḥazm promises to use only these 
sound ḥadīth. Ibn Ḥazm, Muḥallā, vol. 1, p. 2. 
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no matter how closely aligned they may be otherwise—configure the boundaries of 
significance in different ways.  
 At the level of genre, the relationship between form and content is unstable due 
the dialectical relationship between these two concepts. Not only do form and content 
interact in such way that it may be practically difficult to differentiate between these 
aspects of a legal text, but the significance of form and content changes in works of law 
depending on the audience of a genre. To write a commentary on a digest or vice-versa is 
not merely an act of repetition aimed at elucidating the law, but also an act of interpretive 
creation. True, a new work may elucidate problems found in the previous work, but the 
new work will also give rise to new points uncertainty for other readers precisely because 
of the unstable interaction and division between form and content.      
 
b. The Commensurability of Meaning at the Level of Legal Opinion  
 Although it is somewhat easy to accept that different genres configure the 
boundaries of meaning differently, yet it might be supposed that a legal position should at 
least provide a more stable utterance upon which issues of generic form and content 
should not impinge. Nevertheless, Bājī remarks that,  
I discussed in my aforementioned book, the Istīfā’, what I do not 
discuss one iota of in this book. This is that the fatwās of a muftī about 
cases along with his statements and comments about these cases are 
only in accordance with the success and succor that God grants him. 
Thus, one may hold that a particular opinion is correct one time and 
incorrect another time. Due to this, the opinion of the same jurist may 
differ with respect to the same case! 87  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 87 Bājī, Muntaqā, vol. 1, p. 202  
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In terms of the elaboration of law, the same jurist may have different or even 
contradictory opinions on the same case. Thus, a jurist who writes both a commentary 
and a digest, like Bājī and Ibn Ḥazm, does not necessarily provide a consistent legal 
viewpoint on a case. In fact, the inconsistencies of opinions from the same or different 
jurists regarding the same case led in part to the development of the furūq genre, or subtle 
legal distinctions.88 
 The study of gharar reveals that a jurist handles the different views attributed to 
jurists or even the same jurist through two contrary techniques: 1) he limits the 
differences and selects one answer as the correct opinion, or 2) he reifies these 
differences among the competing opinions. For the first approach, a jurist indicates that 
one opinion is correct. In this case, the other opinions might simply be mentioned as way 
to explicitly record them as incorrect so that later jurists do not resurrect them as 
potentially valid solutions to the case.  
The second approach for dealing with different legal views regarding the same 
case takes variety of forms. On the one hand, a jurist may simply allow the different 
positions to remain without indicating his preference for a particular opinion. Authors of 
post-formative works of law regularly compile the contrary opinions regarding that were 
often diffused among several early sources. True, an author may compile these different 
opinions in order that future jurists may have different options to select from with respect 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 88 For example, Juwaynī notes in the introduction to his al-Jam‘ wa’l-farq, one of the 
earliest works of furūq, “Often legal cases have the same form (ṣuwar), but their legal rulings 
differ due to legal causes that necessitate the different legal rulings.” He then goes on to discuss 
the forms of these different rulings and their sources. Abū Muḥammad ‘Abd Allāh al-Juwaynī, 
Al-Jam‘ wa’l-farq, ed. al-Raḥmān b Salama b. ‘Abd Allāh, 3 vols. (Cairo: Dār al-Jīl, 2004), vol. 
1, pp. 37-50.  
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to the same case or similar cases. However, by allowing these contrary opinions to 
remain as equally valid, the author also intentionally leaves a source of potential 
uncertainty for future jurists who are seeking a univocal position with respect to a case.  
On the other hand, he may contextualize and distinguish each position in order 
suggest that each one corresponds to a different case. For this approach, he uses different 
hermeneutic techniques to contextualize these seemingly contradictory positions. In 
essence, this approach reverse engineers a case for a given position and then back-
projects a historical pedigree onto the case and legal position.    
 
c. The Commensurability of Meaning at the Level of the Word 
It is easy to view the uncertainty that Bājī claims to face as the typical pious 
posturing that scholars engage in so as to validate their writings. One should not be so 
quick to dismiss these statements. Although Bājī attributes the differences and 
inconsistencies in the thought of jurists to the hand of providence, Ibn Rushd attributes 
the differences and inconsistencies to the ambiguity inherent in language at the level of 
the word. In the introduction to the Bidāyat al-mujtahid wa-nihāyat al-muqtaṣid, Ibn 
Rushd presents six causes for disagreement in cases of law, which can be summarized as 
follows:  
1. Ambiguity as to whether the word’s meaning is restricted or not (‘amm/khaṣṣ), 
2. The word or phrase is a homonym (ishtirāk),  
3. There is disagreement about the syntax (i‘rāb),  
4. The word may be literal or figurative (ḥaqīqa/majāz), 
5. The word may be qualified or not (muṭlaq/muqayyad), 
6. Contradictions that arise due the aforementioned causes when two statements of a 
law are compared.89 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89 Abū al-Walīd Muḥammad b. Aḥmad b. Rushd, Bidāya, vol. 1, pp. 15-16. 
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This list indicates that differences inevitably arise due to uncertainty about the 
comprehension and extension of words.90   
For jurists, knowledge must stand above the effects of language usage if it is to be 
objective, stable, and commensurable across time and different discourses. The 
statements of an average person may be inherently ambiguous due to the speaker’s lack 
of mastery of Arabic. However, the statements of God and the Prophet are presumed to 
reflect an intended and thus objectively correct meaning, which jurists claim to be able to 
recover. True, Muslim scholars recognized that even the speech of God and the Prophet 
often presented ambiguities on an initial reading. In fact, jurists argued for the ambiguity 
of words to legitimize their interpretive activity.91 However, even these jurists were still 
openly committed to the claim that statements of God and the Prophet have objectively 
correct and stable interpretations that they could find by the application of the 
hermeneutic techniques outlined in works uṣūl al-fiqh.     
Nevertheless, Ibn Qudāma in his Rawḍat al-nāẓir wa-jannat al-munāẓir fī uṣūl al-
fiqh, a work of uṣūl al-fiqh, undermines the ability to obtain the objectively correct 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  90	  	  In his study of Arabic grammar, Sībawayh (d. ca. 180/796) distinguishes between 
word and meaning, and he remarks that the interaction between these elements can give rise to 
homonyms, synonyms, and antonyms. ‘Amr b. Uthmān Sībawayh, Al-Kitāb, ed. Imīl Badī‘ 
Ya‘qūb, 5 vols. (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-‘Ilmīya, 1999), vol. 1, p.  49.  For biographical details on 
Sībawayh, see, Michael Carter, “Sibawayhi,” in Dictionary of Literary Biography: Arabic 
Literary Culture, 500-925, ed. Shawkat Toorawa and Michael Cooperson (Detroit: Thomson 
Gale, 2005), pp. 325-331. The attestation of this distinction in the Kitāb of Sībawayh is 
significant since it may be the first consciously authored book in Arabic. Gregor Schoeler bases 
this claim largely on the existence of internal references within the text. For further details, see 
Gregor Schoeler, The Genesis of Literature in Islam: From the Aural to the Read, tr. Shawkat 
Toorawa (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009), pp.  87-90.  	  
91  Vishanoff, Formation, esp. pp. 152-189; 254-278.  
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interpretations that would engender certainty. In the introduction to this work, he presents 
a standard Aristotelian theory of representation.92 According to this model, a referent has 
four forms: 1) an ontological existence in-itself, 2) knowledge that resembles the 
ontological existent, 3) the verbal expression of this knowledge, and 4) writing of the 
verbal expression. 93 The commensurability of these forms of the referent guarantee the 
validity of a representation. Although these four forms of the referent are equivalent in 
terms of the information they convey, they are not the same. The first form, that of the 
existence of a referent in-itself, is primary and the most important form since it provides 
an objective reference point against which to check the other forms of the referent. 
Thought and expression that match reality are objectively correct.  
Due to importance of the referents in reality for grounding thought and language, 
one would expect that isolating and classifying these self-subsisting referents should be 
unproblematic. Ibn Qudāma, however, deconstructs the commensurability of these forms 
of the referent. According to him, knowledge either takes the form of a concept, which 
represents a single referent, or an assent of judgment (tasḑīq), which represents the 
combination of several referents. In language, a definition corresponds to a concept 
whereas a syllogism corresponds to a judgment.94 A definition may take three forms: 1) a 
literal definition that details the essential attributes of something, 2) a description that 
mixes essential attributes, entailments, and accidental attributes, and 3) synonyms.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 92 In the following chapters I will examine these discussions of representation in the 
introductions of works of uṣūl al-fiqh in more detail.   
 
 93 Ibn Qudāma, Rawḍat al-nāẓir wa-jannat al-munāẓir fī uṣūl al-fiqh (Cairo: Al-Maṭba‘a 
al-Salafīya, 1965), p.7; 
 
 94 Ibn Qudāma, Rawḍa, 4. 
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According to Ibn Qudāma, the literal definition provides the objectively correct 
representation of the referent, but in practice it is too difficult to obtain. Instead, he argues 
that scholars should use descriptions that fulfill an intended goal.95  In addition, he 
acknowledges that a syllogism cannot validate a definition in general since each term of a 
definition would either need to be defined, which would lead to an infinite regress, or that 
the definition could only end with forms of necessary knowledge, but it is seldom 
possible to reach this end.96 Ultimately, Ibn Qudāma suggests that words refer only to 
more words rather than an ultimate referent in reality that would make objective 
knowledge possible.  
The inability to provide an objective definition or validate it according to the 
standards of the Aristotelian model of representation has several important implications. 
First, language cannot “objectively” represent reality. Second, language can only fail to 
correctly represent a referent if language is fundamentally unable to access thought, or if 
thought cannot perfectly copy reality. In either case, language, thought, and reality cannot 
be equivalent in terms of information. Since language and thought cannot access reality 
as it really exist, language and thought cannot be objectively validated or invalidated.  
However, Ibn Qudāma does not deem acceptable any statement about a particular 
matter. After all, he is a jurist who champions particular answers on legal and theological 
issues. Furthermore, his ability to critique representation still presumes some basis for 
meaningful communication between people. Language is not totally indeterminate and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 95 Ibn Qudāma, Rawḍa, 5-7. 
 
 96 Ibn Qudāma, Rawḍa, 7-8.  
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unstable. Rather, he argues that communities should adopt definitions that will serve as 
criteria for truth. This position effectively upends the Aristotelian model of representation 
by making language primary and thought and reality secondary. 97 In effect, language 
creates and determines the contours of reality and thought such that meaning cannot be a 
stable and fixed reference point.  
The fact that reality does not mediate representation does not necessarily lead to 
uncertainty if one were to follow Ibn Qudāma’s view on definitions.  If a community of 
speakers has a perfect mastery over language with stable and univocal meanings there 
would be no ambiguity. However, as already demonstrated above, Muslim jurists did not 
claim that Arabic was such a language at any discursive level. As we will see below, 
jurists also did not claim to be such perfect masters over their discursive practices. This 
point acknowledges the instability in the relationship between word and meaning. 
Furthermore, the fact that discursive communities should adopt different definitions 
fractures the supposed unity of language and different fields of learning.  
Finally, Shīrāzī offers another critique of the stability of meaning; a critique tied 
to the way that the discursive practices of Arabs changed after the advent of Islam. Like 
other jurists, Shīrāzī divides the meaning of words into conventional usages, technical 
religious terms like ṣalāt (prayer), customary usages, and new usages created on the basis 
of qiyās, or analogy. According to Shīrāzī, the lexicographical tradition transmits 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
97 Besides Foucault, a number of scholars have made this point. For a discussion of this at 
the level of the word, see Barthes, Semiotics, pp. 13-34. For a discussion at the level of the text, 
see Stanley Fish, Is There a Text in This Class?: The Authority of Interpretive Communities 
(Cambridge: Mass; Harvard University Press, 1980), esp. 1-17; 303-321.  Below, we will see that 
based on his knowledge of Critical Legal Studies, Sherman Jackson uses this point to argue that 
uṣūl al-fiqh is neither a prescriptive nor a descriptive system for the derivation of law. 
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information on all of the meanings of a word so as to ensure the stable usage and the 
unity of the language. Thus, if there is evidence to indicate that a particular word in the 
Qur’ān or a ḥadīth should be interpreted according to a customary usage, one must 
interpret the word according to its customary usage during the Prophet’s lifetime in 
Mecca and Medina. If one interpreted the word according to a later customary meaning 
this would distort the meaning of the text.98 True, this position acknowledges that the 
meanings of words change due to historical and regional factors. Nevertheless, Shīrāzī 
and most jurists claim that the lexicographical tradition provides a record of discrete 
meanings of the word so as to allow one to find the objectively correct reading of a text.  
However, his discussion of the analogical extension of the meanings of words 
undermines the stability of meaning and, more broadly, of representation within Arabic. 
According to him, the early Arabs use to name individual things (a‘yān) such as using the 
word “khamar” to designate wine made of grapes. Later speakers of Arabic extended to 
the denotive scope of these words to include a larger group of things. Thus, the word 
khamar was extended to all forms of alcohol-based intoxicants.99 His interlocutor then 
objects that this is not an example of analogical extension of the meaning since the 
conventional meaning of a word acts like a genus for its application to different species 
of referents. Nevertheless, Shīrāzī rejects this argument since,  
It is unheard of that the early Arabs ever said, “This is 
conventionally used for a genus of referents,” since they did not 
use the concepts genus and species in their speech. Rather, 
modern speakers adopted the terms genus and species for ease 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
98 Shīrāzī, Sharḥ al-luma’, ed. ‘Abd al-Majīd Turkī, 2 vols. (Beirut: Dār al-Gharb al-
Islāmī, 1988), vol 1, pp. 180-181. 
 
99 Shīrāzī, Sharḥ, vol. 1, pp. 185-186. 
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and pedagogical reasons. As for the early Arabs, they used words 
to designate only individual things without ever mentioning 
whether this meaning is for a genus or individual. So they would 
say this is a horse and that is a wolf…It has not been related that 
they ever said, “We conventionalized this meaning for genus,” 
but rather it is related that they use to call these specific referents 
with those names such that the use of these names is restricted 
and does not admit anything else when judged according to the 
standard of the conventional meaning.100    
 
The conventional reading of this passage would argue that Shīrāzī is merely indicating 
that due to the translation of Hellenistic learning into Arabic that Arabs can now use 
terms like genus and species to analyze the relationship among words and meanings. 
Although this reading is true, it does not recognize the potential implications of this 
passage. For Shīrāzī, the pre-Islamic Arabs lived in a world of immanent representation 
populated by the specific and tangible. With the passage of time, scholars like Shīrāzī 
began to live in a world of abstract relationships and transcendental representation based 
on the Aristotelian taxonomy that creates an organic unity. This is not to say that Shīrāzī 
denies the ability to analogically extend the meaning of a word to cover new referents.101  
Indeed, he recognizes the reality and need for such analogical extensions.  
Although Shīrāzī explicitly frames such changes in linguistic representation as 
merely a historical process, it is tempting to read this passage as recognizing the effect of 
literacy on representation. Walter Ong has argued for the importance of literacy for the 
development of abstract reasoning. According to Ong, illiterate individuals tend to think 
in situational terms that are close to real life experiences. On the other hand, literate 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
100 Shīrāzī, Sharḥ, vol.1, p. 186.  
 
101 Shīrāzī, Sharḥ, vol.1, p. 189.  
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individuals can think in abstract categories that enable modes of deductive and inductive 
reasoning.102  It would not be all that surprising if Shīrāzī was aware of how much 
reading and knowledge changed his view of the world in comparison to contemporary 
illiterates with whom he would have interacted. Indeed, the preceding quotation of 
Shīrāzī paints a picture Arabs living before Islam who spoke in concrete terms about their 
actual surroundings and experiences. Whatever the case may be, the passage does not 
reconcile the immanent and transcendental forms of representation. Rather, the quotation 
points to a profound rupture within the meaning of words that flows at least across time if 
not also socio-economic groups. This rupture reveals the instability of meaning at the 
level of the word due to changing patterns of education among scholars that affect how 
they think and speak about the world.        
To sum up, in this section, I examined the conception of meaning at various 
discursive levels. Rather than meaning being a fixed and stable reference point that would 
ensure the commensurability of knowledge and language usage across different 
discourses, works, and time, jurists expressly signal how unstable it is. At the level of 
genre and texts, form affects content such that these two cannot be separated.  At ever 
smaller discursive levels the instability of meaning becomes more complex. Ibn Qudāma 
and Shīrāzī deconstruct the notion that reality mediates thought and language. In different 
ways, Ibn Qudāma and Shīrāzī reveal how language usage and knowledge put meaning 
into a state of flux–albeit this is only partial flux due to way that previous discourse 
governs the production of new discourse. The instability of meaning creates uncertainty 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
102 For a survey of the difference between the reasoning of oral and literate cultures, see 
Walter Ong, Orality and Literacy: Technologizing of the Word (New York: Methuen, 1982), pp. 
49-57.   
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that calls for the constant interpretation on the part of scholars as we will see in following 
sections.     
 
d. Subjects of Discourse 
  Ibn Qudāma deconstructs the Aristotelian model of representation, one that 
hinges on self-subsisting referents that exist in reality and provide an objective point 
against which to judge representation. Instead, he argues that discursive convention 
should determine meaning. One could save representation from not being bound to reality 
by affirming a perfect subject who has complete mastery over the communal discursive 
practice(s). This perfect subject would thereby ensure the continuity and unity of the 
intellectual tradition. The less mastery that a jurist has over such institutionalized 
meanings, however, the more uncertainty his discourse would have.  
At first glance, it is tempting to assume that jurists–as both readers and writers– 
have or at least claim to have this perfect command over the legal tradition.  However, 
jurists claim that uncertainty plays a central role in their intellectual production. In the 
case of the digests, scholars write for students and in the case of commentaries for more 
advanced scholars. Clearly, a student is marked by his lack of knowledge and error, but 
more advanced scholars also claim to be contending with uncertainty. Bājī states that,  
So whoever examines this book of mine should not think that 
the comments, explanations, analogies, and examinations that I 
wrote down in here are decisive in my view such that I reproach 
and slander whoever disagrees with my view, rather my view is 
only the full extent of my ijtihād. 103 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 103 Bājī, Muntaqā, vol. 1, p. 202  
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As we saw in the previous section, he also says that great jurists often hold 
contradictory opinions regarding the same case. As both producers and interpreters of 
language, jurists did not claim to have a perfect mastery over it such that meaning could 
be stable and unequivocal when properly interpreted. It is thus inevitable that works of 
law and language would give rise to uncertainty. However, this uncertainty opens each 
school of law to interpretation and analysis.  
 Admittedly, it is impossible to expect each jurist to know perfectly every aspect of 
his school’s discursive tradition. Nevertheless, scholars distance themselves from their 
schools in ways that create subtle discontinuities and uncertainty. For example, both Bājī 
and Ibn Ḥazm write digests of their own works. These digests do not appear to differ 
qualitatively or quantitatively that much from the commentaries of Ibn Qudāma and 
Sarakhsī. At first glance, the point that they are writing digests may seem trivial, but it 
raises two questions. First, in each case, why would each jurist state that he is 
summarizing an earlier work of his own rather than simply summarize the source text 
without further ado? To write a digest of one’s own commentary in effect distances the 
source text unless the meaning is really stable and form does not matter. However, the 
previous section suggests that jurists did not think meaning was necessarily a completely 
stable reference point. Moreover, if form does not affect content, it would seem pointless 
to write a digest of one’s commentary since the form should not change anything of 
substance. Second, how did each jurist go about producing his digest? Did he really rely 
directly on his commentary to produce the digest? If so this would suggest that each jurist 
attached some significance to the form of his prior work for mediating the form and 
content of the digest.  
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 Neither jurist directly addresses these questions, but in the case of Ibn Ḥazm, 
these questions have an odd twist since he does not base his work upon that of an earlier 
figure in the Ẓāhirī school. He does not appear to cite the opinions of Ẓāhirī jurists in his 
chapter on sales. Like other Ẓāhirīs, he rejects taqlīd. The lack of engagement with earlier 
Ẓāhirī works and failure of the Ẓāhirīs to successfully become institutionalized invites the 
question: in what sense are Ibn Ḥazm’s legal positions continuous with those of the 
Ẓāhirīs of Baghdad? Did he study their works and simply not mention them, or was his 
claim to be Ẓāhirī a way to create his own school of law while only adopting several 
sufficiently vague Ẓāhirī positions on the sources of law, nature of language, and issues 
of legal epistemology? In effect, he claims to be heir to a tradition that he does not 
invoke, and in fact the Ẓāhirī school adopted ideological positions that thwarted 
institutionalization. 
 
e. History   
These differences of opinion and the uncertainty inherent in language justify the 
practice of interpretation and more generally the writing of trained jurists, as Bājī states 
that, 
 So whoever has appropriate training may examine and act in 
accordance with his ijtihād whether it agrees with my opinion or not. 
However, whoever has not reached this level let him make what this 
book contains his source of peace and aid.104  
 
For Bājī, this uncertainty not only goes hand in hand with a theory justifying the 
interpretive activities of jurists, but also complements a theory of the institutional 	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authority of jurists. To be precise, a theory that only trained jurists may exercise ijtihād 
requires a institution to both train and certify who may practice ijtihād. 
On the other hand, Ibn Rushd argues that fundamentally law and society require 
interpretation since law as found in the Revealed sources is finite but the cases are 
infinite. Thus the ambiguity inherent to language does not become necessarily a failing, 
but the means by which jurists respond to the changing needs and development of the 
community. The jurist and his reasoning thus become the locus for a dialectic between 
the infinite and finite that develops the law.105   
 If one gives due consideration to the statements examined above about meaning 
and the nature of jurists’ mastery over it, uncertainty is an inevitable aspect and product 
of their intellectual production. From the level of genres to individual words, jurists 
recognize, albeit only in their more unguarded moments, that meaning does not have a 
stable and objective existence. To participate in discourse either as a producer or recipient 
of it is to shape and redefine meaning in ways that put it in a state of constant flux. 
Although one cannot create one’s discourse from scratch, one cannot use discourse as a 
perfectly fixed and stable medium for conveying knowledge. Rather, this fluid state of 
discourse gives rise to countless works of law over the centuries.   
In terms of Islamic law, contemporary Western scholars often judge the newness 
of a legal opinion on the basis of things like the use of ijthihād to solve a new case or 
create a position that differs from the previously accepted position. Neither of these 
criteria is actually that transparent or objective when applied to an analysis of works of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
105 Ibn Rushd, Bidāya, vol. 1, pp. 15-16.  
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fiqh.  In the following chapters of this study, I will examine many cases where jurists 
from the different schools all appear to agree on some issue related to the concept of 
gharar. However, generally a closer examination of their opinions reveals differences 
that range from the subtle to the highly significant in terms of their legal reasoning. When 
analyzed carefully, these differences in the reasoning of jurists sometimes reveal insights 
into their constructions of positive law that go against the grain of the typical portrayal of 
schools based on works of uṣūl al-fiqh. For example, although the Ẓāhirīs are the most 
averse to uncertainty in the interpretation of law and the Ḥanafīs are supposedly the most 
accepting of uncertainty in the interpretation of law, when it comes to commercial 
transactions, the Sarakhsī, a Ḥanafī, is far stricter than Ibn Ḥazm, a Ẓāhirī, when it comes 
to uncertainty. Indeed, Sarakhsī is generally the strictest of all the jurists when it comes to 
gharar. This difference in the level of leniency with respect to the various kinds of 
uncertainty in a commercial transaction reflects the different forms of knowledge, 
reasoning, and descriptive techniques that jurists employ to represent a specific 
transaction.    
 Discourse analysis examines the epistemic systems that define the concepts, 
referents, modes of reasoning, and themes that jurists employ. One should not so quickly 
dismiss the ways that jurists reconfigure a discursive element as merely a technical 
refinement or a post-hoc rationalization.106 Such discursive changes provide invaluable 
insight into the intellectual developments among an intellectual community. Law is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
106 Although Norman Calder has presented the most sensitive reading of changes and 
developments in post-formative law, he views juristic discourse as largely a form of intellectual 
patterning whose significance is self-referential. See Norman Calder, Islamic Jurisprudence in 
the Classical Era (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), chs. 1-2.   
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ultimately more than a collection of cases and verdicts. Rather, the reasoning of jurists 
plays an important and constructive role in the delineation of the ethical and intellectual 
principles that form a community, or at least in delineating the way that a community 
wanted to envision itself.    
 
IV. Theoretical Discourses of Islam 
 In addition to works of fiqh, I use theoretical works of uṣūl al-fiqh, kalām, and 
philosophy throughout this study. By the term “theoretical,” I mean that these 
aforementioned genres claim to ground other discourses by supplying the necessary 
premises, arguments, modes of reasoning, and forms of knowledge that make other fields 
of knowledge possible. For example, jurists define uṣūl al-fiqh as the knowledge required 
to derive and justify fiqh.107  
Scholars of Islamic law have analyzed this claim about the relation between uṣūl 
al-fiqh and fiqh from a number of perspectives.108 On the one hand, Hallaq largely 
embraces the claims of Muslim jurists about the relationship between these two genres. 
109 On the other hand, Sherman Jackson refers to uṣūl al-fiqh as “theory talk” that does 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
107 For examples, see Abū al-Wafā’ ‘Alī b. ‘Aqīl, Al-Wāḍiḥ fī uṣūl al-fiqh, ed. George 
Makdisi, 5 vols. (Beirut: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1996), vol. 1, pp. 1-2; ‘Alī b. Muḥammad al-
Āmidī, Bājī, Iḥkām al-fusūl fī aḥkām al-uṣūl, ed. ‘Abd al-Majīd al-Turkī (Beirut: Dār al-Gharb al-
Islāmī, 1984) vol. 1, p. 171; Ibn Qudāma, Rawḍa, p.4; Shīrāzī, Sharḥ, vol 1, pp. 161-163. 
 
 108For the most current overview of the secondary literature about uṣūl al-fiqh, see David 
R. Vishanoff, Formation, pp. xiii-xviii.  
 
 109 For Hallaq’s views, see Hallaq, “Fatwās,” pp. 29-65; Hallaq, “Model,” 109-134; 
Hallaq, “Gate,” pp. 3-41; Hallaq, “Was al-Shāfi‘ī the Master Architect of Islamic 
Jurisprudence?,” The International Journal of Middle East Studies 25, no. 4 (November 1993): 
pp. 587-605. In more recent writings, Hallaq has argued for the essentially dialectic nature of the 
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not prescribe or describe the derivation of law.110 Notwithstanding their contradictory 
views, both scholars of Islamic law agree that uṣūl al-fiqh provides jurists with a 
discursive paradigm.  
My ambition is not as lofty as Hallaq’s or Jackson’s to prove the global 
relationship between uṣūl al-fiqh and fiqh.  Rather, I want to examine the relationship of 
these two genres in terms of the subject of this study—uncertainty. In his trailblazing 
study of uṣūl al-fiqh, Aron Zysow argues that concern for issues of epistemology lies at 
the heart of uṣūl al-fiqh. According to him, uṣūl al-fiqh evolved out of the early legal and 
theological debates about the sources of law, nature of language, modalities of 
interpretation, and relationship that exists between God and the Islamic community. 111  
He details the different methods of reasoning, hermeneutic techniques, and sources of law 
that jurists employ in order to put law on a probabilistic if not a certain footing. He 
concludes the introduction to his study by stating that uṣūl al-fiqh offers scholars of Islam 
a more nuanced understanding of fiqh.112 Unfortunately, neither Zysow nor anyone else 
has analyzed the role of epistemological issues in fiqh, or the relationship between the 
epistemological issues in uṣūl al-fiqh and fiqh.113 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
prescriptive and descriptive character of uṣūl al-fiqh which appears to be a concession to open-
ended nature of uṣūl al-fiqh. Hallaq, Transformations, pp. 72-78.  
 
 110 Sherman A. Jackson, “ Fiction and Formalism: Towards a Functional Analysis of Uṣūl 
al-fiqh,” in Studies in Islamic Legal Theory, ed. Bernard G. Weiss (Leiden: Brill, 2002), pp. 178-
179. 
111  Zysow, Economy, p.1.  
 
112 Zysow, Economy, p. 4.  
 
113 In a thoughtful article, Aron Zysow shows that the relationship between kalām and 
uṣūl al-fiqh is more complex than the simple claim that kalām grounds or has infiltrated uṣūl al-
fiqh. Rather he points to the “associations” between kalām and uṣūl al-fiqh in order to show how 
	  	   76	  
In the following chapters, I compare the uncertainty associated with gharar to the 
varieties of uncertainty discussed in uṣūl al-fiqh and kalām. At first glance, the 
appearance of the term uncertainty (jahl) and the general concern of jurists to define 
certainty suggest a conceptual overlap between the theoretical discourses and fiqh. 
However, the forms of uncertainty associated with gharar and those discussed in uṣūl al-
fiqh and kalām are structurally and functionally different as I will demonstrate in the 
following chapters. Nevertheless, in both cases, certainty defines and subsumes the two 
forms of uncertainty.  
 
 V. Conclusion 
 In this chapter, I briefly contextualized the post-formative jurists and major genres 
that my study employs. Although the institutionalized schools of law produced these 
jurists, these jurists did not view their work as a simple repetition of the school’s 
opinions, notwithstanding their portrayal along these lines in biographical works. Rather, 
uncertainty was inherent in their intellectual production at levels of discourse that ranged 
from the word to the entire genres. It was the ability of jurists to locate differences within 
the school’s doctrines and interpret them that invited jurists to write. In fact, these jurists 
derived their legitimacy from knowledge of the discursive methods of the school. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
these two fields of scholarship interacted to define the status of various theological positions in 
Islamic history. Zysow, “Mu‘tazilism and Māturīdism in Ḥanafī Legal Theory,” in Studies in 
Islamic Legal Theory, ed. Bernard Weiss (Boston: Brill, 2002), p. 235.  In an earlier work, 
George Makdisi claims that Shāfi‘īs Risāla was a polemic against theology and philosophy but 
later uṣūl al-fiqh became a backdoor for these fields to gain entrance into the schools of law. See, 
George Makdisi, “The Juridical Theology of Shāfi‘ī: Origins and Significance of Uṣūl al-Fiqh,” 
in Studia Islamica 59 (1984): pp.  14, 16-18, 42-46. More recently, Lowry has evaluated the 
polemical context of the Risāla in order to question some of Makdisi’s assertions. For further 
details, see, Lowry, Theory, 298-318. 
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However, the fact that these discursive methods ground the work of jurists does not mean 
that their works necessarily form an organic unity between all areas of the legal 
discourse. Although gharar and uṣūl al-fiqh are both concerned with epistemology in the 
broadest sense, a close examination reveals how these two discourses construct 
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Chapter Two  
The Conceptualization of Uncertainty   
 This chapter examines the different types of uncertainty that form the conceptual 
architecture of gharar. By the term “conceptual”, I mean that jurists treat the causes of 
gharar as clearly defined and delineated forms of thought that they can employ to 
analyze and describe the legality of commercial transactions. Although jurists generally 
agree on the small number of forms of uncertainty that cause gharar, this chapter will 
study the different ways that each jurists conceptualizes these forms of uncertainty. As 
for the use of the term “architecture,” I mean that these forms of uncertainty have a 
hierarchical relationship that begins to reveal a rationality to the uncertainty associated 
with gharar.   The phrase “the conceptual architecture of gharar,” however,  presents the 
first and perhaps most intriguing paradox of this study. Generally speaking, concepts and 
hierarchies are supposed to be the sine qua non of knowledge, so what does it mean to 
conceptualize uncertainty?   
To begin to unravel and appreciate this paradox, we need a model of thought and 
more broadly of representation that will orientate the exploration of this question. 
Fortunately, in introductions of works of uṣūl al-fiqh and kalām, Muslim scholars 
generally present rich and nuanced theories of representation by defining the terms ‘ilm, 
ẓann, and jahl, which may be translated respectively as certainty, probabilistic 
knowledge, and uncertainty. These discussions offer a terminological and conceptual 
starting point for analyzing representation and uncertainty within discussions of gharar.  
In their analyses of the definitions of these epistemological terms, Muslim 
scholars attribute great importance to the subtle variations of their definitions of certainty. 
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However, the definitions of certainty generally have the structure: certainty (‘ilm) is 
thought of a referent as it really is (ma‘rifat al-ma‘lūm ‘alā mā huwa ‘alyahi).114 
Certainty thus results from an identity that perfectly equates thought and its referent, the 
ma‘lūm, in accordance with the latter, which governs knowledge and representation. 
Thoughts and statements are only correct when they copy the referent.  Furthermore, as 
we saw in the previous chapter with Ibn Qudāma, although thought of the referent is 
commensurable with this referent, it is not ontologically the referent itself.  
Similarly, definitions of uncertainty have the general form: uncertainty is thought 
of the referent contrary to the way it really is.115 With uncertainty the problem is not the 
abandonment of identitarian thought and representation characterized by discrete 
thoughts that take the form of concepts or predicates. 116  Rather, like certainty, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 114 For examples of definitions that correlate thought and its referent, see Abū Bakr 
Muḥammad b. al-Ṭayyib al-Bāqillānī, Kitāb al-Tamhīd, ed. Richard J. McCarthy (Beirut: 
Librairie Orientale, 1957), p. 6, ¶. 5; Abū Ḥusayn Muḥammad b. al-Bāṣrī, Kitāb al-Mu‘tamad fī 
uṣūl al-fiqh, ed. Muḥammad Ḥamīd Allāh, 2 vols. (Damascus: Institut Français de Damas, 1964), 
vol. 1 p. 10; Āmidī, Abkār, vol. 1, pp. 16-21; Bājī, Iḥkām, vol. 1, pp. 170-171; Ibn ‘Aqīl, Wāḍiḥ, 
vol. 1, pp. 3-4; Ibn Ḥazm, Al-Iḥkām fī uṣūl al-aḥkām, 8 vols. in 1 (Cairo: Maktabat al-Khānjī, 
1925), vol.1, pp. 36-39; Shīrāzī, Al-Luma’ fī uṣūl al-fiqh, ed. Yūsuf ‘Alī Baydawī (Damascus, 
Dār Ibn Kathīr, 2002), p. 29; Shīrāzī, Sharḥ, vol 1, pp. 146-148.  
 There are notable exceptions to this general structure. For examples that define certain 
knowledge as that which makes one a knower (‘ālim), a definition which is usually attributed to 
Ash‘arī, see, Āmidī, Abkār, vol. 1, p. 17; Ibn ‘Aqīl, Wāḍiḥ, p. 4; Ibn Qudāma, Rawḍat, p. 13. 
Another notable example is the definition attributed to Ibn Fūrak that certain knowledge is what 
necessitates the perfect judgment and action of one, see Āmidī, Abkār, vol. 1, p. 17.   
 Franz Rosenthanl has collected and categorized many of these different definitions. See, 
Franz Rosenthal, Knowledge, pp. 52-69.  
 
 115 Bājī, Iḥkām, p. 171; Abū Hāmid Muḥammad b. Muḥammad al-Ghazālī, Al-Mustaṣfā 
min ‘ilm al-uṣūl, ed. Sulaymān al-Ashqar, 2 vols. (Beirut: Mu‘assasat al-Risāla, 1997), vol. 1. p. 
67; Shīrāzī, Sharḥ, vol. 1, p. 151.  
 
 116 Throughout this study I employ the term concept in a rather loose fashion since some 
scholars advocated a nominalist theory of representation such as with the Basran Mu‘tazilites.  
For further details, see Richard MacDonough Frank, Beings and Their Attributes: The Teaching 
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uncertainty is the relation of thought and a referent, but this relation is incorrect. More 
disturbing for those seeking the correct identity, there are seemingly an infinite number of 
wrong combinations of thoughts and referents. The incorrect representation does not 
point the way to the correct identity in any essential manner so as to help one to make an 
informed and conscious decision. The relationship between uncertainty and certainty is 
thus akin to searching for a pin in haystack of errors.  
However, this infinite uncertainty is still bound to the system of identitarian 
thought characterized by discrete referents and thoughts.117 In addition, according to 
Muslim scholars, certainty and uncertainty are contraries, which in the Aristotelian 
conception of difference means that uncertainty and certainty cannot coexist in the same 
subject at the same time. Nevertheless, each contrary may be predicated of the same 
subject without essentially changing the subject.118  Notwithstanding the supposed 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
of the Basran School of the Mu‘tazila in the Classical Period (Albany: State University of New 
York Press, 1978), p. 27.  
 
117 In two thought provoking articles, Michael G. Carter examines the epistemological 
problems that the infinite syntheses associated with uncertainty give rise to in Islamic learning. 
According to Carter, the infinitude of uncertainty is equivalent to lies from the perspective of 
Muslim scholars. To address the problems that an infinite number of potential syntheses pose, 
Carter argues that Muslims developed a fixed corpus of knowledge that they ceaselessly repeated. 
See, Michael Carter, “Infinity and Lies in Medieval Islam,” in Philosophy and Arts in the Islamic 
World: Proceedings of the Eighteenth Congress of the Union Européenne des Arabists et 
Islamisants held at the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven (Leuven:  Peeters Press & Department of 
Oriental Studies, 1998), pp. 233-242. Carter, “More Infinity, More Lies: History, Truth and 
Change in Medieval Islam,” in Continuity and Change in the Realms of Islam: Studies in Honour 
of Professor Urbain Vermeulen. Eds.  K. d’Hulster and J. van Steenbergen (Leuven: Peeters 
Publishers & Department of Oriental Studies, 2008), pp. 105-115. 
   
118 For statements that these two terms are contraries, see Abū Ḥasan ‘Alī b. Ismā‘īl al-
Ash‘arī, Kitāb al-Luma‘ fī radd ‘alā ahl al-ziyagh wa’l-bida‘, in The Theology of Al-Ash‘arī, tr. 
Richard J. McCarthy (Beirut: Imprimerie Catholique, 1953), p. 11, ¶. 16; Ibn Ḥazm, Taqrīb, p. 
70; Abū al-Walīd Muḥammad b. Aḥmad b. Rushd, Kitāb al-Maqūlāt, in Talkhīṣ Manṭiq Arisṭū, 
ed. Jīrār Jahāmī, 3 vols. (Beirut: Manshūrāt al-Jāmi‘īya al-Lubānīya,1982), vol. 1, pp. 37-38. 
Interestingly, Āmidī expands the contraries of ‘ilm to include, doubt, probabilistic knowledge, 
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equality of uncertainty and certainty, both terms presume an identity between a finite 
referent and finite thought. To be precise, uncertainty presumes the correct combination 
of thought and its referent in order to invalidate all of the incorrect combinations.  
However, certainty does not require the infinite number of incorrect combinations 
between thoughts and referents that engender uncertainty in order to validate certainty. If 
these incorrect combinations were an essential aspect of certainty, then one would have to 
pass through each of them in order to obtain and validate the correct combination of 
thought and referent with respect to knowledge of something.  The validation of certainty 
would thus become a Sisyphean task. To best of my knowledge, no Muslim employs this 
reasoning to suggest that certainty and uncertainty have an unequal relationship. 
Nevertheless, in works of uṣūl al-fiqh and kalām, most scholars assert that humans have 
some innate certainty that grounds the acquisition of more knowledge and thus delimits 
uncertainty.119  On the hand, we will see in the conclusion of this chapter, that scholars 
claim that a human mind characterized by pure uncertainty without the least trace of 
certainty is impossible. Uncertainty is thus a by-product of the forms of certainty that one 
possesses.       
Although works of fiqh do not provide explicit discussions of representation and 
uncertainty, commercial law offers a starting point for examining these issues. In 
particular, jurists prohibit commercial transactions due to gharar, which has a number of 
causes. For my purposes, the most interesting causes are varieties of uncertainty, which, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
heedlessness, death, sleep, and speculation (naẓar). Āmidī, Abkār, vol. 1, p. 52. For a brief 
discussion of Aristotelian notions of difference, see, Gilles Deleuze, Différence et Répétition 
(Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1968), pp. 45-52.  
 
 119 Ibn Qudāma, Rawḍat, pp. 13-14; Shīrāzī, Luma‘, p. 30.  
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unlike the uncertainty mentioned in works of kalām and uṣūl al-fiqh, engender valid 
representations and legal judgments. In other words, the uncertainty associated with 
gharar functions like a form of certainty that allows one to make informed statements 
and decisions. To understand how this uncertainty enables valid judgments we need to 
examine 1) the conceptual architecture of uncertainty in discussions of gharar and 2) 
how gharar relates this conceptual architecture to the analysis of specific commercial 
transactions.  This chapter will address the first issue and the remaining chapters the 
second issue. 
 The uncertainty associated with uṣūl al-fiqh and kalām threatens representation by 
implying the possibility of an infinite number of incorrect combinations of thoughts and 
referents. However, gharar does not involve such an infinite and all-consuming notion of 
uncertainty. Rather, jurists identify a constellation of causes for gharar which derive 
from uncertainty with respect to: 1) the qualitative grade and quantity of the good, 2) the 
delivery date of the good, and 3) the ability to deliver the good. These forms of 
uncertainty function as concepts or defined moments of thought that enable valid 
representations and judgments with respect to particular transactions. In order to 
represent these forms of uncertainty, jurists employ several systems of knowledge to 
define each of these forms of uncertainty. In other words, knowledge enables the 
existence of these forms of uncertainty. 
 Below, I analyze all of the jurists’ uses of the term gharar in order to isolate the 
forms of uncertainty associated with it. This method does not imply that gharar and these 
associated forms of uncertainty are completely self-contained conceptual entities. Jurists 
frequently state that transactions have uncertainty without invoking the term gharar to 
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describe the transactions. The categories of uncertainty and certainty are generally more 
productive in the writings of jurists than the technical term gharar. However, gharar has 
manageable and rather well defined material and conceptual boundaries within legal 
works. Just as importantly, gharar opens the analysis of other concepts and modes of 
reasoning within Islamic commercial law and the wider tradition of the Islamic sciences.  
 Finally, although I analyze the conceptual architecture of uncertainty in the 
discourse about gharar, I do not claim to have direct access to the thoughts and cognitive 
processes of either jurists or hypothetical counterparties to a transaction characterized by 
gharar. According to discourse analysis and the statements of Ibn Qudāma about the 
forms of existence of referent and their relations, I have access only to discourse about 
these thoughts and cognitive processes. Foucault and Ibn Qudāma assume a certain 
commensurability between thought and discourse, but this does not mean that they are the 
same thing. Jurists and scholars knowingly or unknowingly labor upon this dissonance in 
order to address the issue of gharar as we will see throughout this study.     
   
I. Gharar As Fraud 
 Gharar as a technical legal term refers to particular forms of uncertainty that 
symmetrically affect the counterparties to commercial transactions in which both parties 
exchange countervalues. Thus, gharar would not directly apply to contracts like gifts. 
Some jurists, however, also employ the word gharar in the sense of fraud. Ibn Rushd 
begins his discussion of gharar by stating that, “The following sales are prohibited due to 
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fraud (ghabn) whose cause is gharar.”120 In fact, form I of the root gh-r-r  refers to 
fraud.121 Conversely, the word gharīr, from the form fa‘īl, which commonly has the same 
meaning as the form I passive participle, means to be someone’s trusted confident 
(kafīl).122 A full survey of the lexicographical tradition of this root is not germane here 
since these definitions do not directly figure in the discourses of my jurists.  
 Notwithstanding his equating fraud with gharar, Ibn Rushd devotes another 
section of the chapter on sales to a discussion of fraud (tadlīs) or potential losses 
(ḍarar).123  In this section on fraud, Ibn Rushd discusses the following sales: 1) a third 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
120 Ibn Rushd, Bidāya, vol. 3, p. 1198.  
 
 121 Abū Naṣr Ismā‘īl b. Ḥammād al-Jawharī, Tāj al-lugha wa-ṣiḥāḥ al-‘arabīya, ed. Imīl 
Badī‘ Ya‘qūb and Muḥammad Nabīl Ṭarīfī (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-‘Ilmīya, 1999), s.v. gh-r-r; E. 
Fagnan, Additions aux Dictionaires Arabes (Beirut: Librairie du Liban, 1960), s.v. gh-r-r; Edward 
W. Lane, Arabic-English Lexicon (London: Williams and Norgate, 1865), s.v. gh-r-r; J.G. Hava, 
Al-Farā’id al-Durrīya (Beirut: Catholic Press, 1951), s.v. gh-r-r; Muḥammad b. Durayd, Kitāb 
Jamharat al-lugha, ed. Ramzī Munīr Ba‘lbakkī (Beirut: Dār al-‘Ilm li’l-Malāyīn, 1987), s.v. r-gh-
gh; Muḥammad b. Mukarram b. Manẓūr, Lisān al-‘arab (Beirut: Dār al-Bayrūt, 1957), s.v. gh-r-r; 
Muḥammad Murtaḍā al-Zabīdī, Tāj al-‘Arūs, ed. ‘Abd al-Sattār Aḥmad Farrāj (Kuwait: Maṭba‘at 
Ḥukūmat al-Kuwayt, 1974), s.v. gh-r-r; Muḥammad b. Ya‘qūb al-Firūzābādī, Qāmūs al-muḥiṭ, 
(Beirut: Dār al-Jīl, 1970), s.v. gh-r-r; R. Dozy, Supplément aux Dictionnaires Arabes, 3rd ed. 
(Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1967), s.v. gh-r-r. Wehr contains a similar definition. See, Hans Wehr, 
Dictionary of Modern Written Arabic, ed. J.M. Cowan (Ithaca: Spoken Language Services, Inc., 
1994), s.v. gh-r-r. The pre-Islamic poet Imru’ al-Qays employs form IV, agharra, in his famous 
mu‘allaqa to describe how his character may have deceived a woman into hating him. Imru’ al-
Qays, Diwān Imri’ al-Qays, ed. Muḥammad Abū al-Faḍl Ibrāhīm, 3rd ed. (Cairo: Dār al-Ma‘ārif, 
1969), p. 13, l. 20.  In one of the earliest literary uses of this root in prose that I have located, 
Jāhiẓ uses this verb in this sense. Abū Uthmān b. Baḥr Jāhiẓ, Kitāb al-Bukhalā’, 2 ed. (Damascus: 
Dār al-Yaqẓa al-‘Arabīya, 1963), p. 45. 
 
122 Ibn ‘Abbād, Muḥīṭ; gh-r-r; Ibn Durayd, Jamharat, s.v. r-gh-gh; al-Firūzābādī, Qāmūs, 
s.v. gh-r-r Lane, Arabic-English, s.v. gh-r-r; Ibn Manẓūr, Lisān, s.v. gh-r-r; Al-Zabīdī, Tāj, s.v. 
gh-r-r. For a discussion of this noun form, see W. Wright, A Grammar of the Arabic Language, 
eds. W. Robertson Smith and M. J. de Goeje, 3rd ed., 2 vols. in 1 (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1967),  vol. 1, pp. 136, 146.  
 
123 Coulson argues that the word tadlīs comes from the Byzantine Greek “dolos” since 
both words share the same meaning and root d-l-s. According to him, this term is one example of 
how Muslim jurists adopted a large portion of technical terminology and institutions like the waqf 
from Roman and Sasanian law. Coulson, History, p. 28.   
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party making a counteroffer after the counterparties have agreed upon the terms to a sale 
(bay‘ al-rajul ‘alā akhīhi), 2) meeting a caravan to conduct a transaction on the highway 
instead of the city market (talaqqī al-rukkāb), 3) a city-dweller conducting business with 
or on behalf of a bedouin (bay’ al-ḥāḍir li’l-bādī),124 4) and submitting false bids in an 
auction (bay al-najash) in order to drive up the price.125 Interestingly, in the section about 
fraud, he does not use the term gharar to describe transactions.  Ibn Qudāma and Shīrāzī 
also use taghrīr and tadlīs to discuss these last three transactions. 126  
Although gharar and fraud arise from uncertainty, there is an important structural 
difference in the distribution of uncertainty in both cases. Ibn Qudāma states that when a 
seller defrauds a buyer, “he hides a defect which he knows so that the buyer imagines it 
does not exist.”127 With fraud, one counterparty exploits its certainty against an 
unsuspecting counterparty. This is the same kind of certainty and uncertainty found in 
works uṣūl al-fiqh and kalām.   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
124  Although most jurists prohibit these transactions in order to protect people from 
fraud, whom this law attempts to protect from fraud and why are issues of debate among jurists. 
For example, to Ibn Rushd, the goods of bedoiuns are nearly free from their perspectivas so that 
they will take a lower price. However, if city-dwellers help them get the best price this will harm 
the urban population at large. See, Ibn Rushd, Bidāya vol. 3, pp. 1229-1230. Ibn Ḥazm rejects 
these arguments and instead claims that the Prophet prohibited these sales to protect bedouin 
from possible fraud. See, Ibn Ḥazm, Muḥallā, vol. 8, p. 453, ¶ 1469. Khiraqī, a prominent 
Ḥanbalī jurist,  states that this sale is void if the bedouin makes a city-dweller his agent, does not 
know the prevailing market price of the good, and intended to sell the good in town. However, if 
one of these stipulations is not met the sale is licit. Ibn Qudāma, however, argues that a city-
dweller may buy for a bedouin since it protects the bedouin from being exploited. See, Ibn 
Qudāma, Mughnī, vol. 4, p. 163, ¶¶. 3072-3073.  
  
125 Ibn Rushd, Bidāya vol. 3, pp. 1227-1232.  
  
126 Ibn Qudāma, Mughnī, vol. 4, p 160, ¶. 3067; Shīrāzī, Muhadhdhab, vol. 3, p.144. 
 
127 Ibn Qudāma, Mughnī, vol. 4, ¶. 2984, p 114. Arabic reads, katamahu ‘an al-mushtarī 
ma‘a ‘ilmihi bihi aw ghaṭṭāhu ‘anhu bi-mā yūhim al-mushtarī ‘adamahu. Bājī makes a similar 
statement. See Bājī, Muntaqā, vol. 6, p. 532. 
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On the other hand, in the more usual discussions of gharar that I will examine 
below, uncertainty with respect to some element of the transaction affects both 
counterparties who are conscious of their uncertainty. Due the symmetrical distribution of 
uncertainty among the counterparties, jurists often compare contracts characterized by 
gharar to forms of gambling as we will see in the following chapter in more detail. Like 
ribā, gharar also poses an ethical problem for jurists. In the case of ribā, jurists do not 
think that it is ethical for one to receive a profit without assuming any commercial and 
legal liability. In the case of gharar, jurists do not think that it is ethical for one to either 
profit or lose money because of uncertainty with respect to certain elements of the 
transaction. In the following section, we will begin to examine what commercial 
uncertainty is from the perspective of jurists. 
 
II. Known-Unknowns, Unknown-Unknowns, and Discourse 
As the definitions of certainty and uncertainty presented in the introduction to this 
chapter indicate, thought must work on the finite.  If we take the insights of Ibn Qudāma 
into the role of discursive communities in defining the concepts and referents that lie 
behind words, then these concepts and referents can be of differing levels of complexity 
and differentiation. Nevertheless, one cannot think everything at once. When it comes to 
commercial transactions, one cannot worry about the infinite number of problems that 
might occur and to enumerate them would paralyze commerce.   
 Ibn Rushd al-Jadd (450-520/1058-1126) indicates the importance of defining a 
small number of uncertainties to analyze in commercial transactions. In his discussion of 
the salam contract, or the pre-paid forward contract in which one party pays immediately 
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to receive possession of a good at a later time, Ibn Rushd al-Jadd reports that some jurists 
permit this contract only if the good exists from the moment that the counterparties enter 
into the contract until the delivery date of the good. These jurists hold this position since 
the contract becomes due upon the death of either counterparty. Thus, the good must 
continuously exist for the contract to avoid gharar. However, Ibn Rushd al-Jadd responds 
in a tone of apparent exasperation,  
This argument is not compelling (lā yalzam) because if 
contracts are legally valid and safe from gharar, what may 
unintentionally happen later is not taken into consideration (fa-
lā yurā‘ā mā yaṭra’ ‘alayhā mimmā lam yuqṣad ilayhi) since if 
this were so no contract, salam, or sale would ever be legally 
valid!128    
 
Likewise, Ibn Ḥazm argues that if every form of uncertainty caused gharar, the sale of a 
sheep would be impossible since one cannot know if it would die in the next moment.129 
By enumerating the forms of uncertainty to analyze, jurists create a system of 
known-unknowns. At the same time, they also create–either explicitly or implicitly–the  
forms of uncertainty that have no standing in the legal system. These undefined forms of 
uncertainty become the unknown-unknowns that have no effect on the validity of 
contracts and thus no standing within the legal system. In both cases, knowledge defines 
both the known-unknowns that it will represent and unknown-unknowns that it will not 
directly represent.  
This division of uncertainty thus does not accord with some natural or purely 
pragmatic law. Returning to uncertainty about the potential death of a counterparty, it is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
128 Abū al-Walīd Muḥammad b. Aḥmad b. Rushd, Al-Muqaddimāt al-mumahhidāt, ed. 
Sa‘īd Aḥmad A‘rāb. 3. Vols. (Beirut: Dār al-Gharb al-Islāmī, 1988), vol. 2, p. 23. For further 
biographical details, see Makhlūf, Shajara, vol. 1, p. 129, no. 376. 
 
129 Ibn Ḥazm, Muḥallā, vol. 8, p. 389, ¶ 1421. 
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true that one cannot predict death. However, jurists could prohibit a sale on credit to 
someone who is on his deathbed. Such a restricted position is easy to analyze and it 
seems likely that traders thought about such situations. Even in cases of gharar, one can 
imagine different ways to define particular a form of uncertainty as we will see below in 
the case of uncertainty associated with the delivery of a good.   
 In the case of gharar, jurists define the forms of uncertainty, or the known-
unknowns, that cause gharar in two ways: 1) they develop typologies that detail the 
causes of gharar and 2) they analyze specific transactions characterized as having 
gharar. I will start with the typologies since they offer a convenient bird’s-eye view of 
the causes of gharar.  
 
a. Typologies of Uncertainty  
When trying to examine the forms of uncertainty that engender of gharar, it 
seems sensible to look for explicit typologies of uncertainty in discussions of jurists about 
gharar. However, only the Mālikīs explicitly typologize the causes of gharar whereas 
Shīrāzī implicitly creates a typology of them through the subheadings of his chapter on 
gharar.  Although these typologies provide an interesting starting point in understanding 
gharar, they are somewhat heterogeneous in terms of the causes enumerated and level of 
abstraction. For example, Bājī presents the most rudimentary and unusual typology of the 
causes of gharar. According to him, “Gharar is correlated with a transaction in three 
ways: through the contract, the counter-values of the transaction, and the delivery 
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date.”130  Although this brief statement connects gharar with various elements of the 
contract, it does not enumerate its causes.  
 In his subheadings of the chapter on gharar, Shīrāzī elaborates the following 
causes of gharar:  
1. Sale of something that seller does not own  
2. Sale of a good whose ownership is not yet legally valid, i.e. sale of dowry 
someone will receive 
3. Sale of a good whose delivery cannot be guaranteed 
4. Sale of a tangible good which is undefined (majhūl) 
5. Sale of something that cannot be examined at the time of the sale 
6. Sale with a blind counterparty 
7. Sale of something which can only be partially inspected 
8. Sale of something with a protective skin 
9. Sale of something whose quantity is undefined (majhūl) 
10. Sale of a fetus 
11. Sale of milk in the udder 
12. Sale of fleece on the back of a sheep 
13. Sale whose countervalue has yet to be defined at time of the contract 
(ma‘lūm) 
14. Sale of good whose price has yet to be defined at the time of the contract 
(ma‘lūm) 
15. Sale whose payment date is undefined at the time of the contract (majhūl) 
16. Sale that is contingent on some event, i.e. rainfall 
17. Sale with someone whose money is from a suspect source 
18. Sale of a pregnant slave whose fetus is excepted from the sale131  
 
As can be seen, some of the items in Shīrāzī’s list are forms of uncertainty that cause 
gharar in specific transactions. The sub-chapters 1-5, 7-9 and 13-16 are causes of 
gharar; however, jurists often combine some of these causes together, such as by treating 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
130 Bājī, Muntaqā, vol. 6, p. 399. Fa’l-gharar yat‘allaqa bi’l-mabī‘ min thalāthat awjuh 
min jihat al-‘aqd wa’l-‘iwaḍ wa’l-ajal. 
 
 131 Shīrāzī, Muhadhdhab, vol. 3, pp. 30-47. 
 
	  	   90	  
the description of the good and payment as one category. On the other hand, sub-chapters 
6,10-12, and 17-18 refer to particular transactions.132    
Of the jurists who offer a typology of the cause of gharar, Ibn Rushd presents the 
theoretically densest discussion. He begins his chapter about gharar by stating that, 
Gharar occurs in several different ways in sales due to 
uncertainty (jahl). Either the uncertainty involves:  
 
1. Specification of the object of the contract or of the type 
contract 
 
2. Description of the price and good of the sale, the quantity, or 
delivery date if there is one  
 
3. The good’s existence or the impossibility of getting it and this 
is related to the inability to deliver it 
 
4. The well-being of the good by which I mean its time until 
expiration133 
 
This passage arranges the causes of gharar into four distinct groups of uncertainty. 
However, the uncertainty associated with the contract and that associated with the 
remaining life of a good play a limited role in Ibn Rushd’s discussions of gharar. 
Furthermore, it is unclear why he combines uncertainty with respect to the quantity and 
quality of the good with that of the delivery date unless he conceives of the delivery date 
as a form of description and mensuration. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
132 The Mālikī Muḥammad b. Aḥmad b. Juzayy (693-741/1294-1340) explicitly provides 
a similar typology. See, Muḥammad b. Aḥmad b. Juzayy, Al-Qawānīn al-fiqhīya (Beirut: Dār al-
Qalam, 1977), pp. 169-170.  
 
133 Ibn Rushd, Bidāya, vol. 3, p. 1198. I have formatted the translation of this paragraph 
with the numbered sections in order to emphasize the key legal and commercial divisions that Ibn 
Rushd sets out in this paragraph. The Arabic reads, 1) Al-jahl bi-ta‘yīn al-ma‘qūd ‘alayhi aw 
ta‘yin al-‘aqd, 2) al-jahl bi-waṣf al-thaman wa’l-mathmūn al-mabī‘ aw bi-qadrihi aw bi-ajalihi in 
kāna hunālika ajal, 3) al-jahl bi-wujūdihi aw ta‘adhdhur al-qudra ‘alayhi wa-hādhā rāji‘ ilā 
ta‘dhdhur al-taslīm, 4) al-jahl bi-salāmatihi, a‘nī baqā’ahu. 
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 Ibn Rushd concludes with the statement, “Sales combine more or less of these 
types of uncertainty,” which offers two important insights into gharar.134 First, these 
forms of uncertainty are not simple contraries of certainty because they can exist in 
greater or lesser degrees. I will explore this point in more detail in the fourth chapter. 
Second, these forms of uncertainty can combine with one another.   
 Although the above typologies have some overlap in terms of the forms of 
uncertainty that engender gharar, these typologies are certainly quite different in terms of 
causes they enumerate. Furthermore, these typologies do not offer much insight into how 
these forms of uncertainty interact. Even when the typologies agree on a particular cause 
of gharar, this does not guarantee that the jurists share the same exact understanding of 
the cause. In order to address these issues, we will need examine the analyses of specific 
commercial transactions. The analyses indicate that jurists share a rather homogenous 
collection of forms of uncertainty that cause gharar and their modalities of interaction. 
Nevertheless, the jurists do not share a completely uniform understanding of each form of 
uncertainty. In the following section, I will examine forms of uncertainty that jurists treat 
as the primary causes of gharar.   
 
b. Sale of the Ma‘dūm and Representation  
 In order to determine the causes of gharar, we need a model of representation that 
will guide our reading of the legal analyses of specific transactions. The model of 
representation that I discussed in the introduction to this chapter offers a starting point for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
134  Ibn Rushd, Bidāya, vol. 3, p. 1198. 
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an analysis of how these forms of uncertainty represent gharar. This model of 
representation, which is implicit in the jurists’ discussions of gharar, subordinates 
representation to a referent. Or to put differently, representation works by describing the 
existence of some referent. Indeed, Ibn Ḥazm sums up this relation when he states that 
what does not exist cannot be represented through thought or language.135 In fact, jurists 
prohibit the sale of the non-existent (ma‘dūm) since they state that uncertainty with 
respect to the existence of the good causes gharar. This sale of the non-existent thus 
offers an important starting point for understanding gharar.  
In a number of recent studies about the Western philosophical traditions, scholars 
have examined non-existent entities like logical contradictions and empirically 
impossible objects in order to reveal how representation works on these entities.136 These 
non-existent entities bring to light in a highly stylized manner the essential premises 
about representation and existence within a given system of philosophy. For example, 
these studies reveal whether the primary existence of the referent is ontological, mental, 
or discursive within a given system of philosophy.  
By the sale of the non-existent, jurists do not mean anything as exotic as the 
round-square or a unicorn. Rather, it refers to the sale of empirically possible goods, such 
as the sale of the dates from a specific palm tree several years in the future or the sale of 
milk in the udder of an animal.  With these goods, jurists develop criteria by which to 
determine when these goods will exist and what can be said about them before they exist. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
135 Ibn Ḥazm, Taqrīb, p. 10.   
 
 136  See, Alain de Libera, La Référence Vide: Théories de la Proposition (Paris: Presses 
Universitaires de France, 2002); Jocelyn Benoist, Représentations sans Objet: Aux Origines de la 
Phénoménologie et de la Philosophie Analytique (Paris: P.U.F, 2001). 
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In other words, jurists develop a system to define a notion of commercial and legal 
existence of goods. As we will see in more detail in the following chapters, when a 
referent does not exist it engenders uncertainty. The sale of the non-existent reveals the 
following hierarchy of the forms of uncertainty associated with gharar: uncertainty with 
respect to the quantity and quality of the good, uncertainty with respect to the delivery of 
the good, and uncertainty with respect to the delivery date. In turn, other causes of gharar 
derive from these primary forms.  
More interestingly, these forms of uncertainty indicate how this discourse 
configures the existence of referents. For a good to exist means that one can make certain 
statements about it is quality and quantity, the ability to deliver it, and the date of 
delivery. I will return to this point in the following chapters. For now, I will briefly 
examine the sale of the non-existent since it serves as a useful introduction to the analysis 
of these three primary forms of uncertainty.  
 
i. Uncertainty with respect to the Quantity and Quality 
 In a discussion about the prohibition against the sale of unripe fruit from a 
specific garden, Ibn Ḥazm provides the most lucid discussion of uncertainty with respect 
to the quantity and quality of the good as a cause of gharar. At first glance, this 
prohibition is surprising, since one may sell fruit that does not yet exist by means of a 
salam contract.  Although I will examine this transaction in more detail in chapter four, 
the fundamental problem for jurists is that the seller may not substitute fruit of the same 
species for fruit from this specific garden. For example, if a blight befell the fruit of 
specific garden the seller could not fulfill the contract by delivering fruit that he bought 
	  	   94	  
from another garden since he would not know the quantity and quality of fruit that his 
garden would have produced. According to Ibn Ḥazm, the sale of this specific fruit is the 
sale of what has not been created (mā lam yukhlaq) and is therefore illicit since “perhaps 
it will not be created and if it is created only God knows (lā yadrī aḥad ghayr Allāh) its 
quantity and quality, so that this transaction is forbidden from every perspective.”137 This 
brief statement indicates that the sale of what does not exist entails two forms of 
uncertainty. First, there is uncertainty with respect to whether the good will ever exist. 
Second, there is uncertainty with respect to the quality and quantity of the good.  
 Ibn Qudāma, Shīrāzī, and Bājī agree that the sale of the non-existent good 
engenders uncertainty with respect to the quantity and quality of the good.138 On the other 
hand, while discussing ribā, Sarakhsī  states that every existent has a quantity and quality 
that allows its comparison with other existents.139 
Finally, Ibn Rushd also connects the non-existent to uncertainty with respect to 
quantity and quality of the good. By qiyās, he permits the sale of unripe fruit (mā lam 
yaṭib min al-thamar) if fruit of the same type has already ripened in the same orchard or a 
nearby one. He goes on to state that, “ Mālik likened gharar affecting a particular quality 
of something to gharar with respect to the thing itself (al-gharar fī'l-ṣifa shabbahahu 
bi’l-gharar fī’ ‘ayn al-shay’).”140 The argument relates the conception of existence as 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
137 Ibn Ḥazm, Muḥallā, vol, 8, p. 407, ¶. 1434. For other discussions of this prohibition in 
his writings, see vol. 8, p. 362, ¶. 1417; vol. 8, p. 458, ¶. 1471.   
 
138 Bājī, Muntaqā, vol. 6, p. 399; Ibn Qudāma, Mughnī, vol. 4, p. 157, ¶¶. 3061-3062; 
Shīrāzī, Muhadhdhab, vol. 3, p. 30. 
 
139 Sarakhsī, Mabsūṭ, vol. 12:4, p. 118. 
 
140 Ibn Rushd, Bidāya, vol. 3, p. 1198 
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such to systems of qualitative and quantitative description that I will examine below in 
more detail.  
 
ii. Uncertainty with Respect to the Delivery 
 Just as jurists posit an inability to describe and measure the non-existent, they also 
relate the non-existent to the inability to deliver it. Sarakhsī, who has the greatest interest 
in the concepts of existence and non-existence in commercial law, states that, 
“Ownership is one of the attributes of existents but the non-existent can only be described 
as non-existent. Ownership is an expression of the ability to deliver the good.”141 For 
Sarakhsī, the non-existent cannot be validly owned or sold because one cannot deliver it 
or accurately describe it.  
Bājī, Ibn Rushd, and Shīrāzī also indicate that this sale has uncertainty with 
respect to the ability to deliver. Whereas Bājī states this specifically in a discussion about 
the sale of an animal on the condition that it be pregnant, the other two jurists simply 
imply it.142 In particular, as we saw in his typology, Ibn Rushd treats uncertainty 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
141 Sarakhsī, Mabsūṭ, vol. 15:5, p. 109. The Arabic reads, wa’l-milk min ṣifāt al-mawjūdāt 
fa’l-ma‘dūm lā yūṣaf bi-shay’ siwā annahu ma‘dūm wa’l-milk ‘ibāra ‘an al-qudra. I base my 
understanding of the word qudra as the ability to deliver on the fact that two lines before this 
quotation, he states that a compensatory contract requires the exchange of ownership of property 
and the delivery of the property. In addition, in the beginning of the same chapter on leases and 
hires, he states that the validity of this contract does not rest on the existence and ownership at the 
time the contract is entered into, but on the ability to deliver (al-qudra ‘alā al-taslīm), vol. 15:5, 
p. 74. Ibn Rushd also uses the word qudra in his discussion of gharar to mean the ability to 
deliver a good, Ibn Rushd, Bidāya, vol. 3, p. 1198. Finally, al-Shīrāzī uses the verb qadara in his 
discussion of the gharar to mean the ability to deliver a good, Muhadhdhab, vol. 3, p. 33.  
 
 142 Bājī, Muntaqā, vol. 6, p. 399. 
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associated with the existence of the good and the ability to deliver it as one category.143 
Shīrāzī states that the sale of “the non-existent is something whose condition and ultimate 
outcome are unknowable.”144 This brief statement indicates that this sale has uncertainty 
with respect to the present and futures states of the good, which might hinder its delivery. 
 To the best of my knowledge, neither Ibn Ḥazm nor Ibn Qudāma equates the sale 
of the non-existent with uncertainty of the delivery of the good. Ibn Ḥazm explicitly 
argues that uncertainty associated with the ability to deliver the good does not cause 
gharar as we will see. As for Ibn Qudāma, the reason for his neglect of this issue is 
unclear since he does agree that uncertainty with respect to delivery causes gharar.  
 
iii. Uncertainty with Respect to the Delivery Date 
 Only Ibn Qudāma and Bājī explicitly address how the sale of the non-existent 
creates uncertainty in terms of its delivery date. Ibn Qudāma forbids the sale of the 
offspring of the offspring since it is the sale of the non-existent, which he claims 
engenders uncertainty with respect to the delivery date. With this sale, the exact delivery 
date cannot be specified at the time when counterparties enter into the contract.145  Bājī 
also forbids this transaction since long dated contracts entail an impermissible level of 
uncertainty with respect to ultimate date of delivery.146 Both jurists are concerned with 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
143 Ibn Rushd, Bidāya, vol. 3, p. 1198. 
 
144 Admittedly, the Arabic is problematic, but this sentence appears to parallel his 
definition of gharar which he gives two lines earlier, “al-gharar mā inṭawā ‘anhu amruhu wa-
khafā ‘alayhi ‘āqibatuhu.” Shīrāzī, Muhadhdhab, vol. 3, p. 30. 
 
 145 Ibn Qudāma, Mughnī, vol. 4, p. 157, ¶. 3061. 
 
 146 Bājī, Muntaqā, vol. 6, p. 359. 
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temporal uncertainty in this transaction, yet they formulate their concern in different 
ways. To remedy the uncertainty in this instance Ibn Qudāma requires a fairly narrowly 
defined delivery date to avoid uncertainty. Bājī, by contrast, emphasizes that any increase 
in the specific period of the delivery is directly proportional to an increase in the level of 
gharar.  
 
iv. Conclusion  
For most of the jurists examined in this chapter, the non-existent presents 
uncertainty in regard to the delivery of the good, its description, and its delivery date. 
Existence in commercial law is thus correlated against these three qualities. Nevertheless, 
the sale of the non-existent raises questions about how jurists define each form of 
uncertainty associated with gharar, and the application of these forms of uncertainty to 
describe the legality of specific transactions. The rest of this chapter will address the first 
question whereas the remaining chapters will examine the second question.     
 
c. Typology of Sales 
Gharar primarily arises within sales, although to a lesser extent it occurs in the 
context of partnerships and agency relationships as well.  In order to better understand the 
forms of uncertainty that I will analyze below, a brief overview of the different types of 
sales is required. In general, jurists distinguish between a sale of a good that is present 
during the bargaining session (bay‘ al-ḥāḍir), and one that is not present at the bargaining 
session (bay‘ al-ghā’ib) but is to be delivered at later a date. The first type covers 	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currency exchanges and conventional cash transactions. The second type refers to the 
salam and bay’ al-ajal contracts, or a pre-paid forward contract and credit sale 
respectively.147 The latter type of sales presents the following three forms of uncertainty: 
1) that associated with the quantity and description of the good, 2) that associated with 
the delivery of the good, and 3) that associated with the delivery date.   
Although the second type of sales presents several forms of uncertainty, gharar 
can also occur in the first type of sales, as I will show in the following chapter in more 
detail. More importantly, even though jurists acknowledge that the salam contract 
involves uncertainty, they permit it. Jurists thus distinguish the traits that the salam 
contract possesses from contracts with gharar.  Due to the resonances between the forms 
of uncertainty that cause gharar and potential for uncertainty with respect to the salam 
contract, I rely upon the jurists’ discussions about the salam contract in order analyze 
gharar as it affects both types of sales.  
 
III. Primary Forms of Uncertainty 
a. Uncertainty with Respect to the Delivery Date 
 Uncertainty with respect to the delivery date primarily affects transactions like 
the salam contract and credit sales, which have delayed either the delivery of the good of 
the contract or the payment of the contract. As with many of the causes of gharar 
considered as contract terms, it seems commonsensical that a creditor will want to know 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
147 For systematic discussions of the distinction between these two types of sales, see 
Bājī, Muntaqā, vol. 6, p. 284, Ibn Ḥazm, Muḥallā, vol, 8, pp. 336-337, ¶ 1411; Ibn Rushd, 
Bidāya, vol. 3, pp. 1159, 1211.  
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when he will be paid or take delivery of his good.148 Nevertheless, to state that the 
delivery date is undefined (majhūl) or defined (ma‘lūm) implies a number of anterior 
systems of knowledge about how to specify the delivery date, which calendar system to 
employ, and how the length of time affects gharar. In other words, a number of systems 
of  knowledge define this form of uncertainty. Notwithstanding the fact that these issues 
of the delivery date are interrelated, I will examine each one separately.  
 
i. Date Selection 
 Although jurists prohibit uncertainty with respect to the delivery date, they differ 
regarding the definitions of uncertainty and certainty in this context. All of them 
examine events upon which the delivery date may be contingent. For example, Bājī 
permits the stipulation of delivery on the distribution of the ‘aṭā’, or payday of soldiers, 
since the date is known and delivery is due on that date regardless of whether the 
government pays the soldiers or not. He also permits stipulating the delivery upon the 
return of a pilgrim from ḥajj or the harvest of a specific crop. As for the harvest, Ibn 
Rushd states that this has a minimal amount of gharar since the date of the harvest of a 
specific type of crop varies so little from year to year. 149  In other words, the historical 
occurrences of past harvests enable one to forecast its probable future occurrences with 
enough certainty.    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
148  Although Sarakhsī does not appear to explicitly equate this form of jahl with gharar, 
he requires the counterparties of salam to specify a delivery date. See, Sarakhsī, Mabsūṭ, vol. 
12:4, pp.124-125.   
  
149 Bājī, Muntaqā, vol. 6, pp. 399-400; Ibn Rushd, Bidāya, vol. 3, p. 1300. 
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 On the other hand, Shīrāzī and Ibn Ḥazm grant no role to probability in these 
cases. According to Shīrāzī, the date is uncertain if the counterparties stipulate it with 
reference to the payday of soldiers or return of a particular pilgrim.150 Ibn Ḥazm argues 
that, “The harvest may be a few days earlier than expected if there was a lot of rain or 
later if was dry. As for the ‘aṭā’, that may be cancelled altogether.”151 Furthermore, 
Shīrāzī and Ibn Ḥazm interpret contracts literally so as to require the actual payment of 
the soldiers before the delivery of the good of the contract. If the payment date comes 
but the government defaults on paying the soldiers, Shīrāzī and Ibn Ḥazm argue that the 
seller does not have to deliver the good since the stipulation makes the delivery 
contingent on the actual payment of the soldiers. Although it is unsurprising that a Ẓāhirī 
jurist would reject inductive reasoning in issues of law, it is somewhat surprising that a 
Shāfi‘ī jurist, supposedly the great champions of analogy and probabilistic reasoning 
that necessarily entails notions of contingency, would take the same position.   
 As for delivery on a fixed date, Bājī permits the counterparties to pick a 
particular day in the month, otherwise if they specify only the month the delivery is 
assumed to be due on the first day of the month.152 Ibn Qudāma states that one may 
either specify a particular day of the month, some part of the month such as the 
beginning, middle, or end, or common Islamic holidays.153 Finally, Ibn Ḥazm and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
150 Shīrāzī, Muhadhdhab, vol. 3, pp. 45-46. 
 
151 Ibn Ḥazm, Muḥallā, vol, 8, pp. 444-445, ¶. 1464. 
 
152 Bājī, Muntaqā, vol. 6, p. 306. 
 
153 Ibn Qudāma, Mughnī, vol. 4, p. 220, ¶. 3184. 
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Shīrāzī argue that the counterparties must specify the exact hour of a particular day.154 
Shīrāzī argues that if one were to stipulate the delivery on some day, month, or year 
there would be no reason to assume the specific moment that delivery is due since each 
moment could be the intended moment of delivery.155 This ambiguity creates a level of 
uncertainty that Ibn Ḥazm and Shīrāzī deem unacceptable. 
 
ii. Calendar Systems 
 Only Ibn Qudāma, Ibn Ḥazm, and Shīrāzī examine the role of the calendar 
system employed in delineating the certainty and uncertainty of the delivery date. Both 
Ibn Qudāma and Ibn Ḥazm agree that Muslims should employ the Islamic lunar 
calendar. As for the use of non-Islamic calendars, Ibn Qudāma divides these into two 
types. The first employs a solar calendar or non-Islamic holidays, which occur on the 
same days each year. Ḥanbalī jurists like al-Khiraqī and Ibn Abī Mūsā forbid the use of 
these calendars to stipulate a delivery date since they are not lunar months and  “it is like 
one who enters into a salam contract for delivery on Palm Sunday or Passover, which is 
illicit because many Muslims do not know when these occur.” In fact, Palm Sunday and 
Passover are not celebrated on the same day of the solar year. On the other hand, Shīrāzī 
permits the use of these calendars and holidays since, he claims, they are well-known 
among Muslims.156   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
154 Ibn Ḥazm, Muḥallā, vol, 8, p. 445, ¶. 1464. 
 
155 Shīrāzī, Muhadhdhab, vol. 3, pp. 171, 173. 
 
156 Ibn Qudāma, Mughnī, vol. 4, pp 220-221, ¶. 3184. 
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As for the second category, non-Islamic holidays that do not occur on a fixed day, 
but are contingent on an event like a moon sighting such as with Passover or Palm 
Sunday, Ibn Qudāma states that,  
Muslims do not know when they occur and it is impermissible to 
follow non-Muslims whose claims are rejected since they make 
the holidays earlier or later on the basis of their own reckoning, 
which Muslim cannot know.157  
 
He then claims that both contracting parties must understand the date and system used to 
assign the delivery date.158Although he does not explain why a Muslim could not know 
these states, Ibn Ḥazm openly states that he distrusts non-Muslims to inform Muslims 
accurately about the occurrence of these holidays.159 Although perhaps distasteful by 
contemporary standards, the views of Ibn Ḥazm and Ibn Qudāma reflect anterior views 
about the relations between Muslims and non-Muslims, which structure how these jurists 
define certainty and uncertainty in regard to the specification of the delivery date. 
 
iii. Length of the Period  
 Only Bājī and Shīrāzī examine uncertainty in terms of the delivery date in regard 
to the length of time until the good is delivered. They discuss this issue in their treatments 
of the salam contract in which one party pays at the time of entering into the contract and 
takes delivery at a later date. According to Bājī, Ibn al-Qāsim found a delivery twenty 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
157 Ibn Qudāma, Mughnī, vol. 4, p 221, ¶. 3184. Li-anna al-muslimīn lā ya‘rifūnahu wa-
lā yujāz taqlīd ahl al-dhimma fīhi li-anna qawlahum ghayr maqbūḍ wa-li-annahum 
yuqaddimūnahu wa-yu’akhkhirūnahu ‘alā ḥisāb lahum lā ya‘rifuhu al-muslmūn. 
 
158Ibn Qudāma, Mughnī, vol. 4, p 221, ¶. 3184. 
  
159 Ibn Ḥazm, Muḥallā, vol, 8, p. 445, ¶. 1464. 
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years later reprehensible (makrūh), but he invalidated only transactions that had delivery 
dates for eighty or ninety years later. Such a distant delivery date presents uncertainty in 
regards to whether the counterparties will be alive.160 On the other hand, Shīrāzī permits a 
salam contract in which delivery occurs on the same day of concluding the contract since 
it has less gharar than longer dated contracts.161  
 In addition to discussions about the length of delay in the delivery date, Sarakhsī 
and Shīrāzī also discuss how the length of time to the expiration of an option (khiyār) 
affects the level of gharar. Shīrāzī prohibits the buyer from having an option to cancel a 
sale more than three days after the completion of the contract due to excessive gharar. He 
bases his opinion on a ḥadīth, which he interprets to bear on the issue of gharar, that 
permits an option for at most three days. He reasons a fortiori that if three days is 
permissible than fewer days should be even more so due to less gharar.162  
Although the eponym of the Ḥanafī school and his students knew this ḥadīth, they 
took different stances on the maximum length of such an option. Abū Ḥanīfa permits a 
maximum length of three days whereas his students permit an option for any length of 
time as long as the period of the option’s life is stipulated in the contract. On the basis of 
qiyās, some jurists prohibit any such option on the grounds that is possesses gharar. 
Sarakhsī, however, rejects this stringent view due to the aforementioned ḥadīth that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
160 Bājī, Muntaqā, vol. 6, p. 401. 
 
161 Shīrāzī, Muhadhdhab, vol. 3, pp. 162-163.Interestingly, Sarakhsī rejects the claim that 
a salam contract that is due immediately has less gharar, since he argues that the seller has less 
time to procure the good. Sarakhsī, Mabsūṭ, vol. 12:4, p. 126. 
 
162 Shīrāzī, Muhadhdhab, vol. 3, pp. 13-14. A discussion of the rules regulating options in 
the different schools of law is outside of the scope of this study. 
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permits an option of three days. Nevertheless, he states that this ḥadīth does not justify a 
longer period since, “the permissibility of the contract with a little bit of gharar does 
indicate the permissibility with respect to a lot of gharar.”163 
 
iv. Summary of the Discussions of Uncertainty with Respect the Delivery Date 
 In this section, I examined the epistemic systems that jurists employ to define the 
uncertainty associated with the delivery date. Although these jurists agree that uncertainty 
with respect to the delivery date can invalidate certain transactions, they disagree about 
the standards used to define this uncertainty. Bājī and Ibn Rushd have a minimalist 
standard of what constitutes certainty; whereas Ibn Ḥazm and Shīrāzī generally have a 
stricter one. However, the two sets of jurists employ different forms of reasoning and 
legal mechanisms in order to justify their positions. In the case of designating the harvest 
as the delivery date, Ibn Rushd and Bājī use the probability of the occurrence of events to 
define certainty.164 In addition, Ibn Rushd and Bājī allow the date of the payday to be 
used to specify the delivery date. Ibn Ḥazm and Shīrāzī on the other hand, interpret this 
stipulation literally as requiring the payment of the soldiers in order to require the 
delivery of the good. Ultimately the definition of uncertainty and its contrary, certainty, 
are related to anterior discursive systems of dating, modes of reasoning, and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
163 Sarakhsī, Mabsūṭ, vol. 13:5, pp. 17, 41. 
 
164  Ibn Ḥazm’s rejection of probability here is in keeping with what Zysow refers as the 
materialist position of the Ẓāhirīs who rejected probabilistic knowledge (ẓann). Nevertheless, he 
notes that the definition of probabilistic knowledge changed over the centuries for them. See, 
Zysow, Economy, pp. 3-4.   
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hermeneutics. Thus, the definition of this form of uncertainty depends on a number of 
forms of knowledge to delineate its contours.  
 In addition, the discussions of Ibn Qudāma and Ibn Ḥazm acknowledge 
explicitly the role of convention in the definition of the contours of uncertainty and 
certainty. It is the counterparties’ mutual knowledge that leads to certainty and 
consequently to the definition of uncertainty. Designating a delivery date is a discursive 
act that requires a shared practice among participants. 
 
b. Uncertainty with Respect to the Description of the Good 
 All of our jurists agree that uncertainty with respect to the quality and quantity 
causes gharar.165 The quantity and quality of a good are essential for valuing and more 
broadly representing a good in the eyes of jurists.  According to Ibn Ḥazm, a legally 
binding contract requires the mutual consent (al-tarāḍī) of both counterparties, but 
consent cannot occur when either one or both counterparties are uncertain.166  Below, I 
examine the forms of knowledge that jurists employ to define this form of uncertainty. 
Like the epistemic systems employed to define the delivery date, these systems are 
anterior to being employed to discussions of gharar such that knowledge enables the 
definition of this form uncertainty.   
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
165 In fact, there are several transactions where jurists allow an exchange although one of 
the countervalues is uncertain to both counterparties. We will examine the exceptions to this 
requirement in more detail in the following chapter.  
 
166 Ibn Ḥazm, Muḥallā, vol. 8, p. 341, ¶. 1413; p. 439 ¶.1461; v. 9, p. 20, ¶. 1524. 
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i. Uncertainty of the Quality 
Most jurists employ the word ṣifa, or qualitative grade (henceforth simply 
quality), to discuss the information about a good that counterparties require.167 The term 
“quality” implies a high resolution of descriptive knowledge about a good. In fact, 
Shīrāzī’s and Sarakhsī’s use of the terms ‘ayn, or specific and tangible property, and jins, 
or genus, respectively suggest the need for this anterior descriptive information. 168 These 
requirements and varying technical vocabulary raise the following interconnected 
questions: 1) why is this form of uncertainty so important, 2) how does one acquire 
certainty with respect to the quality of a good, and 3) how does one describe a good with 
sufficient precision? 
 The answer to the first question is rather straightforward. An accurate description 
of the quality of the good allows one to value it. According to jurists, the description of 
the quality must be accurate enough to allow the counterparties to differentiate between 
the prices of similar goods.169 The value of and description of a good are thus not 
absolute or intrinsic characteristics of it, but rather they are relational. For example, Bājī 
notes that a slight increase in the fat content of meat can double its price.170  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
167 Bājī, Muntaqā, vol. 6, pp. 36, 144,185, 216, 399,401, 405-406, 543; Ibn Ḥazm, 
Muḥallā, vol. 8, p. 389, ¶. 1421; p. 407, ¶. 1434; p. 458 ¶. 1471; Ibn Qudāma, Mughnī, vol. 4, p. 
157, ¶. 3061; Ibn Rushd, Bidāya, v. 3, pp. 1198,1206, 1215.  
 
168 Shīrāzī, Muhadhdhab, vol. 3, pp. 34; Sarakhsī, Mabsūṭ, vol. 12:4, p. 163. 
 
169 Bājī, Muntaqā, vol. 6, pp 296-297; Ibn Qudāma, Mughnī, vol. 4, p. 207, ¶. 3158; 
Sarakhsī, Mabsūṭ, vol. 12:4, p. 136; Shīrāzī, Muhadhdhab, vol. 3, p. 170.    
 
170 Bājī, Muntaqā, vol. 6, p. 298. 
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As for the acquisition of certainty with respect to the quality of a good, one 
method is the visual inspection of it when the counterparties negotiate the contract. 
However, this method is problematic since fraud may subvert the value of an inspection. 
Furthermore, the Mālikīs argue that a more complex good like a house requires a 
substantial amount of time to analyze. The acquisition of certainty through sight is thus 
not certain or instantaneous in the context of commercial law, contrary to the claims of 
works of uṣūl al-fiqh and kalām, in which sensory data leads to necessary and immediate 
certainty.171   
A verbal description of the good is another method to obtain certainty with 
respect to the quality of a good.172 In the introduction to this chapter, I noted that in 
works of uṣūl al-fiqh and kalām, authors generally claim that language maps perfectly 
onto thought and existence.173 The relation between language, thought, and referent is, 
however, more complex in commercial law as we will see below in more detail.  
Although Bājī claims that a visual inspection is a better method to obtain certainty with 
respect to the good, the other jurists suggest the equivalence between thought and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 171 For examples of this claim, see Bājī, Iḥkām, pp. 170-171; Ibn ‘Aqīl, Wāḍiḥ, pp. 8-9; 
Ibn Qudāma, Rawḍat, pp. 13-14; Shīrāzī, Sharḥ, vol. 1, pp. 148-149. In fact, authors of these 
genres often recognize that the senses can be deceived. For example, although a shadow appears 
to be motionless, a careful study of it over a sufficiently long period of time reveals that it is 
constantly moving. See Abū Ḥāmid Muḥammad b. Muḥammad al-Ghazālī, Al-Munqidh min al-
dalāl (Beirut: Commssion Internationale pour la Traduction des Chefs-d’Oeuvre, 1959), pp. 12-
13. ‘Aḍud al-Dīn ‘Abd al-Raḥmān b. Aḥmad al-Ījī, Kitāb al-Mawāqif, ed. ‘Abd al-Rahmān 
‘Umayra, 3 vols. (Beirut: Dār al-Jīl, 1997), vol. 1, pp. 83-91.  
 
172 Bājī, Muntaqā, vol. 6, pp. 285, 301, 364; Ibn Ḥazm, Muḥallā, vol, 8, p. 343, ¶. 1413; 
Ibn Qudāma, Mughnī, vol. 3, p. 496,¶. 2773, vol. 4, pp. 211-212, ¶. 3164; Ibn Rushd, Bidāya, vol. 
3, pp. 1211-1212. 
 
173 In chapter five, I will examine how the interaction of certainty from these two sources 
actually creates uncertainty.   
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communication with these two modes of acquiring certainty with respect to the quality of 
a good.174  
Nevertheless, Ibn Qudāma argues that an overly exact verbal description is not 
only unnecessary, but creates another form of uncertainty—that associated with the 
delivery of the good.  According to him,   
An exhaustive description (istiqṣā’ kull al-ṣifāt) is unnecessary 
because it is impossible (yata‘adhdhar), and such a description  
might lead to a situation where the delivery of the good of the 
salam contract would become impossible since the existence of 
the good of the salam contract with all of those qualities upon 
the delivery date becomes improbable (yab‘ad wujūd al-muslam 
fīhi ‘ind al-maḥall)…. because one of the requirements of a 
salam contract is that existence of its good should be widespread 
upon the delivery date.175    
 
This passage thus raises the astonishing paradox that more certainty simultaneously 
creates more uncertainty. Generally speaking, the acquisition of certainty is conceived of 
as step forward along a linear epistemological path. However, the typologization of the 
forms of uncertainty in discussions of gharar may create non-linear epistemological 
paths such that the acquisition of one form of certainty might increase a different form of 
uncertainty. This point is in keeping with my larger argument that certainty creates 
uncertainty. However in the context of gharar, jurists convert these non-linear 
interactions into a linear path through the ultimate subordination of all forms of 
uncertainty to the description and method of purchase of goods as I will show below in 
more detail.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 174 Bājī, Muntaqā, vol. 6, p. 301. 
 
175 Ibn Qudāma, Mughnī, vol. 4, pp. 211-212, ¶. 3164. 
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To determine which qualities of a good must be described in the contract, jurists 
develop a system of what I will refer to as “essential” qualities. Knowledge of these 
essential qualities through a verbal description makes a contract licit and provides the 
information required for a buyer to value the good instead of needing to inspect the good.  
Returning to Bājī’s example of the sale of meat in which a little change in the fat content 
of meat may double its price one would expect that jurists would require the most 
extensive description. However, Bājī notes that an exhaustive description of a good is 
unnecessary since many qualities do not affect its price. For example, extra lean meat 
seldom varies much in price from that of lean meat.176 Thus we need a list of the essential 
qualities that would mediate both the analysis of a given good and its verbal description. 
 For the most part, jurists, however, do not elaborate such a comprehensive 
typology of goods and their essential qualities. Ibn Ḥazm, Ibn Rushd, and Shīrāzī merely 
state that the good must be described comprehensively (yanḍabiṭ bi’l-ṣifa) so as to allow 
one to discriminate between the prices of it and similar goods.177 Bājī adopts a similar 
position, but adds that the description must also take into account the purpose of the good 
(aghrāḍ).178 This stipulation reflects the Mālikī position that the usufruct more accurately 
defines an object than its common name does.179 Sarakhsī states that the counterparties 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
176 Bājī, Muntaqā, vol. 6, pp. 297-298. 
 
177 Ibn Ḥazm, Muḥallā, vol, 9, p. 113, ¶ 1620; Ibn Rushd, Bidāya, vol. 3, p. 1296; Shīrāzī, 
Muhadhdhab, vol. 3, pp. 163-164. 
 
 178 Bājī, Muntaqā, vol. 6, pp. 297-298. Thus the Mālikīs allow one to trade goods with the 
same name unequally if they have different usufructs notwithstanding the prohibition on ribā.   
 
 179 Bājī, Muntaqā, vol. 6, pp. 28-30. 
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must know the genus, species, and qualitative grade of the good.180 Only Ibn Qudāma 
creates a typology of several different types of goods and the grades that must be defined 
in a contract.181 Nevertheless, his typology does not cover every conceivable object. 
It seems puzzling that only Ibn Qudāma creates a typology of the essential traits 
of goods notwithstanding their importance for a valid sale. A cursory review of works of 
shurūṭ, or legal formula, which notaries used as reference works to draw up contracts, 
reveals more detailed lists of goods and their essential qualities that must be described for 
a contract to be valid. For example, Suyūṭī (849-906/ 1445-1501), the Shāfi‘ī polymath, 
includes a list of descriptions for numerous goods in his shurūṭ work.182 Aḥmad b. 
Mughīth al-Ṭulaytulī (d. 459/1067), a Mālikī jurist, even creates a typology of the 
descriptions of the charms of female slaves.183 Nevertheless, this genre does not 
exhaustively typologize the descriptive qualities of all goods either.184  
Returning to sales, jurists disagree about which goods may be sold on the basis of 
a description. On the one hand, jurists argue that goods like grain and minerals may be 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
180 Bājī, Muntaqā, vol. 6, p. 405; Sarakhsī, Mabsūṭ, vol. 12:4, p. 124.  
 
 181 Ibn Qudāma, Mughnī, vol. 4, pp. 212-216, ¶¶. 3165-3176. 
 
 182 Jalāl al-Din ‘Abd al-Raḥmān al-Suyūṭī, Jawāhir al-‘uqūd, ed. Mas‘ad ‘Abd al-Ḥamīd 
Muḥammad al-Sa‘danī, 2 vols. (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-‘Ilmīya,1996), vol. 2, pp. 117-119. For 
more discussions of the descriptions of goods of the salam contract, see Abū Ja‘far Aḥmad b. 
Muḥammad Ṭaḥāwī, Kitāb al-shurūṭ al-kabīr, in The Function of Documents in Islamic Law, ed. 
Jeanette Wakin (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1972), 193-200.  
 
 183 Aḥmad b. Mughīth al-Ṭulaytulī, Al-Muqni‘ fī-‘ilm al-shurūṭ, ed. Francisco Javier 
Aguirre Sadaba (Madrid: Instituto de Cooperación con el Mundo Árabe, 1994). 
 
184  A far more interesting source for a typology of qualities of goods is a short epistle 
attributed to Jāhiẓ that discusses valuable goods like animals, gems, and fabrics. See, Abū 
Uthmān b. Baḥr al-Jāhiẓ, Kitāb al-tabaṣṣur bi’l-tijāra, ed. Ḥasan ‘Abd al-Wahhāb (Cairo: Dār al-
Kitāb al-Jadīd). 
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sold on the basis of a verbal description. On the other hand, they disagree about other 
goods that cannot be sold on the basis of description. The distinction between goods that 
may be sold on the basis of verbal descriptions and those that may not relates to the 
distinction between fungible and non-fungible goods. Whereas fungible goods 
supposedly have an objective description, non-fungible goods do not.   
For example, Bājī, Ibn Qudāma, and Shīrāzī agree that animals may be sold on 
the basis of a verbal description.185  Only Ibn Qudāma outlines the qualities that must be 
described in order to sell animals.186 On the other hand, Sarakhsī is skeptical about the 
ability to accurately describe animals. This is not because he is unaware of these systems 
of description. Rather, he claims that, 
You can find two horses of the same age and quality but you will 
pay double for one of them due to some non-manifest reason like 
its gait or temperament… Thus if the animals cannot be 
categorized as essentially similar in terms of their monetary value 
by mentioning their traits then we hold that they cannot be sold in 
a transaction by a salam contract.187 
 
For Sarakhsī, these animals defy any description that would correlate their representation 
and their value since they possess traits that do not immediately manifest. More 
importantly, unlike fungible goods, the valuation of non-fungible goods depends on the 
subjective tastes of the buyer.  
Sarakhsī’s opinion implies that there are two models of representation if one 
wants to maintain the categories of objectivity and subjectivity as Sarakhsī’s quotation 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 185 Bājī, Muntaqā, vol. 6, p. 298; Shīrāzī, Muhadhdhab, vol. 3, p. 163. 
 
 186 Ibn Qudāma, Mughnī, vol. 4, pp. 212-216, ¶. 3168. 
 
187 Sarakhsī, Mabsūṭ, vol. 12:4, pp. 132-133. 
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implies. With fungible goods, language maps onto thought so as to enable objective 
representations and valuations within legal discourse. In other words, language can 
accurately represent these goods such that a valid description of the good is legally and 
commercially equivalent to an inspection of it. On the other hand, with non-fungible 
goods, the good does not essentially mediate thought and language, rather our subjective 
values do. In this case, there is no objective means to describe the good such that 
different buyers would each assign the same price to the good. Rather, with non-fungible 
goods, buyers assign different prices to the same good due to their different personal 
values.  
However, this distinction between the objective representations of fungible goods 
and subjective representations of non-fungible goods cannot be either objective or 
subjective. If this distinction had an objective basis then non-fungible goods would on 
some level have an objective representation. Conversely, if these distinctions were purely 
subjective then the fungible goods would not have representations that permit different 
people to reach the same valuations of these goods. Rather the distinction is ultimately 
discursive and reflects the different ways that jurists configure representation within 
commercial law.  
   
ii. Uncertainty with Respect to the Quantity 
Beyond a lack of knowledge about the quality of a good, jurists also agree that the 
quantity of the good of the transaction may not be unknown. By good, they mean not 
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only something like a dress, but also money, a countervalue of many trades.188  
Furthermore, they frequently pair uncertainty in terms of the quality of the good and its 
quantity in their discussions of gharar.189 At first glance, one might suspect that 
uncertainty with respect to the quantity occurs when one sells a good without quantifying 
it. However, one may sell a pile of wheat without quantifying it (juzāf). This prohibition 
is further nuanced by the fact that even if one measures the good, this measurement might 
increase uncertainty as we will see in the fifth chapter.  
Jurists recognize four forms of mensuration: counting, weighing, length 
measurement, and volumetric measurement.  However, the method of measuring a 
specific object is a matter of convention. Shīrāzī and Sarakhsī argue that the 
counterparties must measure a specific object according to the method used for it in the 
Hejaz during the life of the Prophet. For example, if a good was sold by volume in the 
Hejaz during the Prophet’s lifetime, it should be sold the same way today. If there is no 
report about how it was measured, Sarakhsī permits the use the convention (‘urf) of a 
particular market.190 Shīrāzī either uses qiyās to extend the methods of the Hejaz or 
follows the convention of a particular market. 191 Ibn Qudāma adopts the view of Shīrāzī 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
188 Bājī, Muntaqā, vol. 6, pp 26, 69, 247, 399-400; v.7, p. 94; Ibn Ḥazm, Muḥallā, vol, 8, 
pp. 444, ¶ 1464; vol. 9, p. 14, ¶. 1515; vol. 9, p. 21, ¶. 1526; vol. 9, p. 23, ¶. 1531; Ibn Qudāma, 
Mughnī, vol. 4, p. 229, ¶. 3198; Ibn Rushd, Bidāya, vol. 3, pp. 1198, 1208-1209, 1222; Shīrāzī, 
Muhadhdhab, vol. 3, pp. 43-45. 
 
189 Bājī, Muntaqā, vol. 6, pp. 180, 333, 402-403; Ibn Ḥazm, Muḥallā, vol, 8, p. 389, 
¶.1421; p. 407, ¶. 1434; p. 458, ¶. 1471; Ibn Qudāma, Mughnī, vol. 4, p. 157,¶. 3062; Ibn Rushd, 
Bidāya, vol. 3, pp. 1198, 1206, 1216-1217; Sarakhsī, Mabsūṭ, vol. 12:4, p. 163. 
 
190 Sarakhsī, Mabsūṭ, vol. 12:4, p. 142. For a study of weights and measures in the 
Islamic world, see EI2, s.v. Makāyīl; Walther Hinz, Islamische Masse and Gewichte: 
Umgerechnet ins metrische System (Leiden: Brill, 1955). 
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when it comes to the exchange of any good subject to the prohibition against ribā; 
otherwise, the counterparties may employ any system since “the goal is knowledge of the 
quantity of a good and the removal of any uncertainty about it  (ma‘rifat qadrihi wa-
khurūjuha min al-jahāla).192 Bājī presents the following typology of systems of 
measurement:193 
A. Legal mode of measurement based on a revealed textual source 
B. Non-legal conventional measurement 
1. Conventional method uniform in all lands 
2. Conventional method varies in all lands 
C. No method of measurement. 
 
Ibn Rushd merely states that one should use the conventional mode of measurement and 
instrument with every object.194 For example, a good that is measured by length must 
employ the standardized market ruler rather than someone’s arm since if the person 
whose arm was used to measure the good died the good could not be delivered as 
specified by the contract.195   
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
191 Shīrāzī, Muhadhdhab, vol. 3, pp. 69-71.  
 
192 According to Ibn Qudāma, this is also the view of the Shāfi‘īs and Mālikīs 
notwithstanding the fact that our jurists from these schools clearly indicate that counterparties 
must follow the conventional system for each good with a salam contract. Ibn Qudāma, Mughnī, 
vol. 4, p. 16, ¶ 2812; pp. 216-217, ¶¶ 3177-3178.   
 
193 Bājī, Muntaqā, vol. 6, p 327. 
 
194 Ibn Rushd, Bidāya, vol. 3, pp. 1301. 
 
195 According to Bājī, Ibn al-Qāsim permits counterparties to use a specific person’s arm 
to measure cloth, but his student Aṣbagh argues that this introduces uncertainty which invalidates 
the contract; Muntaqā, vol. 6, p 305. For the views of our other jurists, see Ibn Qudāma, Mughnī, 
vol. 4, pp. 216-217, ¶. 3177; Sarakhsī, Mabsūṭ, vol. 12:4, p. 152; Shīrāzī, Muhadhdhab, vol. 3, p. 
169.    
 
	  	   115	  
iii. Conclusion of the Discussion of Uncertainty with Respect to the Good 
 Uncertainty in terms of the description and quantity presumes a number of prior 
systems of description and mensuration. Besides relating this form of uncertainty to the 
analysis of the legality of a transaction, jurists also relate it to the valuation of the good. 
To know the quality and quantity of a good is to be able to value it. However, jurists 
claim that valuation works upon a principle of the essential qualities of goods rather than 
an exact and comprehensive representation of a good. At first glance, this implies that a 
good governs the system of representation like the Aristotelian model of representation 
that I examined in the introduction to this chapter. However, the fact that language cannot  
adequately and objectively represent non-fungible goods draws into question both the 
standard model of representation and objectivity of categories like certainty and 
uncertainty. Rather, the analysis of uncertainty with respect to quality and quantity 
reveals that it is the discursive practices that communities adopt that determine the 
distribution of certainty and uncertainty.  
 
c. Uncertainty with Respect to Delivery 
With the exception of Ibn Ḥazm, who has a unique theory of ownership, which I 
will examine in the following chapter, the other jurists prohibit the sale of what cannot be 
delivered (bay‘ mā lā yuqdar ‘alā taslimihi) due to excessive gharar.196 Uncertainty with 
respect to the delivery of the good forms the last of primary causes of gharar. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
196 Bājī, Muntaqā, vol. 6, pp. 284, 399-401; Ibn Qudāma, Mughnī, vol. 4, pp. 151-152, 
¶¶. 3048-3050; Ibn Rushd, Bidāya, vol. 3, p. 1198; Sarakhsī, Mabsūṭ, vol. 11:4, p. 22; Shīrāzī, 
Muhadhdhab, vol. 3, pp. 33-34,43. 
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Discussions of this prohibition typically revolve around a comparison of the legality of 
the salam contract to the illegality of the sale of a runaway slave, a bird in flight, and a 
fish in water. It is tempting to compare this form of uncertainty to modern conceptions of 
credit risk since both discourses examine whether a lender will be repaid. However there 
is an important difference between uncertainty with respect to delivery and credit risk. 
Analysis of credit risk focuses on the solvency of the debtor. Jurists primarily analyze 
this form of uncertainty in terms of 1) the fungibility of the good and 2) the legal and 
economic effects of non-delivery. Although these two epistemic systems that jurists 
employ are not mutually exclusive, they have different functions as we will see.  
 
i. Fungibility 
For most jurists, the fungibility of a good defines uncertainty in terms of its 
delivery. According to Bājī, gharar occurs in the case of the sale of a specific runaway 
slave since the seller does not physically posses the slave (bay‘ mā laysa ‘indahu) and 
thus cannot guarantee its delivery, with the result that “the impossibility of taking 
possession of the good is feared (mā yukhāf min ta‘adhdhur qabḍihi).”197 No sooner does 
Ibn Qudāma express the same prohibition than he affirms the legality of the salam 
contract since its goods must be fungible. Unlike with a non-fungible good, with a 
fungible good “the effort required to transport it is generally known, and the total time of 
delay of the delivery is known.”198 As for a specific bird in flight, there is uncertainty 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
197 Bājī, Muntaqā, vol. 6, pp. 284; 399.   
 
198 Ibn Qudāma, Mughnī, vol. 4, p. 151, ¶. 3049. The Arabic reads, “tu‘lam al-kulfa allatī 
yaḥtāj ilayhi fī iḥḍārihi bi’l-‘āda wa-ta’khīr al-taslīm muddatuhu ma‘lūma.” Admittedly, in the  
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associated with the possibility of capturing it. Even if one could guarantee its capture, this 
would require an uncertain amount of labor and time. Ibn Qudāma does permit the sale of 
a bird that is in a cage, or of a fish that is in a small tank with clear water since the labor 
and time required to capture either animal are minor.199  
Ibn Qudāma and Bājī focus on several issues related to the fungibility of the good 
in order to define this form uncertainty. First, gharar occurs due to uncertainty associated 
with physically obtaining a non-fungible good. Second, the amount of labor required to 
obtain the good is unknown. Considering this labor should be a component in the quoted 
price, this uncertainty would further affect the value of the contract. Third, the time 
required to obtain and deliver the good is unknown.  Fourth, although a salam contract 
may require a tremendous amount of labor, these jurists argue that this labor can be 
known when the contract is struck.   
 
ii. Legal and Economic Effects   
Ibn Rushd’s analysis relates this form of uncertainty to that associated with the 
nature of the contract. Like the other jurists, he prohibits the sale of a runaway slave due 
to excessive gharar. However, if the seller knows the location of the slave, the two 
parties may enter into the transaction but not exchange money. In effect, knowledge of 
the slave’s location partially restores the owner’s right to dispose of his property since the 
delivery of the slave seems possible from the perspective of Ibn Rushd. If the buyer were 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
199 Ibn Qudāma, Mughnī, vol. 4, pp. 151-152, ¶¶. 3049-3050. Admittedly in the Kāfī he 
states that these sales are licit as long as they require no labor. See Ibn Qudāma, Al-Kāfī fī fiqh 
li’l-imām al-muḥayyal Aḥmad Ḥanbal, 3 vols. (N.P.: Al-Manshūrāt al-Maktab al-Islāmī, ND.), 
vol. 2, p. 11. 
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to pay before taking possession of this slave “the contract would vacillate between being 
a sale and a loan.”200 In other words, if the buyer gets the slave as described the sale is 
completed. On the other hand, if he does not, the seller effectively receives an interest-
free loan until he returns the buyer’s pre-payment. Thus, this form of uncertainty 
potentially leads to another uncertainty–uncertainty about whether the contract is a sale or 
interest free-loan.   
The reasoning of Ibn Rushd, however, focuses on the effects of this form of 
uncertainty whereas the previous explanations focus on the causes. Undoubtedly the 
causes and effects are connected. By defining the causes of this form of uncertainty, one 
can avoid it at the time of contracting. However, by focusing on the effects, one cannot 
determine whether a transaction has uncertainty until the actual failure to deliver the good 
occurs. Ibn Rushd’s analysis thus does not describe how to avoid this form of uncertainty, 
but merely justifies the prohibition.  
 
iii. Mixed Discourses 
By combining elements of the analyses of Ibn Rushd and Ibn Qudāma, Shīrāzī’s 
analysis of these transactions acknowledges the uncertainty that both counterparties face. 
For the buyer, he focuses on the effects associated with this form of uncertainty. The 
whole point of a sale is for the buyer to obtain full disposition over the good (al-qaṣd 
bi’l-bay’ tamlīk al-taṣarruf), but with the sale of a good whose delivery is uncertain, this 
ability is jeopardized. As for the seller, he examines the sale of a bird in a locked cage 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
200  Ibn Rushd, Bidāya, vol. 3, pp. 1198,1215.  
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and of a fish in a tank in a manner similar to Ibn Qudāma to qualify the amount of labor 
required to deliver the fish or bird.201  
Likewise, Sarakhsī’s discussion combines many of the elements of the previous 
discussions, but he also introduces the ontological categories of mawjūd and ma‘dūm, or 
existent and non-existent, respectively. According to him, the sale of a runaway slave 
creates gharar since, “ Neither how long he will remain in this state, nor whether he will 
return so that he can be delivered is truly known.”202 Furthermore, he states that, “the 
monetary value of the runaway slave is like that of one in the grave. It as though he does 
not really exist.”203     
Sarakhsī’s discussion about a salam contract for food offers further insight into 
what it means to be able to deliver a good. He argues that the ability to deliver a good is 
based on the ability to obtain it or the coming harvest (bi’l-takassub aw bi-majī’ zamān 
al-ḥiṣād).204 In addition, he explains the prohibition against a salam contract for fruit 
from a particular garden by stating that, 
The obligation of delivery is required for the permissibility of the 
contract, and one does not know one’s ability to deliver this fruit 
when its delivery is due except by the existence of the fruit on 
those trees or in the specified orchard. The future existence of 
that fruit is based upon pure speculation, which does not 
establish the ability to deliver the fruit.205   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
201  Shīrāzī, Muhadhdhab, vol. 3, pp. 33-34. 
 
202 Sarakhsī, Mabsūṭ, vol. 11:4, p. 22. Lā yu‘lam baqā’uhu fī al-ḥāl ḥaqiqatan lā ‘awduhu 
li-yuqdar ‘alā al-taslīm. 
 
203 Sarakhsī, Mabsūṭ, vol. 13:5, p. 10. Al-mālīya fī’l-ābiq thāwiya ka’l-ma‘dūm ḥaqīqtan. 
 
204 Sarakhsī, Mabsūṭ, vol. 12:5, p. 126. 
 
205 Sarakhsī, Mabsūṭ, vol. 12:5, p. 130.  Wujūb al-taslīm sharṭ li-jawāz al-‘aqd wa-lā 
ya‘lam qudratahu ‘alā al-taslīm ‘inda ḥulūl al-ajal illā bi-wujūd al-thimār fī tilka al-nakhla aw 
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The quotation indicates that not only does the very existence of the good factor into the 
analysis of the ability to deliver it, but so does its fungibility. As shown in discussions of 
uncertainty associated with the description of the good, the jurists do not agree about 
which goods are fungible. Rather, the classification of the fungibility of a good depends 
on a wider set of considerations than the mere good itself.  
Sarakhsī’s focus on the existence of the good also reflects the fact that the 
Ḥanafīs are generally more conservative in terms of defining a good as existing. Due to 
his conservativeness with defining the existence of goods, Sarakhsī tends to have a wider 
definition of uncertainty with respect to the existence of goods. Unlike the other schools, 
the Ḥanafīs require that the goods of a salam contract exist somewhere from the moment 
that the counterparties enter into a transaction until its delivery date since the contract 
becomes due immediately upon the death of either counterparty.206 The other schools 
require only that the existence of the good be likely at the delivery date.207 This extreme 
aversion to uncertainty with respect to the existence of goods runs contrary to the general 
portrayal of Ḥanafīs as being more tolerant of forms of knowledge and methods of 
reasoning that the other schools view as probabilistic as best.  
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
al-ḥā’iṭ alladhī ‘ayyanahu wa-wujūd dhālika mawhūm wa-bi’l-mawhūm lā tathbut al-qudra ‘alā 
al-taslīim.  
 
206 Sarakhsī, Mabsūṭ, vol. 12:4, p. 131. 
 
207 Bājī, Muntaqā, vol. 6, p. 309; Ibn Ḥazm, Muḥallā, vol, 9, pp. 114-115, ¶ 1621; Ibn 
Qudāma, Mughnī, vol. 4, pp. 151-152, ¶¶. 3049-3050; Shīrāzī, Muhadhdhab, vol. 3, p. 168.  
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d. The Interaction of the Primary Forms of Uncertainty 
 In the section about uncertainty associated with the quality, I cited Ibn Qudāma, 
who prohibits an overly exact description of the good since this increases the uncertainty 
associated with its delivery. As a good becomes conceived of as increasingly unique 
rather than as a member of a class of goods, the uncertainty associated with its delivery 
increases. However, these forms of uncertainty are not always inversely related. Rather 
their relationship depends on the nature of the good and method of sale. As indicated 
above, both forms of uncertainty vanish in the case of a good sold on the basis of a visual 
inspection. Even if delivery of the good sold on the basis of a visual description occurs at 
a later date, jurists assume that there is no uncertainty associated with this later delivery. 
True, the good may be destroyed through some act of God and wipe out the seller’s 
wealth, but this form of uncertainty occurs with any credit transaction from the 
perspective of jurists.  
 Furthermore, fungible goods present no uncertainty with respect to the ability to 
describe and deliver them. Conversely, non-fungible goods that are not present at a 
transaction give rise to all forms of uncertainty. However, jurists forbid precisely the sale 
of a non-fungible good that is not present when the counterparties enter into the contract 
due to the non-linear interactions of these forms of uncertainty.  
 
IV. Secondary Causes 
Uncertainty associated with the actual delivery date, quality and quantity of the 
good, and delivery constitute the primary causes of gharar. However, in the section on 
the typology of the causes of gharar, we saw that some jurists have a wider set of causes 
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for gharar. In fact, some of these additional causes of gharar are forms of uncertainty. In 
order to appreciate the relation of these other forms of uncertainty to those forms 
examined above, I will examine how jurists describe and employ these other forms of 
uncertainty. A careful analysis of these other forms of uncertainty reveal that they are 
derived from the three forms of uncertainty examined in the previous section. I refer to 
these other forms of uncertainty as secondary whereas the three forms of uncertainty 
examined the previous section I refer to as the primary forms of uncertainty.  
This distinction between primary and secondary causes of gharar reflects a 
hierarchy of the forms of uncertainty associated with gharar.  In other words, the forms 
of uncertainty associated with gharar mirror the ability of forms of certainty to create 
hierarchies that relate one from of certainty to another to create a form of rationality.  In 
chapter four, I will explore the rationality of gharar in more detail.   
 
a. Sale of Non-Possessed Goods  
 According to our jurists, one may not sell a good that one does not possess. They 
employ a variety of phrases to express this prohibition: the sale of what one does not have 
(bay‘ mā laysa ‘indahu), the sale of a good that one has not taken legal possession of 
(qabḍ), and the sale of what one does not own. Notwithstanding the categorical nature of 
this prohibition, jurists no sooner pronounce it then they state that the salam contract and 
the ijāra, or contract of lease and hire, are exceptions to this prohibition. Although most 
of our jurists explain this prohibition with reference to uncertainty associated with the 
delivery, there are some notable exceptions.  
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i. Uncertainty with Respect to the Delivery  
 Without much fanfare, Shīrāzī states that due to inability to ensure delivery, one 
cannot sell what one does not own.208 Although Sarakhsī and Ibn Qudāma adopt the same 
general reasoning, they restrict the scope of this prohibition by creating a typology of the 
goods to which it applies. According to Sarakhsī, one cannot sell moveable property that 
is not in his possession due to the inability to guarantee its delivery.209 This property may 
be destroyed before the seller or final buyer takes possession of it, or someone else may 
lay claim to it (istiḥqāq). However, once the buyer takes possession of it, gharar due to 
its potential destruction ceases to be a concern. On the other hand, he permits the sale of 
immoveable property before the buyer takes possession of it since the potential for its 
destruction is deemed unlikely. Although someone may claim this property, this risk is 
unavoidable so that it is not taken into account in the legal analysis of these sales.210 Thus 
Sarakhsī distinguishes between forms of uncertainty that affect all transactions and 
cannot be mitigated, and those forms of uncertainty that are unique to some transactions 
and can be mitigated.  
According to Ibn Qudāma, the Ḥanbalīs, however, disagree about the goods that 
are subject to this prohibition against selling what is not in one’s possession. On the one 
hand, Ibn Ḥanbal adopts the Mālikī position that one may sell fungible non-food goods 
before taking possession of them. On the other hand, Khiraqī extends this prohibition to 
non-food goods sold by weight, measure, or number. Ibn Qudāma reconciles these 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
208 Shīrāzī, Muhadhdhab, vol. 3, p. 31. 
 
209 Sarakhsī, Mabsūṭ, vol. 13:5, p. 8. 
 
210 Sarakhsī, Mabsūṭ, vol. 13:5, p. 9. 
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positions by prohibiting the sale of only food sold by weight, measure, or number before 
one has take possession of it, such as in the case of a dowry. In addition, this prohibition 
applies only to goods purchased through a salam contract.211 Notwithstanding the fact 
that the fungibility of the goods of a salam contract ensures the ability to deliver them, 
Ibn Qudāma prevents the buyer from hedging a salam contract through another one. 
According to him, with the salam contract, the buyer may only sell a good once he 
becomes liable for it since both contracts must be invalidated if the good were 
destroyed.212  This point about liability is important since when one purchases a good by 
means of a salam contract the seller remains liable for the loss of the good or damage to it 
until he delivers it to the buyer who takes possession of the good. From Ibn Qudāma’s 
perspective, if one sells a good before he is liable for it he has earned a profit without any 
risk. Furthermore, this prohibition prevents the proliferation of the credit risk that would 
arise from chains of interconnected contracts through an economy.  Finally, with non-
fungible goods, ownership immediately transfers to the buyer whether he physically takes 
possession of them or not.213 Thus, if a buyer inspects a non-fungible good, pays for it 
through a salam contract, but does not take he still is liable for it. 
 
ii. Double Sales and Certainty 
 Bājī prohibits the sale of what one does not possess for two reasons that have 
contrary epistemological implications. First, he prohibits the sale of non-fungible goods 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
211 Ibn Qudāma, Mughnī, vol. 4, p. 85, ¶. 2934; p. 227, ¶3195.  
 
212 Ibn Qudāma, Mughnī, vol. 4, p. 87, ¶. 2940. 
 
213 Ibn Qudāma, Mughnī, vol. 4, pp. 82-83, ¶. 2929. 
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by a salam contract due to uncertainty with respect to their delivery.214 Second, he 
prohibits the bay‘ al-‘īna, or repurchase sale with food that one does not own. This type 
of sale combines several licit transactions like a conventional contract of sale, a salam 
contract, and a bay‘ al-ajal  (credit sale) in order to synthesize prohibited transactions 
that have cash-flows that replicate those of illicit interest-bearing loans and forward 
contracts. These synthetic transactions arise because the Mālikīs permit the sale of 
fungible non-food goods that one does not possess.215  
 However, the Mālikīs prohibit the sale of food through these transactions since 
they claim that people know the future value and price of food with enough certainty to 
create an arbitrage, or riskless profit.216 In other words, Ibn Rushd and Bājī paradoxically 
claim that the sale of food before one has taken possession of it has gharar due to too 
much certainty about the future price and ability to deliver the good.  
 These apparently contradictory reasons for banning the sale of what one does not 
possess reflects a reconfiguration of two legal domains. On the one hand, early jurists 
permitted the sale of certain fungible goods before one possessed them, but prohibited it 
with food in order to prevent people from engaging in regulatory arbitrage or speculation 
on the price of food. In particular, during the first century of Islam, people used to 
speculate on the price of grain by buying and selling the checks that entitled soldiers to 
their future stipend payments of grain.217 At a later point, probably through the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
214 Bājī, Muntaqā, vol. 6, p. 284. 
 
215 Bājī, Muntaqā, vol. 6, pp. 270-273. 
 
216 Bājī, Muntaqā, vol. 6, pp. 273-274; Ibn Rushd, Bidāya, vol. 3, p. 1209. 
 
217 Coulson, History, 38-39.   
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acceptance of a ḥadīth that prohibited the sale of what one does not possess due to 
gharar, they classified the sale of food that one does not possess as gharar in order to 
strengthen the claim of this transaction’s prohibition. Nevertheless, they maintain the 
permissibility of selling non-food fungible goods notwithstanding the apparent legal 
contradiction. 
 
iii. Uncertainty with Respect to the Good 
Finally, Ibn Ḥazm’s discussion of this prohibition is more ambiguous than those 
of the preceding jurists. In his analysis of a Ḥanafī position that allows government tax-
collectors to take the countervalue of goods that are subject to zakāt, rather than taking 
payment in kind, he argues that this is effectively like selling a good before taking 
possession of it.218 According to him, “this is truly the sale of gharar because one does 
not know what he is selling or the value of what he is taking.”219 Since the tax collector 
does not truly take possession of the good, he has in effect taken a countervalue without 
certain knowledge of the value of the good that he has forgone. For this reasoning to 
hold, one must accept the implicit claim that the tax-collectors are not knowledgeable 
about the value of goods like grain, fruit, and animals. Second, one might infer that Ibn 
Ḥazm was unaware of or rejected the notion that collecting, transporting, and selling 
taxes collected in kind has costs and potential risks that the tax-collectors wanted to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 218 Zakāt is obligatory tax on variety of assets. With the exception of the Ḥanafīs, the 
other schools require that the tax on a good be paid in kind which made tax collection far more 
complex and costly for the government. For further details, see EI2, s.v. Zakāt.   
 
219 This translation is conjectural. The Arabic reads, “hādhā bay‘ al-gharar ḥaqqan li-
annahu lā yadrī mā bā‘a wa-lā ayyuhā bā‘a wa-lā qīmat mādhā akhadha.” Ibn Ḥazm, Muḥallā, 
vol, 8, p. 390, ¶. 1421. 
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avoid. On the other hand, it is possible that he wanted the tax-collectors to collect the 
taxes in kind as way of protecting tax-payers from the arbitrary monetary assessments of 
the tax-collectors. 
However, Ibn Ḥazm also applies this reasoning to when a purchaser knows the 
good that he will receive, but sells it before taking possession of it. During a discussion of 
the iqāla, which most jurists claim is the cancellation of a salam contract, Ibn Ḥazm 
argues that the word iqāla cannot mean cancellation since that would be the sale of what 
one does not possess and the sale of what is unknown, which is gharar.220 Elsewhere he 
states that,   
This is the sale of what you do not posses, sale with gharar, 
sale of what has not been taken possession of, and the uncertain 
sale is what is unknown to exist in the world (bay‘ mā laysa 
‘indaka wa-bay‘ al-gharar wa-bay‘ mā lam yuqbaḍ wa-bay‘ 
majhūl lā yudrā ayyumā fī al-‘ālam huwa).221 
 
Although not clearly explained, the ability to cancel a sale undermines the agreed upon 
price of transaction and enforceability of contracts in general. Each party would have an 
incentive to cancel the transaction if the price of the good subsequently changes in the 
market. For example, if the price rose before the delivery of the good, the seller might 
cancel the transaction and sell the good at the higher current market price. On the other 
hand, if the price fell, the buyer might cancel the transaction and buy the good at the 
lower current market price. In effect, the ability to cancel the transaction would embed 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
220 Ibn Ḥazm, Muḥallā, vol, 9, p.115 , ¶. 1622. 
 
221 Ibn Ḥazm, Muḥallā, vol, 9, p.5 , ¶. 1509. 
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an option on the transaction for both counterparties and undermine the enforceability of 
contracts.  
However, Ibn Ḥazm wants to ensure the enforceability of contracts since wealth 
and contracts have an inviolable status, which an option of cancellation threatens.222 Ibn 
Ḥazm, a supposed literalist, rejects the literal meaning of the word iqāla as 
“cancellation.” Rather, he treats the word as a technical legal term whose exact meaning 
he cannot precisely define. He further justifies his position by invoking gharar and 
claiming that the cancellation creates uncertainty. By invoking gharar, he committed 
himself to explaining this prohibition within his discursive framework, which recognizes 
only uncertainty in terms of the delivery date and description of the good. Undoubtedly, 
it is true that the quantity of the price is uncertain due to the potential to cancel the 
contract. Ibn Ḥazm might have also added that the delivery is uncertain, but he does not 
recognize this as a form of uncertainty that voids contracts.    
 
b. Idiosyncratic Forms of Secondary Uncertainty 
  Until now, I have examined types of uncertainty that most if not all of our jurists 
recognize as causes of gharar. Below, I will examine the forms of uncertainty that are 
idiosyncratic to a minority of jurists. Note that jurists employ the primary forms of 
uncertainty that I previously detailed in order to explain their idiosyncratic forms of 
uncertainty.   
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
222 Ibn Ḥazm, Muḥallā, vol, 9, pp.3-6 , ¶. 1509. 
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i. The Impossibility of Establishing Ownership  
 Both Shīrāzī and Ibn Ḥazm argue that the sale of a good whose ownership cannot 
be established (ghayr mustaqarr) creates excessive gharar.  Notwithstanding the 
common usage of the term istiqrār, their analyses differ considerably. For Shīrāzī, this 
cause of gharar arises when one’s ownership of a good is not settled such as with 
subleasing or the sale of a dowry that one does not yet possess. In these cases, ownership 
is not established due to the lack of possession, so if the good is destroyed it cannot be 
delivered and all related contracts are invalidated.223 For Shīrāzī, this issue is derivative 
of that of the sale of what one does not possess, which is itself derivative of uncertainty 
with respect to the delivery.   
  For Ibn Ḥazm, this form of uncertainty refers to the physical impossibility of 
taking possession of the good such as with the air rights over a building. According to 
him, one may not sell the air above a building or fence for someone to build on since,   
The air is never fixed so that its ownership cannot ever be 
determined precisely (lā yuḍbaṭ milkuhu abadan). Rather it is 
constantly undulating so that some air is flowing out whereas 
some is flowing in constantly. Thus, the sale of this air is 
devouring wealth in vain and the buyer cannot take possession of 
it. Accordingly, this is the sale of gharar, the sale what one does 
not own, and the sale of the unknown.224 
 
Like Shīrāzī, Ibn Ḥazm prohibits this sale due to the inability of the buyer to take 
possession of it. Although this inability mirrors the inability of the seller to deliver a 
good, Ibn Ḥazm does not establish this symmetry because he does not recognize 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
223 Shīrāzī, Muhadhdhab, vol. 3, p. 31. 
 
224 Ibn Ḥazm, Muḥallā, vol, 9, p.19 , ¶. 1522. 
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uncertainty with respect to delivery as a cause of gharar. Rather, he explains this form of 
gharar in terms of the uncertainty associated with the description. To be precise, he 
argues that the air cannot be described due to its unstable nature. 
Interestingly, Ibn Ḥazm presents two counterarguments to his position. One 
position states that the buyer is really buying the three dimensional space above the roof. 
According to another argument, the buyer is buying the surface of the roof in order to 
build upon it. However, Ibn Ḥazm retorts that the Qur’ān and ḥadīth do not validate any 
stipulation to destroy part of the surface.225 In other words, he argues that any addition to 
the roof would damage it.  Both of his opponents’ counterarguments would provide a 
tangible and defined substrate such that the ownership could be specified. Ibn Ḥazm’s 
arguments attempt to undermine any claim that the space can be described and quantified.   
The difference between his position and his opponents’ reflects different methods 
for representing the goods of these transactions. In the coming chapters, I will 
demonstrate that goods are not passive entities that language and concepts can 
encapsulate so as to represent perfectly; a point already illustrated by the discussion of 
the uncertainty associated with the descriptions of goods indicated. Rather, the different 
discursive techniques that jurists employ to represent goods affect the ability to represent 
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ii. Uncertainty with Respect to the Contract and the Good 
 Both Ibn Rushd and Bājī argue that gharar occurs when the terms of contract 
(‘aqd) are not sufficiently defined. Ibn Rushd adds that the object of the contract (al-
ma‘qūd ‘alayhi) cannot be undefined. Bājī only mentions uncertainty with respect to the 
contract and the good during his analysis of repurchase sales where counterparties know 
the goods and contract with certainty, as I showed above. In addition, he states that the 
pre-Islamic bay‘ al-ḥaṣā, in which one counterparty threw a stone and bought the object 
that it landed upon, is an example of this type of uncertainty. The problem with this sale 
is that the good of the sale is undefined at the time of the contract. Finally, he states that 
with the ‘arbān, which is analogous to a modern call option, in which the buyer gives the 
seller some money in order to have the right to buy the good at a specified price and date, 
is a form of gharar. The gharar probably occurs because the existence of an option 
implies that the sale will not necessarily become binding, which causes uncertainty.226  
 Notwithstanding the fact that Ibn Rushd lists this form of uncertainty within his 
typology of gharar, he does not explicitly deploy or develop it.227 In addition, those 
transactions that Bājī lists as examples of uncertainty associated with the contract, Ibn 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
226 Bājī, Muntaqā, vol. 6, p. 400. 
 
227 Ibn Rushd, Bidāya, vol. 3, p. 1198. 
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iii. Uncertainty with Respect to the Remaining Life 
 The fourth type gharar that Ibn Rushd lists in his typology is that of the sound 
condition (salām) and remaining life (baqā’) of a good.228 However, like the previous 
form of uncertainty, he does not explicitly use it in his analysis of transactions 
characterized by gharar. Nevertheless, one may guess that this type of uncertainty refers 
to the qualities and quantity of a good and its existence at present and in the future.  
In fact, Shīrāzī uses the word baqā’ several times in his sub-chapter on gharar in 
this way. For example, Shīrāzī cites two opinions regarding the sale of a non-fungible 
good that is not present at the sale and that may change before its delivery. According to 
one opinion, this sale is impermissible “because there is doubt about it remaining 
qualitatively the same (li-annahu mashkūk fī baqā’ihi ‘alā ṣifatihi).”229 Later, he 
discusses whether gharar arises from selling things that have a protective coating, shell, 
or container. Ibn Surayj (d. 306/918) permitted the sale of musk in a container on the 
grounds that the container preserves the musk to a greater extent (li-anna baqā’ahu fīhā 
akthar).230 However, the school opinion forbids this sale due to uncertainty with respect 
to the quality and quantity of the musk in the container.231 Sarakhsī also uses the verb 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
228 Ibn Rushd, Bidāya, vol. 3, p. 1198. 
 
229 Shīrāzī, Muhadhdhab, vol. 3, p. 37. 
 
 230 Abū al-‘Abbās Aḥmad b. ‘Umar b. Surayj was a prominent Shāfi‘ī who was 
responsible for the institutionalization of the school. For further biographical details, see EI2., s.v. 
Ibn Suraydj.   
 
231 Shīrāzī, Muhadhdhab, vol. 3, p. 39. 
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baqā in a similar sense to argue that one cannot sell a runaway slave on the presumption 
that the slave will remain the same.232 
  
V. Conclusion  
In this chapter, I have examined the discursive systems employed to outline 
conceptual architecture of gharar. At various points in this chapter, I have distinguished 
between two forms of uncertainty: 1) unknown-unknowns and 2) known-unknowns. For 
the most part, this chapter focused on analyzing the forms of knowledge that jurists 
employ to define the forms of uncertainty–the known-unknowns–associated with gharar. 
These forms of knowledge—such as description, mensuration, and ability to deliver a 
good—are discursively anterior to their configuration and deployment in the discourse of 
gharar.  From uncertainty with respect to the description, the delivery date, and ability to 
deliver jurists derive and explain the secondary causes of gharar. Notwithstanding the 
fact that each jurist defines the primary forms of uncertainty in slightly different ways, 
these forms of uncertainty form a discursive regularity that allows for the debates among 
jurists from different schools of law. 
Returning to the unknown-unknowns, knowledge also gives rise to them. In the 
case of the unknown-unknowns associated with gharar, they arise from the bounds that 
jurists place on discourse. For example, we saw how jurists ignore issues such as the 
potential death of a counterparty or the complex logistics required for delivering goods. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
232 Sarakhsī, Mabsūṭ, vol. 12:4, p.135. 
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When discourse sets the bounds on what will be thought and how thought will occur it 
also creates these unknown-unknowns.  
Is there a form of uncertainty that knowledge does not create and subsume such 
that it can stand as a true contrary to certainty? In terms of their discussions of gharar, 
jurists offer no insight into this question. However, returning to the discussions of 
uncertainty in works of uṣūl al-fiqh in kalām, two interesting passages suggest that the 
answer to this question is no. ‘Alī b. ‘Alī al-Āmidī (d. 631/1233) divides uncertainty into 
simple and complex, or basīṭ and murakkab respectively. According to him, simple 
uncertainty is a total privation of thought with respect to what one should know but does 
not. This privation has important implications for the representation of gharar as we will 
see in the following chapter. Indeed, this privation is a form of ignorance in Āmidī’s 
view.   
On the other hand, complex uncertainty arises from the mismatch between 
thought and referent that I examined in the introduction to this chapter. Regardless of the 
structural difference of both forms of uncertainty, Āmidī defines them both in relation to 
certainty. Seeing the potential circularity of defining uncertainty in terms of certainty, 
Āmidī insists that simple uncertainty is essentially contrary to certainty such that they 
cannot combine. In fact, he claims that an absolute uncertainty (al-jahl al-muṭlaq), which 
would not be defined in relation to certainty, cannot exist since such uncertainty could 
only apply to inanimate matter devoid of thought and language.233 Certainty and 
uncertainty are traits of human thought, and like most if not all Muslim scholars, Āmidī 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 233 Āmidī, Abkār, vol. 1, p. 52. For biographical details, see EI2, s.v. al-Āmidī.  
 
	  	   135	  
agrees that some form of innate certainty grounds the acquisition of all knowledge. Such 
a claim about innate certainty should draw into question his claim that simple uncertainty 
and certainty can be essential contraries. Even in the case of simple uncertainty, the lack 
of knowledge is still defined in relation to the knowledge that someone should or will 
eventually have.      
Second, in the introduction to his Anwār al-Malakūt, the Shi‘ī theologian ‘Allāma 
al-Ḥillī (648/1250-726/1325) notes that some people claim that it is impossible to define 
certainty.234 According to this group, whatever is not certainty can only be defined by 
certainty, but this definition converts uncertainty into certainty such that it is impossible 
for the counter moment to certainty to remain uncertainty. In effect, nothing can 
effectively stand outside of certainty and its identitarian mode of representation. This 
position means that certainty is circular since there is no true contrary to validate it.235 
However, to save representation and thought from this circularity, Ḥillī remarks, 
Knowledge is either a relational predicate (ṣifa) subsisting in the 
knower or a concept commensurable with the referent of 
knowledge. Notwithstanding the difference between these two 
views and appraisals, this referent of knowledge (ma‘lūm) is 
only known when its concept or predication occurs to the 
knower. Knowledge of this concept or predication may also be 
due to a definition or description from what was not known. 
However, the dependency of the referent on knowledge in the 
first case is different from the dependency of this concept on the 
definition of description such that there is no circularity 
(tawaqquf al-ma‘lūm ‘alā al-‘ilm fī’l-awwal mughāyir li-
tawaqquf bi-tilka al-ṣura ‘alā al-ḥadd wa’l-rasm).236  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 234 For biographical details, see EI2, s.v. al-Ḥillī. 
 
 235 Jamāl al-Dīn Ḥasan b. Yūsif b. Muṭahhar al-Ḥillī, Anwār al-malakūt fī sharḥ al-yāqūt 
(Tehran: Chāpkhānah-i Dānisghāh, 1959), p.12. 
  
 236 Ḥillī, Anwār, p. 13. 
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 Although the Arabic of this passage is problematic, Ḥillī argues for two alternative 
moments in the production of certainty.237 The first is the acquisition of a concept or a 
predicate of the referent. Presumably, such acquisition arises from perception or some 
form of reasoning. The second moment in the acquisition of certainty is a definition or 
description of the previously unknown referent.  According to Ḥillī, these two ways of 
obtaining certainty are different such that no circularity occurs in the definition of 
certainty. Again, this position is similar to the claim of Ibn Qudāma that we saw in 
chapter one that a referent, knowledge of it, and communication of it are not all the same. 
Although Ibn Qudāma establishes that these three forms of the referent are not the same, 
they must be commensurable for representation to occur. Likewise. Ḥillī still links 
language and thought through the concept or predicate that is subordinated to the referent. 
In the end, Ḥillī’s analysis remains within the confines of the notion of certainty achieved 
through an identity between referent, thought of it, and communication of it.     
Although neither Ḥillī nor Āmidī clarifies what is exactly at stake if certainty 
subsumes uncertainty, the litterateur Abū Ḥayyān al-Tawḥīdī (d. 414/1023) offers some 
insight into the implications in the introduction to an epistle he wrote in defense of 
logic.238  Tawḥīdī remarks that,  
Both a priori rational knowledge and intuitive knowledge affirm 
that certainty is superior to uncertainty. Indeed, uncertainty does 
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 237  The Arabic should probably read, tawaqquf al-‘ilm ‘alā al-ma‘lūm.  
 
238 For further biographical details about Tawḥīdī, see EI2, s.v. Abū Ḥayyān al-Tawḥīdī; 
Mary St. Germain, “Abū Ḥayyān al-Tawḥīdī,” in Essays in Arabic Literary Biography: 925-
1350. Ed. Terri DeYoung and Mary St. Germain (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 2011), pp. 
348-356. For a discussion of the role of philosophy in adāb, see Everett K. Rowson, “Philosopher 
as Littérateur: al-Tawḥīdī and His Predecessors,” Zeitschrift für Geschichte der Arabisch-
Islamischen Wissenschaten 5, (1990): pp. 53-92.  
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uncertainty. In fact, uncertainty is the complete privation of any 
form of superiority. Likewise existence is said to be superior to 
its privation and completeness is superior to defectiveness.239       
 
This passage outlines a theory of representation, which Tawḥīdī claims everyone knows 
both intuitively and rationally.  To be precise, this passage coordinates three sets of 
contraries: the ontological contraries of existence and its privation or non-existence, the 
epistemological contraries of certainty and uncertainty, and the teleological categories of 
completeness and defectiveness. On the one hand, the passage equates existence, 
certainty, and completeness with virtue. On the other hand, it equates the privation of 
existence, uncertainty, and defectiveness with inferiority and immorality.  
This short yet fecund passage reveals the complex process that ensures the 
marginalization of uncertainty. This theory strips uncertainty of any merit as an object of 
study. Indeed, uncertainty is a threat that exists only in its relation to the morally positive 
counter-moments of existence, certainty, and completion.  To study and thereby 
acknowledge uncertainty would be the basest act that one could engage in according to 
this charged passage. 
 If uncertainty were the product of certainty it would collapse the systems of 
contraries that coordinate representation. In particular, it would undermine the notion of 
truth and certainty, which arises from objectivity, and error and uncertainty, which arises 
from subjectivity. Furthermore, if certainty produced uncertainty it would collapse the 
moral equation that this passage presents. Certainty could not be the virtuous reference 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
239 Abū Ḥayyān al-Tawḥīdī, Al-Risāla fī al-‘ulūm, in Risālatān li’l-‘allāma al-shahīr Abī 
Ḥayyān al-Tawḥīdī (Qusṭanṭīnīya: Maṭba‘at al-Jawā’ib, 1884), p. 201.  Annahu subiqa fī qaḍāyā 
al-‘uqūl al-ṣaḥīḥa wa-thubita fī muqaddamāt al-albāb al-ṣarīḥa anna al-‘ilm ashraf min al-jahl 
bal lā sharaf  li’l-jahl fa-yakun ghayruhu ashraf minhu li-anna al-jahl ‘adam hākadhā. Qila al-
wujūd ashraf min al-‘adam wa’l-ṣiḥḥa ashraf min al-saqam.   
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point if it were also to give rise uncertainty, a point of extreme immorality. Indeed, the 
moral problem that arises from knowledge creating uncertainty has well-known parallels 
in Islamic theology with the problem of how an omnipotent and just God could create 
evil or allow it to exist.  
The uncertainty associated with gharar and the uncertainty discussed in work of 
uṣūl al-fiqh and kalām are both immoral. The uncertainty associated with gharar is even 
worse since it is illegal unlike simple forms of ignorance or error. Although gharar 
symmetrically affects both counterparties when they enter into a transaction, ultimately 
one counterparty will benefit at the expense of the other given time. In effect, gharar is 
like a form of gambling– an analogy we will examine in the next chapter. For jurists, gain 
and loss should follow certainty, albeit certainty defined only in terms of the description, 
delivery date, and ability to delivery of the good.  
There remains another key difference between discussions of uncertainty in 
Islamic commercial law on the one hand and in uṣūl al-fiqh and kalām. In the case of uṣūl 
al-fiqh and kalām, a representation is incorrect due to an incorrect relationship between 
thought and the referent. Even more problematically, one who has this form of 
uncertainty cannot recognize the error, a situation which leads to mistakes. However, in 
the case of the forms of uncertainty associated with gharar, one is conscious of it and 
thus can make informed decisions. In the following chapters, in order to explain the 
differences between the forms of uncertainty associated with gharar and that adumbrated 
in uṣūl al-fiqh and kalām, I examine the relationships between forms of uncertainty and 
the referents upon which thought labors.  
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Chapter Three  
The Privation of Objects and Thought 
In the previous chapter, I examined the forms of uncertainty that engender gharar 
and how jurists employ a variety of forms of knowledge in order to conceptualize and 
define these forms of uncertainty. In this chapter, I will begin to examine how jurists 
apply these forms of uncertainty to analyze and discuss specific transactions.  In order to 
pursue this analysis, this chapter will examine two interconnected issues. The first issue 
is to understand the systems of knowledge that jurists employ to describe the existence of 
goods and various aspects of commercial transactions. The second issue is to understand 
the exact way that jurists employ the forms of uncertainty examined in the previous 
chapter to describe the legality of commercial transaction. Or to put it differently, one 
must understand how the forms of uncertainty associated with gharar relate to specific 
referents and transactions. The examination of these two issues reveals how gharar 
enables accurate representations and judgments about commercial transactions.    
To begin to analyze the relationship between the forms of uncertainty associated 
with gharar and specific transactions and goods we need return once again to the model 
of representation common to works of kalām and uṣūl al-fiqh. According to this model, 
reality, which must exist in-itself, is the ultimate arbiter of the validity of thought and 
communication. Whereas, certainty arises from a perfect identity between thought and its 
referent, uncertainty arises from a mismatch between the two. With this form of 
uncertainty detailed in works of kalām and uṣūl al-fiqh, one is unconscious of this 
incorrect synthesis and thus cannot make an informed decision.  
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On the other hand, with gharar, counterparties are aware when uncertainty affects 
a transaction, and thus they can make informed decisions about this uncertainty. Such 
consciousness of uncertainty requires a different relationship between thought and 
referents than the relationship outlined in works of uṣūl al-fiqh and kalām.  
In order to understand gharar, in the remaining chapters of this study I will examine the 
use of the forms of uncertainty with gharar to analyze specific transactions. 
Notwithstanding the variety of transactions and legal views that jurists present, the 
relationship between the forms of uncertainty and their employment to analyze 
transactions may be categorized into three types of relationships: 1) privative, 2) 
analogical, and 3) hermeneutical.  
This chapter will focus on the privative relationship since it is the most basic 
interaction between the forms of uncertainty and the transactions that jurists analyze in 
commercial transactions. To understand the privation, we first most briefly return to 
Aristotelian model of representation, which argues for the commensurability of a 
referent’s existence, thought of it, and communication about it. Notwithstanding the 
commensurability of these three forms of a referent, the existence of the referent in 
reality is primary whereas thought of and communication about it are secondary. It is 
reality that determines the objective validity of thought and language. Without such an 
independent reality populated with self-subsisting referents objective truth would not 
exist. Ibn Ḥazm sheds light on this point in his Taqrīb li-ḥadd al-manţiq when he remarks 
that existence has four modes of manifestation (bayān), but it “is the first of these modes 
of manifestation (bayān) of the referent, since a non-existent cannot be recognized.” In 
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turn, the non-existent cannot be thought or spoken of, according to Ibn Ḥazm.240 The lack 
of a referent in reality causes privation of thought and communication about it.  
 The privation that causes gharar is more complex than logically or empirically 
impossible referents like the round-square or unicorn. The referents that jurists analyze in 
their discussions of gharar must be able to exist so as to permit the formation of the 
identity that engenders certainty. In the case where the specific referent does not exist  
this causes the privation of thought about it that engenders uncertainty. The privation is 
thus not a complete lack. Rather, it exists only in relation to the possibility of the correct 
identity between the referent and thought that is required to obtain certainty with respect 
to a specific transaction. Uncertainty thus can only exist as a by-product of certainty in 
the case of gharar. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 240  Ibn Ḥazm, Taqrīb, pp. 10-12. The use of term bayān in theories of representation has 
a rich and complex history that pre-dates Ibn Ḥazm’s use of the term. Interestingly, the earliest 
technical use of the term appears to be in the Risāla of Shāfi‘ī who uses to term to detail the ways 
that the Qur’an, sunna, and ijtihād interact to represent the Law. For the most systematic 
presentation of his theory of bayān in the Risāla, see Muḥammad Idrīs al-Shāfi‘ī, Risāla, in al-
Umm, Rif‘at Fawzī ‘Abd al-Muṭṭalib, 11 vols. (Manṣūra, Dār al-Wafā li’l-Tiba‘a wa’l-Nashr, 
2005), vol. 1, pp. 7-22. According to Lowry, the concept of bayān is the core idea that structures 
the law in Shāfi‘ī’s view. See, Lowry, Theory, pp. 23-59.  
Jāhiẓ appears to be the next scholar to use the term bayān to outline a theory of 
representation, which Montgomery reads as a conscious polemic against Shāfi‘ī usage of the 
term. Jāhiẓ’s theory of representation has five modes: speech, gesticulation, math, writing, and 
index (niṣba). By the last term, index, I mean forms of representation that are not conventional 
and thus not restricted to human production. Rather, these modes of communication rely on 
inferences and deduction to create meanings. For example, Jāhiẓ claims that nature provides 
many indexes of God’s existence and the corpse is an index of the death of the person. Although 
Jāhiẓ claims that each of the five modes of representation are different, he also states that the 
index can replace the other four modes of representation. Index thus grounds all conventional 
human forms of communication. Montgomery, who reads this passage in the light of Aristotle’s 
Categories, translates the term “niṣba” as location for the Aristotelian term “to keisthai.”  
However, this translation of the term and reading of the Jāhiẓ’s work in the light of the Hellenistic 
and more specifically Aristotelian tradition does not make sense of the examples that Jāhiẓ gives 
and lacks any solid “philological proof” as Montgomery admits. See, Abū Uthmān b. Baḥr al-
Jāhiẓ, Kitāb al-Bayān wa’l-Tabyīn, ed. Ibrāhīm Shams al-Dīn, 2 vols. (Beirut: Mu’assasat al-
A’lamī al-Maṭbū‘āt, 2003), vol. 1, pp. 82-88; Montgomery, Bayān, esp. pp. 91-93, 125-133.  
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It is important to note that the forms of uncertainty associated with gharar are 
more general judgments about a lack of referent in the analysis of a specific transaction. 
To say that a transaction has uncertainty in terms of the quality does not indicate the 
exact quality that must be present and known. The forms of uncertainty configure a 
checklist of the general referents and traits that a valid contract must posses to avoid 
gharar.  
To understand how this privation occurs in jurists’ discussions of commercial 
transactions, I will explore the nature of the existence of the referents that jurists discuss 
in several transactions characterized by gharar. Notwithstanding the claims of Ibn Ḥazm 
and other scholars who support the Aristotelian model of representation, referents do not 
simply exist as self-subsisting entities, or at least not in commercial law. We saw in 
chapter one that Ibn Qudāma deconstructs this notion of reality to subordinate it to 
discursive practices of a community. In a similar fashion, Ibn Ḥazm also deconstructs the 
objective referents that this Aristotelian model of representation requires.241 Rather, 
discourse structures how we think and represent the referents that populate reality.   
In this chapter, I will be exploring the forms of discursive knowledge that jurists 
employ to imagine and describe the existence and non-existence of a referent. By the 
phrase “legal existence,” I mean that jurists accord a referent a status of existing in the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
241  To be precise, Ibn Ḥazm declares the universality of thought due to its subordination 
to reality. However, he remarks a few pages later that Latin employs several different words and 
concepts, which Arabic lacks, to pose questions. See Ibn Ḥazm, Taqrīb, p. 20. However, if 
thought is truly universal, Latin should not have additional concepts for asking questions. One 
might try to save Ibn Ḥazm from this aporia by claiming that a referent existing in reality does 
not lie behind the words and concepts of questions unlike the word and concept for “table,” which 
does have a referent in reality.  Unfortunately, this counterargument would only further prove that 
representation is subordinated to specific discourses rather than some form of a univocal and 
static reality.  
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eyes of the law even if the referent may not “physically” exist. Conversely, they may 
deny the legal existence of a referent even if it “physically” exists at the time that the 
counterparties enter into the contract. This legal existence is like the concept of 
constructivism in American law, which accords corporations a legal personality 
notwithstanding the fact that corporations lack sentience or personality in the same sense 
as people.242 The legal existence of the referent enables jurists and counterparties to have 
certainty with respect to the ability to deliver the good of the contract, specify the 
delivery date, and describe the good. Conversely, the lack of a specific referent leads to 
privation of representation that causes the forms of uncertainty associated with gharar.       
In order to elucidate the different forms of discursive knowledge systems that 
jurists employ to represent the legal existence of the referents of their analyses, I will 
analyze several important paradigmatic transactions that have gharar. Transactions like 
the mulāmasa, munābadha, and bay‘ al-ḥaṣā are rather clear-cut commercial situations 
where the counterparties lack the referents required to attain certainty with respect to 
good of the sale. On the other hand, transactions like the sale of milk in the udder of a 
cow or the sale of a fetus, are particularly hard cases where jurists examine the referents 
whose existence is uncertain. Taken together, this chapter and the previous one detail 
how jurists represent the forms of uncertainty associated with gharar so as to create a 
privation of identity between referents and thought.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
242  For further details in American law, see Black’s Law Dictionary, 7th ed., s.v. 
constructive,  legal fiction,  personality. For a longer discussions of legal personality in Common 
Law, George Whitecross Paton, A Text-Book of Jurisprudence (Melbourne: Clarendon Press, 
1946), pp. 249-281.  
	  	   144	  
Finally, pre-modern Muslim scholars discussed the nature of existence at great 
length in works or kalām and philosophy. With the victory of ‘Ash‘arī and Māturīdī 
theology, most Muslims adopted an occasionalist ontology in which the semblance of 
causation is merely a form of grace from God to make the world appear rational for 
humans. To the best of my knowledge, the only explicit parallel with theological 
occasionalism is Sarakhsī’s fascinating comparison of the existence of the usufruct of 
goods to the existence of the accidents in atoms as we will see below. More generally, 
Ibn Ḥazm employs a theological argument to validate his notion of ownership and 
gharar.  Nevertheless, theological considerations, such as whether people have free-will 
or events or predestined, do not overtly inform the discussion of gharar in any 
meaningful sense.  
 
I. Discursive Levels—Mulāmasa, Munābadha, and Bay‘ al-ḥaṣā 
 Mulāmasa, munābadha, and bay‘ al-ḥaṣā form a triumvirate of allegedly pre-
Islamic sales that jurists generally examine first in their discussions of gharar. Unlike 
other transactions characterized by gharar, my jurists present relatively uniform 
descriptions of and rulings on these three transactions. For jurists, these transactions 
function, due to the role of contingency, as extreme cases of uncertainty in terms of the 
description and quantity of the good. More importantly, the relationship between this 
form of uncertainty and the goods of these transactions creates, from the perspective of 
jurists, a privation of identity between thought and the description and quantity of the 
good for both counterparties. However, the unity of legal analysis does not imply the 
unity of functions of discourse about these transactions. Functionally, the discourses of 
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jurists fall into two categories: 1) paradigmatic discourses on gharar, and 2) comparative 
discourses.  
 
a. Paradigmatic Discourse 
Ibn Rushd presents the most detailed description of the mulāmasa, munābadha, 
and bay‘ al-ḥaṣā, which he claims were common pre-Islamic transactions. The mulāmasa 
was the purchase of a robe on the basis of touching it either without unfolding it or in the 
dark.243 As for the munābdaha, counterparties threw each other goods on the condition 
that the sale was binding. Finally, with the bay‘ al-ḥaṣā, a person would either throw a 
stone and get the dress that it landed on, or the sale would become binding if a stone fell 
from the buyer’s hand.244  Most of the other jurists offer similar descriptions of these 
transactions. However, Ibn Qudāma describes a variation on the bay‘ al-ḥaṣā where the 
buyer would promise to purchase all of the land that the stone that he threw hit.245    
While reading their descriptions, one gets the sense that the jurists employed 
some folk etymology to explain these terms. If the reports about the shrewdness of the 
Qurayshī merchants are to be believed, it seems improbable that they employed these 
methods in their serious business dealings.246  These transactions seem reminiscent of a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
243 Ibn Rushd, Bidāya, vol. 3, p. 1200. 
 
244 Ibn Rushd, Bidāya, vol. 3, p. 1200. 
 
245 Ibn Qudāma, Mughnī, vol. 4, p. 156, ¶ 3059. For other descriptions of these sales, see 
Bājī, Muntaqā, vol. 6, p. 405-406; Shīrāzī, Muhadhdhab, vol. 3, pp. 45-46. 
 
246 According to common wisdom, the Meccans were savvy merchants and financiers by 
the time of the Prophet. They controlled the trade of precious goods flowing form South Arabia to 
the Byzantine and Sassanian Empires. For these accounts, see Fred Donner, “Mecca’s Food 
Supplies and Muḥammad’s Boycott,” Journal of Economic and Social History of the Orient 20:3 
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ring toss game at a carnival. Indeed, these transactions seem to be examples of a larger 
narrative about the recklessness and amorality of people in Pre-Islamic Arabian society. 
Discursively, the importance of these transactions is not their historicity, but the fact that 
they serve as cases of maximal and pointless gharar. Ibn Rushd concludes his brief 
paragraph on bay‘ al-ḥaṣā by stating that these transactions are like qimār, gambling.247  
Bājī, Shīrāzī, and Ibn Qudāma argue that a sale cannot be contingent on a random future 
event like the tossing of stone (lā yajūz ta‘līq al-bay‘ ‘alā sharṭ al-mustaqbal).248 
According to Ibn Rushd, the munābdaha occurs without either counterparty selecting 
(yu‘ayyin) the good but rather on the basis of chance (ittifāq).249   
Due to the role of chance, the good of the sale is unknown at the time the 
counterparties enter into the contract.250 Both Bājī and Ibn Qudāma state that the buyer 
purchases a good without any contemplation (ghayr ta’ammul).251 Ibn Rushd claims that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
(1977), pp. 249-250; M.A. Shaban, Islamic History A.D. 600-750: A New Interpretation 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971), pp. 2-9; W. Montgomery Watt, Muhammad at 
Mecca (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1953), p. 3. In her study, Patricia Crone has drawn into 
question the portrayal of the Meccans as controlling a long distance trade in high value goods.  
Although she suggests that the Meccans may have traded common pastoralist and agricultural 
goods throughout Arabia and on the fringes of settled areas, she argues that the logistics and 
economics of this trade make do not make sense on the basis of our current understanding of 
trade networks in Arabia. Patricia Crone, Meccan Trade and the Rise of Islam (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1987), pp. 3-11, 149-167. 
 
247 Ibn Rushd, Bidāya, vol. 3, p. 1210.  
 
248 Bājī, Muntaqā, vol. 6, p. 405, Ibn Qudāma, Mughnī, vol. 4, p. 156, ¶ 3058; Shīrāzī, 
Muhadhdhab, vol. 3, p. 45. 
 
249 Ibn Rushd, Bidāya, vol. 3, p. 1200. 
 
250 Shīrāzī, Muhadhdhab, vol. 3, pp. 45-46. 
 
251 Bājī, Muntaqā, vol. 6, p. 405; Ibn Qudāma, Mughnī, vol. 4, p. 156, ¶¶ 3058-3059. 
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the munābadha creates uncertainty with respect to the quality of the good.252  Bājī 
elaborates on this comment by stating that,  
The buyer cannot examine and know the good’s characteristics 
until he touches it or the seller throws it to him. The buyer thus 
does not know the description of the good whose price will vary 
as the description does.253 
 
Bājī’s criticism connects the epistemological dimensions of gharar to the ability to value 
a good.  By not specifying the good, the counterparties lack certainty with respect to its 
description such that it becomes impossible to value the transaction.  
 Due to the role of chance, either the buyer or both counterparties are uncertain 
with respect to the quality and quantity of the good. As indicated in the previous chapter, 
to acquire certainty with respect to the description of the good one must either visually 
inspect it or receive a description of its relevant traits. True, the buyer in these 
transactions may have some intuition about the good that he feels in the dark or the object 
that his stone will hit. However, rather than according any representative value to these 
ideas or intuitions, jurists simply treat them as uncertainty. In effect, the discourses of 
these jurists suppress the existence of the objects of these transactions so that a privation 
of identity occurs, which creates uncertainty with respect to the description of the good of 
the transaction.  
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
252 Ibn Rushd, Bidāya, vol. 3, p. 1200. 
 
253 Bājī, Muntaqā, vol. 6, p. 405. Lā ya‘rif bihi al-mubtā‘ mā yaḥtāj ilā ma‘rifatihi min 
ṣifāt al-mabī‘ alladhī yakhtalif thamanuhu bi-ikhtilāfihi wa-yatafāwat). 
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b. Comparative Discourse 
 Unlike the previous jurists, Ibn Ḥazm and Sarakhsī employ these transactions 
within their conversations about the typologies of licit commercial transactions. Both 
jurists discuss transactions that initially seem to lack a good, such as a salam contract or 
lease.  One might think that these transactions have gharar since they lack a good at the 
time of the contract. These two jurists, however, then compare these seemingly 
problematic transactions to the mulāmasa, munābadha, and bay‘ al-ḥaṣā in an effort to 
refute any analogy between the two sets of transactions. Although the discussions of Ibn 
Ḥazm and Sarakhsī clearly presume those in the previous section, Ibn Ḥazm and Sarakhsī 
do not describe mulāmasa, munābadha, and bay‘ al-ḥaṣā.   
 According to Ibn Ḥazm, some Shāfi‘īs interpret the prohibition on the mulāmasa, 
munābadha, and bay‘ al-ḥaṣā to mean that all transactions require a visual inspection. 
Although Shīrāzī does not corroborate this claim, Ibn Ḥazm attributes a number of 
arguments to the Shāfi‘īs. According to one argument, the sale of what is not present 
when the contract is negotiated causes gharar since the good may be destroyed before the 
buyer takes possession of it. However, Ibn Ḥazm retorts that if the sale on the basis of a 
description has gharar due to this reason, every sale on the face of the Earth would fall 
prey to the same concern. Ibn Ḥazm then claims that these Shāfi‘īs also compare the sale 
of a good that is not present at the sale to the mulāmasa and munābadha. Ibn Ḥazm 
responds that a sale on the basis of a description bears no resemblance to these prohibited 
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transactions since God permits the sale of what is not present based on a description and 
as long as the seller owns the good.254  
 Implicit in this debate is the question of whether a valid analogy exists between a 
sale based on a description and the mulāmasa and munābadha. On the one hand, 
according to Ibn Ḥazm, these Shāfi‘īs argue that with the mulāmasa and munābadha the 
buyer cannot inspect the good of the transaction in order to gain certainty and thus any 
transaction without a visual inspection is uncertain. For this group, even with fungible 
goods, language is not equivalent to knowledge acquired by a visual inspection. On the 
other hand, Ibn Ḥazm denies the validity of this analogy and lays out the two-tier 
typology of licit sales: 1) a good that is present at the transaction and can be inspected 
(sil‘a ḥāḍira mar’īya muqallab), and 2) a good that is not present, but can be accurately 
described with reference to a good similar to it (sil‘a ghā’iba ma‘rūfa aw mawṣufa bi-
mithlihā).255 Ultimately, a verbal description engenders certainty with respect to fungible 
goods since the description stands in for the actual object according to Ibn Ḥazm and the 
other jurists examined in this study. On the other hand, the mulāmasa and munābadha 
effectively lack a good that one can examine or describe due to the role of contingency in 
these transactions.   
Sarakhsī mentions the prohibition against mulāmasa and munābadha in the 
beginning of his chapter about contracts of lease and hire. For Sarakhsī, a lease or hire 
poses a conceptual problem of defining and valuing the usufruct of the good or service. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
254  Ibn Ḥazm, Muḥallā, vol, 8, pp. 339-341, ¶ 1411. 
 
255 Ibn Ḥazm, Muḥallā, vol. 8, p. 336, ¶ 1411.  
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Usufruct does not tangibly exist like land, grain, or a person. In fact, Sarakhsī compares 
usufruct to the accidents of substances. These accidents phase in and out of existence 
unpredictably.256 This comparison between usufruct and metaphysical attributes should 
imply the impossibility of defining and valuing a lease or hire.  
However, Sarakhsī argues that a host of legal mechanisms create an epistemic 
space so that uncertainty with respect to the quantity and description of a good does not 
occur, unlike in the case of the mulāmasa and munābadha.257 In particular, the contract 
and good or labor stand in for the usufruct as the relevant referents for the analysis of 
whether gharar affects a particular transaction. As with the other jurists, for Sarakhsī, the 
mulāmasa and munābadha lack any referents or any method to ameliorate this lack, and 
so there is uncertainty with respect to these transactions.   
 
II. Sales of Milk 
 According to jurists, the mulāmasa, munābadha, and bay‘ al-ḥaṣā, lack a specific 
good, a lack which leads to uncertainty notwithstanding the fact that the counterparties 
may have some vague conception of the good.  Although jurists may have the luxury to 
prohibit the mulāmasa, munābadha, and bay‘ al-ḥaṣā due to the role of chance, others 
transactions like the sale of milk in the udder and the sale of fruit present uncertainty due 
to the structure of the referents of legal analysis. In both cases, jurists employ a variety of 
epistemic systems to delineate a referent’s existence. I will first examine the sale of milk 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
256 For his comparison of usufruct and utility of goods with accidents within substances, 
see Sarakhsī, Mabsūṭ, vol. 11:4, pp. 79-80; vol, 15:5, pp. 126. 
 
257 Sarakhsī, Mabsūṭ, vol. 15:5, p. 76.  
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in the udder, for which jurists develop a range of interesting yet legally contradictory 




 The majority of jurists describe this transaction as the sale of the milk in the udder 
of an individual animal. This individuality, however, presents maximal uncertainty. 
According to Sarakhsī,  
Gharar is what has an unforeseeable outcome (mastūr al-
‘āqiba). It is unknown (lā yudrā) whether air, blood, or milk is 
in the udder. A sale is restricted to property with monetary 
value (al-bay‘ yakhtaṣṣ bi-‘ayn māl mutaqawwim). However, 
the milk is like a quality inside the animal (bi-manzilat al-ṣifa 
fī’l-ḥayawān) and the milk in the udder lacks monetary value by 
itself before it is milked. The interior qualities of an animal do 
not permit a sale as with a hand or a foot because the milk 
increases moment after moment and the sale neglects this 
increase. The mixing of the sold milk with milk produced after 
the sale that belongs to the animal’s owner makes 
distinguishing the sold milk from the unsold milk impossible 
(yata‘adhdhar tamyīzuhu), which invalidates the sale. Thus a 
legal dispute may occur between the counterparties with respect 
to the delivery because the buyer will relentlessly claim that he 
is owed more milk, but the seller will reject these demands258  
 
In this quotation, gharar coordinates the use of several forms of uncertainty and modes of 
analysis. The milk in the udder presents uncertainty in terms of the exact quantity and 
quality that is being purchased. Sarakhsī even doubts the very existence of milk in udders 
in order imply that the transaction lacks a referent. Even if the udder has milk, this creates 
more uncertainty since the sold milk cannot be distinguished from the milk that the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
258 Sarakhsī, Mabsūṭ, vol. 12:4, pp. 194-195. 
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animal produced after the sale and thus belongs to its owner. The uncertainty with respect 
to the quantity and quality of the milk also causes uncertainty with respect to its delivery. 
Taken together, Sarakhsī argues that this transaction lacks a referent that would enable 
the representation of its legal and economic value.  
 Ibn Ḥazm prohibits this sale for similar reasons when he states that, 
The proof of the invalidity of a sale of what is not known either 
by visual inspection or a sound description is the prohibition of 
the Prophet against sales with gharar and this transaction 
epitomizes gharar since the good of the sale is unknown (lā 
yudrā).259  
 
He then adds another, novel, reason for prohibiting this sale that compounds the 
uncertainty. If the milk has not been extracted, one of the counterparties must take the 
time and labor to milk the animal. However, just as the quantity of milk cannot be 
quantified beforehand, neither can the labor required to extract it be defined so that the 
price of the milk is unknown.260 Shīrāzī and Ibn Qudāma offer reasons similar to those of 
Ibn Ḥazm and Sarakhsī.261 
 
b. Generality  
 As compelling as these arguments may be, they rest on several assumptions and 
reasoning techniques to define the referent of these transactions and thus gharar. In 
particular, these jurists grant no role to expert knowledge and probability. Considering 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
259 Ibn Ḥazm, Muḥallā, vol, 8, p. 343, ¶ 1413. 
 
260 Ibn Ḥazm, Muḥallā, vol, 8, p. 343, ¶ 1413. 
 
261 Ibn Qudāma, Mughnī, vol. 4, p. 157, ¶¶ 3061-3062; Shīrāzī, Muhadhdhab, vol. 3, p. 
43. 
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the fact that a cow must be milked twice a day in order for its udders to not become 
infected, it seems that the counterparties would or at least could know the likely quantity 
and quality of milk to be produced. Furthermore, in the previous chapter, I noted that 
jurists argue that valuation relies on the construction of general classes of goods that 
allow for comparisons on the basis of a resemblance. Surely, it must be possible to do the 
same in this case.   
In fact, Bājī and Ibn Rushd introduce a subtle yet significant change into their 
analyses of this transaction to provide a referent. Rather than discussing the sale of milk 
from an individual animal, they discuss that of a herd.  According to Ibn Rushd, one may 
sell in advance, for a defined number of days, the milk of specific animals (ghanam 
mu‘ayyana) if the quantity and quality of their milk is generally known (mā yuḥlab minhā 
ma‘rūfan fī’l-‘āda).262  
Bājī adds that one may buy the milk of a specific herd of animals by one of two 
means. First, the buyer must stipulate a particular quantity to take each day. This mode 
must fulfill the following three stipulations: 
1.) He must promptly take the milk, 
2.) He must mention how much he will take each day and pick a 
length of time during which these animals will likely keep 
producing, 
3.) He must stipulate a quantity of milk that the likes of these 
animals will most likely produce.263 
   
With the second method, the buyer contracts to take all of the milk that the herd 
produces. The duration of the contract cannot exceed the time that the herd is likely to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
262 Ibn Rushd, Bidāya, vol. 3, p. 1215. 
 
263 Bājī, Muntaqā, vol. 6, p. 208. 
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produce milk of the specified quality and quantity. Bājī goes on to state that the sale of 
milk in the udder is licit because it is not really a sale but a lease (ijāra) of the udder. 
Like any lease, this contract requires a specific duration. So the counterparties must 
assess the traits of the herd in order to define a quantity that is likely to be produced.264   
Unlike the other jurists, Bājī argues that one can have certainty with respect to the 
quantity and quality of the milk of the herd. According to Aṣbagh, whom Bājī cites, “The 
gharar in one specific animal and a number of animals are of the same type but gharar is 
greater in the case of one animal.”265  In other words, the uncertainty that occurs in the 
sale of the milk of one animal and that of the herd are the same qualitatively but not 
quantitatively. With one specific animal changes may affect its milk production so that 
the level of gharar can vary widely. However, with multiple animals “some of them will 
pick up the slack of others so that no increase or decrease will appear in total and this 
decreases the amount of gharar.”266   
Ultimately, Ibn Rushd and Bājī use probability to tame the uncertainty that the 
other jurists argue resides at the center of this transaction. The different views reflect the 
difference between specificity and generality. For all of the jurists, the past production of 
a specific animal does not provide insight into its future production. However, generality 
rather than specificity enables Bājī to circumscribe a set of referents– a herd of cows– 
whose past production provides certainty about the future milk production. Certainty 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
264 Bājī, Muntaqā, vol. 6, p. 208. 
 
265 Bājī, Muntaqā, vol. 6, p. 209. Al-gharar fīha wa-fī’l-‘adad sawā’ wa-huwa fī’l-waḥida 
athqal.  
 
266 Bājī, Muntaqā, vol. 6, p. 209. Al-ghanam al-kathira yahṣul ba‘ḍuhā ba‘ḍan fa-lā 
yaẓhar fī’l-jumlatihā  taghayyur bi-ziyāda wa-lā nuqṣan fa-yab‘ud al-gharar fīhā. 
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about the future production of the herd provides certainty into quantity and quality of the 
milk and the ability to deliver this future milk.  
Unfortunately, the other jurists do not discuss the sale of milk from a herd. I am 
inclined to think that this silence reflects a conscious decision on the parts of these jurists. 
Although the use of probability to delineate a referent for this transaction is interesting, as 
I mentioned before, anyone who has milked a cow before would know this. In this study, 
we have and will continue to see that the Bājī and Ibn Rushd generally take the most 
permissive view toward the use of induction and probability to define certainty. However, 
what is surprising is the fact that Sarakhsī, a Ḥanafī, is often the most averse to 
probability and induction, which challenges the general narrative that Ḥanafīs are the 
most lenient school due to their acceptance of use of analogy to derive laws.   
 
III. Peels, Shells, and Containers 
 In the previous transaction, notwithstanding the fact that the udder prevents the 
inspection of the milk one can always buy a bucket of milk in the market where it can be 
inspected. Many goods, however, like fruits, vegetables, eggs, and nuts have protective 
coatings that one cannot break without the interior quickly spoiling. Only Shīrāzī, Ibn 
Qudāma, and Ibn Ḥazm substantively discuss this type of goods. Their analyses of these 
goods can be divided in terms of whether jurists focus on discussing the physical 
properties of a good, and analyses that construct the buyer and his subjective goals. 
Although terms like objectivity and subjectivity are not fixed reference points in either 
discussions of gharar or the theoretical discourses of uṣūl al-fiqh and kalām, these two 
terms offer a convenient matrix to understand the legal analyses of these transactions.  
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a. Objectivity 
 An egg has a particular set of physical traits that jurists must acknowledge. 
However, the ways that jurists describe these traits open different avenues for 
epistemological and legal considerations. On the one hand, Ibn Ḥazm takes a maximally 
permissive view of this type of sale by conceiving of goods as undifferentiated wholes. 
On the other hand, Ibn Qudāma and Shīrāzī have a more nuanced analysis of the traits of 
the goods and how these traits relate to the buyer’s intended uses of these goods.   
Although Ibn Ḥazm discusses the problem of the sale of goods whose interiors 
cannot be examined by referring to many such goods–like nuts, coconuts, honey in 
beeswax, meat of unskinned sheep, olive oil in olives, an animal along with the sale of 
the milk in its udders, and eggs–his legal analysis is homogeneous.  According to him, 
the sale of these goods is permissible since God created them and everything else too 
with depth, length and width. In other words, everything has an interior that may be 
partially unexaminable. He then cites part of Q 2:275, “God made trade permissible,” and 
claims that the sunna and ijmā‘ permit the sale of grapes and dates with their pits, eggs, 
and the oil in olives and sesame seeds. He then asks,  
What is the difference between these goods that jurists agree 
about the legality of their sales and those goods, like musk in 
the gland and honey in beeswax, that jurists disagree about the 
legality of their sales? There is no way to distinguish them on 
the basis of the Qur’ān, sunna, a defective tradition (riwāya 
saqīma), opinion of the Companions, opinion of the Successors, 
qiyās, a conceptual reason, or ra’y. God permitted all of these 
transactions and did not restrict anything since He said, “So He 
has distinguished for you what He has prohibited for you.”267 So 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
267 Q: 6. 119.  
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if these transactions were impermissible He would have 
distinguished them for us, but since He did not, their legality is 
textually stipulated (manṣūṣ).268 
 
His argument has two parts. First, all jurists permit the sale of grapes, olives, and 
dates notwithstanding the fact that these goods have interiors that cannot be examined. 
However, if someone claims that this form of uncertainty creates gharar, he responds 
that, “The truth is that there is no gharar, because each good is an undifferentiated body 
(jism wāḥid), which God created as it is and all that is within it is a portion of all of it.”269 
Although fruit has an interior and exterior, he conceives of it as a whole for the sake of 
his analysis of gharar and value. The second part of his argument hinges on the Qur’ānic 
verse, which he interprets to mean that God must define all of His prohibitions and that 
things are presumed to be licit unless God states otherwise.270  
His argument clearly analogizes the goods he is analyzing to those that have a 
consensus on the legality of their sale. The legal analogy hinges upon the resemblance 
between the three-dimensional structures of both sets of goods. Undoubtedly, Ibn Ḥazm 
would deny that he engaged in analogical reasoning here. Rather he might claim that the 
unrestricted meaning of the verse embraces all such goods and thereby this meaning 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
268 Ibn Ḥazm, Muḥallā, vol, 8, p. 392, ¶ 1422. 
 
269 Ibn Ḥazm, Muḥallā, vol, 8, p. 392, ¶ 1422.  Ammā al-ḥaqq fa-innahu laysa ghararan 
li-annahu jism wāhid khalaqhu Allāh ‘azza wa-jalla ka-mā huwa wa-kull mā dākhiluhu ba‘ḍ li’l-
jumlatihi. 
 
270 In works of uṣūl al-fiqh and kalām, authors generally present complex discussions 
about whether God must provide evidence for each law and the default status of acts before and 
after Revelation. For the most in-depth study of these conversations among formative and post-
formative jurists, see A. Kevin Reinhart, Before Revelation: The Boundaries of Muslim Moral 
Thought (Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 1995).   
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supports his argument. Nevertheless, as crafted, his argument explicitly draws attention to 
the resemblance between the goods to justify their similar legal statuses.  
 Ibn Ḥazm then lambasts the Shāfi‘ī position that the sale of a coconut with both 
its outer and inner shells has excessive gharar, but if one removes the outer shell the 
transaction is licit. Although Ibn Ḥazm claims in his polemic that this is the majority 
opinion among the Shāfi‘īs, Shīrāzī states that it is a minority opinion. Regardless of this 
fact, Ibn Ḥazm argues that, “With respect to something that is concealed, there is no 
distinction in the knowledge of the quality (al-ma‘rifa bi-ṣifa) of what is underneath the 
peel whether it has one, two, or more peels.”271  In other words, whether a good has one 
skin or more is irrelevant since the center still cannot be examined. He then points out the 
fact that the Shāfi‘īs also contradict themselves since they allow the sale of an egg, which 
has a shell and membrane.272 
 Ultimately, Ibn Ḥazm argues that these objects are undifferentiated wholes for 
purposes of legal analysis. This argument suppresses the physical interiorities whose 
representations are impossible. When these objects are conceived of as undifferentiated 
wholes, inspections or verbal descriptions of the exterior become a sufficient basis for 
knowledge and representations of the entirety of these goods for Ibn Ḥazm. 
   
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
271 Ibn Ḥazm, Muḥallā, vol, 8, pp. 392-393, ¶ 1422. 
 
272 Ibn Ḥazm, Muḥallā, vol, 8, p. 393, ¶ 1422. 
 
	  	   159	  
b. Objectivity and Subjectivity 
According to Shīrāzī, the Shāfi‘īs disagree about the sales of these types of goods. 
Unlike Ibn Ḥazm, who argues that fruits and vegetables are undifferentiated wholes for 
the analysis of gharar, the Shāfi‘īs differentiate these goods. For example, in the Umm, 
Shāfi‘ī prohibits the sales of fava beans in the pod since the pod may either be empty, or 
if there are seeds there is uncertainty with respect to their quantity and quality. The same 
goes for grain in the husk. 273   The inability to examine the interior of such goods draws 
into question their very existence and thus the ability to represent them. For this position, 
value and knowledge are more than skin deep.    
In order to permit these transactions, Shāfi‘ī jurists conceive of the physical 
structure of these goods differently and rely on notions of the subjective values of the 
buyer. In terms of the physical structure, jurists argue that the coat preserves the interior 
of the good such as in the case of deer musk in the gland (nāfija) of the deer or the inner 
shell of a coconut. 274  In this case, jurists essentially treat the good as an undifferentiated 
whole as Ibn Ḥazm does. For goods whose exteriors are not so beneficial, jurists rely 
upon the buyer’s uses of the goods to determine the traits to be represented.  For example, 
Shīrāzī forbids the sale of a spadix, which has a cover around it, since the interior, the 
intended part of the transaction from his perspective, cannot be inspected and he claims 
that the cover has no use. He also cites Abū Hurayra who permits the sale since one may 
intend to use the cover as fodder such that there is a referent to represent. In general, Ibn 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
273 Shīrāzī, Muhadhdhab, vol. 3, p. 38-39. 
 
274 Shīrāzī, Muhadhdhab, vol. 3, p. 38-39. 
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Qudāma’s discussion follows a similar pattern of modulating the objectivity and 
subjectivity of discourse.275   
  
IV. Sale of a Runaway Slave 
 With the sale of a runaway slave, jurists once again offer a range of views on the 
legality of the transaction that revolve around the notions of value, knowledge, and 
ownership rights. However, in this case, the different positions of jurists relate to the 
epistemic systems that they employ to delineate the object of the transaction. Whereas 
most jurists analyze this transaction in terms of the ability to deliver the slave, Ibn Ḥazm 
invokes theology to analyze this transaction. 
 
a. Delivery and Knowledge 
 For most jurists, the analysis of this transaction hinges on the ability to deliver the 
slave and how uncertainty about the ability to deliver the slave affects the owner’s right 
to dispose of the slave. Ibn Qudāma puts the problem most concisely when he prohibits 
the sale of a runaway slave or animal whether the seller knows the location or not (sawā’ 
‘alima  makānahu aw jahilahu) due to the inability of the seller to guarantee the delivery 
of the slave or animal.276  Bājī adds that the slave must be described and in the possession 
of the seller. Although one may sell fungible goods without owning them as we saw in 
the previous chapter, with a runaway slave gharar arises from the fact that the seller can 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
275 Ibn Qudāma, Mughnī, vol. 4, p. 71, ¶. 2902. 
  
276 Ibn Qudāma, Mughnī, vol. 4, pp. 150-151, ¶. 3048. 
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guarantee neither delivery of the specified slave nor a perfect substitute.277 Elsewhere, 
Bājī states that with this sale, “there is fear about the impossibility of taking possession of 
it since the buyer can only acquire liability for it by taking possession of it.”278  
Sarakhsī adds to these explanations,  
With a runaway, ownership of the slave is still affirmed but  
running away prevents the owner from delivering the slave. Due 
to this, the sale is impermissible since it is only permissible to 
sell what the seller can deliver.  The seller’s ability to deliver the 
slave is non-existent due to the slave having run away 
(qudratuhu ‘alā al-taslīm tan‘adim bi’l-ibāq). This sale contains 
gharar because neither the slave’s continued survival in this 
condition nor his return are certain in reality (lā yu‘lam baqā’uhu 
fī al-ḥāl haqīqatan wa-lā ‘awd).279 
  
Sarakhsī argues in this passage that the status of the slave raises uncertainty about the 
ability to deliver it. He then goes even further to deprive the slave of the legal status of 
existence when he states that, “The monetary value of a runaway slave is in the grave, 
which is to say that it is as though the slave is non-existent in reality (al-mālīya fī’l-ābiq 
thāwiya fa-huwa ka’l-ma‘dūm haqīqatan).”280  In general, Sarakhsī and these jurists 
argue that since the slave is not under its owner’s control the slave’s existence cannot be 
assured. True, the owner may be able to describe the slave perfectly, but uncertainty 
about the slave’s whereabouts and existence make this description worthless for jurists. 
They thus deprive the slave of legal existence with respect to the owner’s ability to sell 
the slave.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
277 Bājī, Muntaqā, vol. 6, p. 284. 
 
278 Bājī, Muntaqā, vol. 6, p. 399.  
 
279 Sarakhsī, Mabsūṭ, vol. 11:4, p. 22. 
 
280 Sarakhsī, Mabsūṭ, vol. 13:5, p. 10. 
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This privation is not complete for all jurists since Ibn Rushd and Shīrāzī permit 
this sale if the owner knows the location of the slave at the time of the contract.281  
However, the seller cannot take the payment until the buyer gets the slave. If the seller 
were paid up-front, this payment would vacillate between being a payment for the sale or 
an interest-free loan if the sale were later cancelled due to the inability to deliver the 
slave. Ibn Rushd concludes that the buyer does not pay when a non-fungible object is not 
present and securely possessed (bay‘ al-ghā’ib ghayr al-ma’mūn).282  Nevertheless, 
Sarakhsī permits the owner to manumit such a slave or give the slave to a family 
member.283 These jurists thus do not totally deprive the owner of all of his rights of 
disposition over the slave. 
 
b. Fate and Ownership 
 Ibn Ḥazm has the most lenient position notwithstanding the fact that the Ẓāhirīs 
forbid uncertainty in law, or at least in the hermeneutic construction of law. He permits 
the sale of a runaway slave or animal whether the seller knows the slave’s current 
location or not. To an interlocutor who prohibits the sale since “neither the owner nor 
anyone else may recognize it,” Ibn Ḥazm responds, “Why is it obligatory in your view 
that a Muslim should lose ownership of his property due to his uncertainty with respect to 
it?”284 According to him, if uncertainty about its location invalidates someone’s 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
281 Shīrāzī, Muhadhdhab, vol. 3, pp. 33-34. 
 
282 Ibn Rushd, Bidāya, vol. 3, p. 1215. 
 
283 Sarakhsī, Mabsūṭ, vol. 11:4, p. 22. 
 
284 Ibn Ḥazm, Muḥallā, vol, 8, pp. 388-389, ¶ 1431. 
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ownership, it would be impossible to own a piece land without natural or artificial 
borders to identify and constantly affirm one’s ownership of it.  
For Ibn Ḥazm, the central problem is to preserve the rights of an owner to dispose 
of his property by sale. To solve this problem, Ibn Ḥazm claims that God is the ultimate 
registrar for all property. Even if a person loses his property, God affirms his rights over 
it until the end of time. Thus, the sale of runaway slave is binding as long as the seller 
does not prevent the buyer from taking possession of it.285 Ibn Ḥazm adduces a number of 
textual sources to refute counterarguments. 286 The following quotation is his most 
interesting argument:  
 
This sale does not have gharar since it is the sale of something 
whose seller’s ownership is legally affirmed and the slave has a 
certain description and quantity… If this had gharar, the sale of 
an animal whether present or not at the sale would be illicit since 
its buyer does not know (lā yadrī) whether it will live or die after 
he buys it. He also does not know whether the animal is healthy 
or sick and if it is sick whether this sickness is temporary so that 
the animal will recover, or whether this is terminal so that the 
animal will perish. Gharar is not taken into account 
prospectively since destiny occurs according to what is unknown 
and impossible to defend against because it is invisible. God, 
may He be exalted, said, “No one knows what is hidden in the 
heavens or Earth except God…” Gharar is what is contracted 
with uncertainty in terms of the quantity or quality in the 
contract. If they say, “Perhaps the slave died or his description 
changed at the time of the contract,” we respond, “ The slave is 
presumed to be alive and sound such that he is deemed safe from 
death and his description is presumed to be known with certainty 
such that he is deemed safe from any change (wa-‘alā mā 
tayaqqan min ṣifātihi ḥattā yaṣiḥḥ taghyiruhu). If his death or 
change is confirmed the agreement is invalidated.287 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
285 Ibn Ḥazm, Muḥallā, vol, 8, p. 389, ¶ 1431. 
 
286 Ibn Ḥazm, Muḥallā, vol, 8, pp. 390-391, ¶ 1432. 
 
287 Ibn Ḥazm, Muḥallā, vol, 8, pp. 389-390, ¶ 1431. 
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In this passage, Ibn Ḥazm recognizes that gharar arises from uncertainty, but he limits 
the forms of uncertainty that cause gharar to that of the description of the good. Just as 
importantly, he limits the effects of temporal causality through two techniques in order to 
claim certainty with respect to this transaction.  First, he argues for the absolute 
indeterminacy of future events by invoking destiny (qadar). But rather than give into a 
notion of a future without any causality, Ibn Ḥazm adopts the pragmatic view that the 
description has not changed.  Thus, after initially undermining any form of causality that 
would link certainty from the past and present to that of the future, he reaffirms the role 
of causality.   
 The question naturally arises whether Ibn Ḥazm would be so cavalier about the 
sale of slave who has been missing for ten years. However, he does not address this 
question since he includes an option in this sale so that sale is invalidated if the slave is 
not as described in the contract. The option allows Ibn Ḥazm to avoid any complex 
analysis of the future and to posit a slave that exists as previously observed. Ultimately, 
Ibn Ḥazm ensures the legal existence of the slave through his arguments about destiny 
and ownership rights. The other jurists argue that the slave has no legal existence, which 
causes uncertainty with respect to its delivery.  
  
V. Offspring and Breeding Contracts 
 In the previous chapter, we saw that gharar arises due to three forms of 
uncertainty: the delivery date, ability to deliver the good of the contract, and the 
description of the good. However, these forms of uncertainty often combine, such as in 
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discussions of the following three sales; bay‘ ḥabal al-ḥabala, bay’ al-maḍāmīn, and bay’ 
al- malāqīḥ.288  Like mulāmasa, munābadha, and bay‘ al-ḥaṣā  contracts, jurists rely on 
folk etymology to detail these three supposedly Pre-Islamic contracts. According to Ibn 
Rushd, bay‘ ḥabal al-ḥabala, which means the sale of the offspring of the offspring, 
refers either to the sale of the second offspring that the same animal or slave will give 
birth to, or the sale of the third generation of the lineage of an animal or slave.289 Ibn 
Rushd states that the bay’ al-malāqīḥ refers to the sale of sperm and copulation rights 
with a male (mā fī ẓuhūr al-fuḥūl) and the bay’ al-maḍāmīn refers to contents of the 
womb of the female (mā fī buṭūn al-ḥawāmil). 290  On the other hand, both Bājī and Ibn 
Qudāma argue that the maḍāmīn sale pertains to the male and the malāqīḥ sale pertains to 
the female.291 Sarakhsī admits his uncertainty about the gender of each contract.292 
Nevertheless, Ibn Qudāma states that with the maḍāmīn sale the purchaser would get all 
of the offspring that the male sired during a specified period of time that may run for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
288 To the best of my knowledge, Ibn Ḥazm does not address these transactions.  
289 Ibn Rushd, Bidāya, vol. 3, p. 1200. 
 
 290 Ibn Rushd, Bidāya, vol. 3, p. 1200. Interestingly, Jāhiẓ uses the word talāqaḥa in his 
Kitāb al-Ḥayawān to refer to inter-species mating. He discusses the hybrid offspring of humans 
and angels along with various ways to create hybrid dogs. However, Jāhiẓ notes that the 
possibility and results of these unions can be unpredictable in both the short-term and long-term. 
In fact, in his study of camels, Richard Bulliet notes that successive generations of hybrids often 
become economically useless if mated with other hybrids. It is tempting to speculate that 
historically this prohibition referred to creating hybrids, but later jurists extended it to cover all 
types of mating. Abū Uthmān b. Baḥr al-Jāhiẓ, Kitāb al-Ḥayawān, 7 vols. (Cairo: Maktabat 
Muṣṭafā al-Bābi al-Ḥalabī, 1938), vol. 1, pp.156,184-185, 188-189; Richard Bulliet, The Camel 
and the Wheel (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1975), pp. 142-146.  For other early 
uses of this root, see Worterbuch der Klassischen Arabischen Sprache, s.v. l-q-ḥ.  
 
291 Bājī, Muntaqā, vol. 6, p. 359. 
 
292 Sarakhsī, Mabsūṭ, vol. 12:4, p. 195. 
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several years.293 Regardless of this confusion about the meaning of each term, all of the 
jurist agree that with any one of these transactions one attempted to purchase the unborn 
offspring of an animal through these contracts.  
 Turning to the analyses of the jurists, Ibn Qudāma denudes the fetus of existence 
by using an a minora ad maius argument to prohibit the ḥabal al-ḥabala sale. First, he 
prohibits the sale of a fetus in general since there is uncertainty in terms of the description 
of the fetus. The buyer does not know if the fetus is alive and even if it is alive, the seller 
cannot ensure the delivery of offspring. Finally, the delivery date cannot be specified 
with sufficient accuracy. Due to these reasons, he claims that the sale of the fetus is the 
sale of what does not exist (al-ma‘dūm). Since from Ibn Qudāma’s perspective the fetus 
does not exist, one cannot represent its description, delivery date, or ability to deliver it.  
He then reasons that if one cannot sell a fetus due to these reasons then this prohibition is 
even stronger for the sale of unborn offspring of the unborn offspring.294  
 Sarakhsī’s reasoning also denudes the fetus of any legal existence. According to 
him, as with the sale of milk in the udder, the seller, due to uncertainty, cannot ensure 
delivery of the good. This uncertainty is correlated with the fact that the fetus has no 
monetary value (al-in‘idām al-mālīya wa’l-taqawwum). He then analogizes this to the 
sale of wool on the back of sheep. In both cases, the wool and offspring have no value 
until separated from the sheep and womb of the mother respectively. This physical 
separation gives the wool and child a legal existence that engenders certainty with respect 
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to their descriptions and delivery. Without the ability to analyze the child on its own or 
wool shorn from the sheep, a legal dispute may arise between counterparties according to 
Sarakhsī.295    
Finally, Shīrāzī also prohibits the sale of a fetus in general since the animal may 
be pregnant or it may be merely bloated. Even if the animal is pregnant the ability to 
deliver its offspring and the description of the offspring are uncertain.296 He then 
discusses whether one may sell an animal on the condition that it is pregnant. His school 
has two views on this issue. The first prohibits this sale since the existence of the fetus is 
uncertain, and if it does exist its description is uncertain. On the other hand, the second 
view permits this stipulation since the existence of the fetus is manifest (ẓāhir). As for 
any remaining uncertainty affecting the existence and quality of the offspring, he states 
that, “The uncertainty has no legal effect since inspecting it is possible and this effaces 
any uncertainty.”297  Like the sale of a house where one cannot inspect its foundation, one 
must rely on the inspection of the rest of the house to determine the state of the 
foundation.298  In other words, one may obtain certainty based on inferences from certain 
physical traits. These inferences then serve as referents for obtaining certainty with 
respect to the delivery and description of the offspring. Unfortunately, Shīrāzī does not 
indicate which opinion he favors.    
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The analyses of Bājī and Ibn Rushd generally follow the patterns of the above 
jurists. Bājī, however, adds two interesting points. 299  First, he prohibits these 
transactions due to uncertainty in terms of the delivery date since a specific date cannot 
be defined and a long-dated contract has more gharar. 300 Second, although Bājī agrees 
that the maḍāmīn sale and malāqīḥ sale are illicit due to gharar, he permits one to lease 
of a male camel to mate with a female camel. 301  According to him,  
If one leases a stallion in order to mount his female a few times 
such that this may occur once or several times close together this 
is permissible. This is because the stallion is defined and 
specified (ma‘lūm mu‘ayyan), the number of times that 
copulation is required is known, so that there is no gharar or 
uncertainty.”302  
 
Once he renames this transaction a hire it becomes licit. With a sale, one guarantees the 
production of offspring. By changing the form and goal of the contract to that of a hire, 
Bājī focuses on the issues that he claims that the counterparties can know. In this case, he 
argues that a specific stallion that will mate a defined number of times serves as a set of 
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VI. Multiple Contractual Agreements in One  
 For most of the jurists, the transactions raise gharar because the good cannot be 
examined at the time of the sale and in many cases there are reasons to doubt that the 
good can be delivered. True, there are ways to conceive of goods, such as the case of 
food that has protective shell or skin, so that one can claim to have knowledge of the 
good’s description. However, gharar can also occur even when one can examine a good 
and is certain to receive it.  For example, jurists prohibit contracting multiples sales in 
one contract. Generally, jurists use the phrase bay’atān fī bay’a, or two sales in one, to 
describe such a transaction, but Sarakhsī employs the term ṣafqatān fī ṣafqa, or two deals 
in one.303 Although only Ibn Rushd, Bājī, and Shīrāzī state that these transactions cause 
gharar, the other jurists also prohibit them. 
 Once again, Ibn Rushd offers the most detailed and systematic presentation of this 
type of transaction. He identifies three types of such transactions: (1) the sale of two 
goods for two different prices, (2) the sale of one good at two different prices, (3) the sale 
of two goods at one price on the condition that one of the two sales is binding. The first 
type of sale may take one of the two following forms: ‘Amr sells a house to Zayd for a 
stipulated price on the condition that Zayd sells him a slave at a different price, or ‘Amr 
offers to sell either a specific good for a dīnār or another good for several dīnārs. The 
second type gives the buyer the option to pay either a lower cash price or a higher credit 
price after the counterparties agree to the sale. Finally, the third type, the sale of one of 
two goods quoted at the same price, is rather straightforward. For example, one might 
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offer to sell one of two dresses at the same price. 304 In the second and third types of sales, 
the seller offers several options, the counterparties agree on the transaction, and after the 
transaction is completed the buyer exercises one of his options. 
Bājī mentions a report in which Ibn Wahb asks his teacher, Ibn al-Qāsim, what 
the phrase “bay’atān fī bay’a” means. Ibn al-Qāsim responds that the phrase refers, 
To more than can possibly be explained, but the basis that it is 
built upon and by which its reprehensibility is well-known is that 
the counterparties transact in two things such that if one is 
invalidated the other is invalid and this creates impermissible 
gharar.305  
 
Notwithstanding his teacher’s inability describe all of the transactions that violate this 
prohibition, Ibn Wahb still managed to formulate some of its general categories. In 
particular, Ibn Wahb describes the second and third categories described in the typology 
of Ibn Rushd. Bājī also prohibits transactions of the first type described in the typology of 
Ibn Rushd. The rest of our jurists discuss only the first and second types of 
transactions.306  In addition, Ibn Qudāma and Ibn Ḥazm prohibit the sale of a good for 
dīnārs on the condition that, post-sale, the buyer exchanges the dīnārs for dirhāms.307  
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305 Bājī, Muntaqā, vol. 6, p. 394. 
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For the jurists, the optionality of the contract creates uncertainty in terms of the 
good, price, and delivery.308 Considering the fact that seller has quoted the price or good 
to the buyer it is initially unclear where the uncertainty lies. However, according to 
Shīrāzī, when one sells a good at a specified price on the condition that the buyer agrees 
to sell a specific good at a specific price,   
This sale is illicit due to stipulation of the joint sales in the 
contract. If the stipulation is removed the price of the good must 
be increased in proportion to the removed stipulation but this 
increase is unknown. Thus, if the price is increased it becomes 
unknown and this is illicit. When the price or good is unknown 
the sale is invalid.309 
 
In the case where ‘Amr offers to sell a good to Zayd on the condition that Zayd will sell a 
good to him, the price of one good is contingent upon that of the other good. 
Accordingly, the price of one good might be lower or higher than its market value in 
order to get the other to be sold. If one of the goods cannot be delivered its payment 
should be returned. However, since neither good was sold at its market value one party 
would benefit at the expense of the other if one leg of such a transaction were cancelled. 
Indeed, it is easy to envision that the counterparty that stands to benefit from the cheaper 
price might intentionally cancel the other part of the transaction. In this case, the two 
transactions create uncertainty with respect to the delivery of both legs of the trade. 
However, this reasoning does not apply to the other types of sales where the 
problem is too much certainty. Ibn Rushd, Ibn Ḥazm, and Bājī forbid these transactions 
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since they evade the rules on ribā when one offers a cash price and higher credit price, or 
when the counterparties engage in a repurchase sale (bay‘ al-‘īna).310  
 Finally, Bājī discusses what happens when one offers the buyer the choice of one 
of two dresses with each dress having the same price. However, unlike the other jurists, 
Bājī defines the legality of this transaction in terms of the relationship between the two 
dresses and their values. According to him, if the two dresses are the same type and value 
this sale is permissible since, 
 
This is not two sales in one because the meaning of two sales in 
one is that each sale is intended for a specific purpose that occurs 
when the prices differ, the genus of the goods differ, or the 
quality of the goods differs such that the price does.311 
 
In other words, if the seller offers two goods that are of the same type, quality, and value, 
he has offered two indistinguishable copies of the same good so that there exists no real 
choice or uncertainty since the buyer’s choice is irrelevant in relation to good’s qualities. 
Likewise, if dresses are the same price the contract is valid.312  
Ultimately, the analysis of Bājī raises the larger question of how one determines 
the nature of equality and difference in order to represent and categorize goods. The 
notion of equality and difference looms large in the process of valuing goods and 
services. For example, discussions of ribā categorize goods so as to determine which 
goods are the same type and thus must be traded in equal quantities.    
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The issue of difference and equality also plays a central role in the analysis of 
gharar as we saw in the previous chapter’s discussion of fungible and non-fungible 
goods. To recall, jurists argue that fungible goods of the same type have a level of 
sameness that enables objective representations. On the other hand, non-fungible goods 
lack a sufficient level of similarity that would enable objective representations. Rather, 
the representations of non-fungible goods reflect the subjective values of counterparties. 
Nevertheless, goods do not mediate the distinction between fungible and non-fungible. If 
a good did mediate this distinction non-fungible goods would have an objective 
representation. In chapter two, we saw that although must jurists permit one to sell a 
horse on the basis of a verbal description, Sarakhsī does not since he claims that a horse 
is a non-fungible good whose price depends on the subjective values of a buyer. The fact 
that jurists debate which goods are fungible and which are non-fungible indicates that the 
categorization of goods is not inherent to the goods themselves. Rather, the distinction 
between fungible and non-fungible reflects the discursive practices that jurists employ to 
analyze and compare goods. The following chapters will examine in more detail the 
discursive practices that jurists employ to conceive of the existence of goods and 
represent gharar.  
 
VII. Conclusion 
 In this chapter, I detailed the relationship between the forms of uncertainty 
associated with gharar and the referents that jurists analyze to determine the legality of 
commercial transactions. Unlike the uncertainty detailed in works of uṣūl al-fiqh and 
kalām that arises from a mismatch between thought and the referent, gharar arises from a 
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lack of referent, which in turn leads to a lack of thought with respect to it. This lack of 
both referent and thought creates the privation of identity that engenders gharar.  
Throughout this study, I have claimed that certainty subsumes and creates 
uncertainty such that uncertainty is derivative of and secondary to it. In the previous 
chapter, I examined the forms of knowledge that jurists employ to define the types of 
uncertainty that cause gharar. Likewise, jurists also employ a number of forms of 
knowledge to represent and analyze the legal existence of the referents of commercial 
transactions. In both the cases of the definition of the forms of uncertainty and referents, 
jurists employ a variety of forms of knowledge to endow gharar with an existence.  
In a more complex sense, the privation also depends on the correct identity 
between thought and referent. In the introduction to the previous chapter, I remarked that 
the forms of uncertainty discussed in the introduction to works of uṣūl al-fiqh and kalām 
present a potentially infinite number of incorrect combinations of thoughts and referents 
in reality. Furthermore, this form of uncertainty does not signal in any essential manner 
the correct identity. Due to this dissonance between this form of uncertainty and 
certainty, the uncertainty has no value for helping one to make informed judgments since 
the representation is incorrect when judged against reality. On the other hand, the forms 
of uncertainty associated with gharar enable counterparties to make informed legal and 
commercial decisions about specific transactions.  Furthermore, these forms of 
uncertainty implicitly indicate what the counterparties must do to acquire certainty with 
respect to a transaction.   
Thus, the uncertainty associated with gharar and the uncertainty detailed in works 
of uṣūl al-fiqh and kalām are functionally and structurally different. To appreciate the 
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subtle yet significant distinction between the two forms of uncertainty, we need to 
understand the forms of difference that relates each form of uncertainty to certainty. To 
be precise, on the one hand, contrary relates certainty to the uncertainty detailed in works 
kalām and uṣūl al-fiqh. On the other hand, the privation relates certainty to the forms 
uncertainty associated with gharar.   
Fortunately, Ibn Rushd and Abū Naṣr Muḥammad al-Fārābī (d. 339/950) discuss 
both the contrary and privation as they relate to representation in great detail in their 
commentaries of Aristotle’s De Interpretatione, or Kitāb al-‘ibāra. 313 Ibn Rushd 
analyzes the privation in response to the question; what is the most perfect and maximal 
difference in terms of thought: a privation of identity or its contrary? For example, which 
phrase, “ no one is just,” or   “everyone is unjust,” differs the most from the phrase, 
“everyone is just?”314 Initially, Ibn Rushd claims that the answer may not necessarily 
reflect the difference that exists in reality. For example, the statements, “life is good” and 
“death is bad” are contraries ontologically and logically, but from the perspective of the 
mind these two statements are not different, but are actually mutually entailed 
(talāzum).315 The position that the greatest difference–whether the contrary or privation– 
may not reflect reality would upend the traditional subordination of representation to 
existence by making the thought primary in the validation of representation.  
Ibn Rushd, however, saves the primacy of existence in representation by arguing 
that the greatest difference between two statements is the privation. Unlike a contrary, 	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314  Ibn Rushd,‘Ibāra, vol. 1, p. 127. 
 
 315 Ibn Rushd, ‘Ibāra, vol. 1, p. 128. 
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privation preserves the concept and referent of a specific identity. The only difference 
between the privation and the identity is that former denies the existence of the 
relationship that occurs with the latter. Or to put differently, the privation is simply the 
negation of the identity between a specific thought and referent. The identity thus must 
precede its privation. Furthermore, the identity is discursively simpler than its privation. 
In fact, Ibn Rushd compares the relationship between identity and privation to that 
between existence and non-existence. This last point reaffirms the subordination of 
difference and more broadly representation to existence. 316 
On the other hand, Ibn Rushd claims that with a contrary multiple referents, 
concepts, and statements occur such that there is no guarantee that the mind will 
recognize the differences between the statements as with the case of the life and death.317 
To understand that life and death are contraries and essentially different, one would need 
to known the hierarchically superior concept that opposes life to death. Thus with identity 
and privation there is merely one viewpoint that is modified by means of a negation, but 
with contraries the viewpoints proliferate as the concepts and referents do. 
Although Ibn Rushd does not comment on how a privation relates to uncertainty, 
al-Fārābī offers some tantalizing remark into this relation. In his commentary on De 
Interpretatione, al-Fārābī (d. 339/950) argues that privation is more different than 
contrary since privation and identity engender a greater level of shubha, tashakkuk, and 	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unfortunately, does not explain the last reason, but it is possible that he agrees with Ibn Rushd 
about the ambiguity of contraries. Ibn Qudāma, Rawḍat, 7. 
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ḥayra, or uncertainty and confusion. According to him, in the case of privation and 
identity one knows that either the privation or identity is essentially correct. On the other 
hand, in the case of the contraries, no contrary may be correct such that the correct 
viewpoint is never necessarily entailed as in the case of identity and privation. 
Admittedly, Fārābī’s argument is somewhat counterintuitive and strained. In the case of 
the privation and identity, a person must know that one of the two options is correct 
according to the reasoning of Fārābī. On the other hand, with contraries, none of the 
options may be correct. Indeed, the contrary should present more uncertainty. 318  
Nevertheless, Fārābī’s opinion is significant since it indicates that privation and 
identity are essentially bound to a single viewpoint. In gharar, the privation of identity 
that engenders uncertainty is bound to the correct identity that engenders certainty with 
respect to transaction. To say that one has uncertainty with respect to the description of 
the good, is to acknowledge that he has not seen or received a verbal description of the 
general description of the good. I say “general description,” because the judgment that 
one has uncertainty with respect to the description of a good does not indicate the exact 
referents that one needs to know with respect to a specific transaction. The forms of 
uncertainty associated with gharar thus reveal both a mimetic quality based on an 
identity, or more correctly a privation of identity between a specific referent and thought 
of it; and a hierarchy that relates uncertainty with respect to specific referents together in 
the larger categories of the primary forms of the uncertainty that I examined in the 
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previous chapter. The mimetic and hierarchical qualities of gharar indicate a form of 
rationality that I will examine in more detail in the following chapter.  
On the other hand, Fārābī and Ibn Rushd indicate that in the case of contraries, the 
difference between each identity does not necessarily imply the correct identity. In fact, 
with contraries, one might not even recognize that they are different. The inability to 
recognize the difference between contraries does not point the mind to the correct 
identity. Indeed, each identity may be incorrect at Fārābī states. As the contraries 
multiply, so do the viewpoints just like with infinite viewpoints of the uncertainty 
elaborated the works of uṣūl al-fiqh and kalām.  
Uncertainty thus has two different senses depending on its function and the 
relation of thought and referent. In gharar and the wider arena of commercial law, 
counterparties need to represent their lack of certainty such that they can make informed 
decisions. However, in the realms of uṣūl al-fiqh and kalām, the definition of uncertainty 
has the properties of the contrary that produces multiple viewpoints without necessarily 
indicating the correct identity and viewpoint. This type of uncertainty functions in the 
sphere of scholarly debates where one needs a form of uncertainty that explains why 
one’s opponents are wrong and unaware of the error. In addition, this type of uncertainty 
does not permit a simple teleological construction of the correct identity as it does within 
gharar where one knows what referents must be analyzed. If the uncertainty mentioned 
in the introductions to works of uṣūl al-fiqh and kalām had such a simple function no one 
would make errors since everyone would implicitly know the correct identity as in the 
case of gharar.   
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Chapter Four  
Resemblance and Analogy 
In the previous chapter, I examined the role of privation in discussions of gharar. 
According to jurists, gharar arises when a specific referent of their legal analysis of a 
transaction does not exist. The lack of referent in turn causes a lack of thought that 
creates the forms of uncertainty associated with gharar.  Notwithstanding the claims of 
Ibn Rushd that the privation of referent is more different than the contrary of the referent, 
the privation is still essentially bound to the identity so as to ensure an accurate 
representation and informed judgment. The dependency of the privation of the referent on 
its affirmation mirrors the dependency of the forms of uncertainty associated with gharar 
on the forms of certainty that a contract requires to be valid.  In the case of gharar, the 
forms of uncertainty indicate the forms of certainty that the counterparties require for the 
transaction to be legal. Furthermore, in the case of a transaction characterized by gharar, 
the counterparties are conscious of the uncertainty impairing the legality of the 
transaction.     
Notwithstanding the importance of the identity between thought and referent to 
form an individual representation, no representation exists as an isolated phenomenon. 
Even the essence of something requires and presupposes a wider matrix to represent and 
relate it to other essences and accidents. Each representation exists within a schema of 
representations that enables the construction of typologies and hierarchies of 
representations. Indeed, the schema forms the backbone of rational thought.  
To a certain extent, the previous chapters discussed the rationality of uncertainty 
and gharar. The second chapter revealed a hierarchy of forms of uncertainty associated 
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with gharar and the systems of knowledge that define each form of uncertainty. The 
previous chapter also indicated that the forms of uncertainty associated with gharar 
represent more general judgments about the referents that are not properly defined for the 
contract of a specific transaction. Finally, the question of distinguishing between fungible 
and non-fungible goods requires a schema to relate individual goods within a hierarchy.   
In this chapter, I will examine how jurists employ resemblance and analogy to 
represent transactions characterized by gharar. In the discussions of gharar, analogy 
plays two roles. The first role, which scholars of Islamic law are intimately familiar with, 
is the extension of recognized legal precedent to a new case. The second role coordinates 
several epistemic systems to represent gharar in more complex ways. Throughout this 
study, we have come across statements that gharar is not simply one pole of a binary 
relation. In order to endow the representation of gharar with varying levels, jurists must 
posit referents that have more than the contrary states of existence and non-existence. 
Rather, the discourse of jurists must posit referents that are characterized by varying 
levels of existence.  
To understand the possibility of varying levels gharar, we need to understand the 
role of identity in a schema of representation. In his magnum opus, Difference and 
Repetition, Gilles Deleuze discusses how the Western philosophical tradition has 
subordinated difference to the power of identitarian thought.  According to Deleuze,  
There are four principal aspects to reason in so far as it is the 
medium of representation: identity, in the form of the 
undetermined concept; analogy, in the relation between ultimate 
determinable concepts; opposition, in the relation between 
determinations within concepts; resemblance, in the determined 
object of the concept itself. These forms are like the four heads 
of or the four shackles of mediation. Difference is “mediated” to 
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the extent that it is subjected to the fourfold root of identity, 
opposition, analogy, and resemblance.319 
 
For Deleuze, this representation of difference, which he refers to as finite representation, 
inscribes difference within concepts. Identity affirms, whereas difference simply negates 
identity. In fact, difference can only arise from the negation of an identity. Analogy, 
resemblance, and opposition are subordinated to the identity between thought and 
referent.  
Deleuze’s insight into and critique of identity also applies to the role of identity in 
discussions of gharar. Gharar, like the difference of finite representation, relies on 
identity to form it. Like difference, the privation that engenders gharar exists simply as 
the negation of an identity. Not surprisingly, the forms of uncertainty associated with 
gharar function according to Deleuze’s “four shackles of finite representation”: identity, 
opposition, analogy, and resemblance. In order to illustrate the usefulness of Deleuze’s 
insight into role of identity in the representation of gharar, I will now analyze several 
legal discussions about crop sales. In their discussions of these transactions, jurists use 
opposition, resemblance and analogy to modulate the identity between referent and 
thought in order to create varying levels of gharar.  
 
I. Qiyās and Gharar 
 Both pre-modern Muslim jurists and modern scholars of Islamic law have devoted 
an immense amount of energy to analyzing qiyās, which is usually translated as 
“analogy” notwithstanding the fact that its scope is somewhat wider than forms of 	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   182	  
inductive reasoning. Hermeneutic techniques like ‘āmm and khāṣṣ (restricted and 
unrestricted meaning of a word or statement) and methods of reasoning like istihsān, 
istisḥāb, and istiṣlāḥ also use a resemblance to justify the application of a pre-existing 
ruling to another case. A detailed survey of all of these reasoning methods is beyond the 
scope of this study, but a brief overview of qiyās will orientate us to the role of analogy 
and resemblance within discussions of gharar, where jurists implicitly and explicitly 
draw on qiyās. Just as importantly, these theoretical discussions about qiyās reveal the 
complexity of defining a valid resemblance between two referents. 
Jurists generally distinguish between three types of analogies: 1) causal analogy 
(qiyās al-‘illa), 2) inferential analogy (qiyās al-dalāla), and 3) analogy of resemblance 
(qiyās al-shabah).320  Jurists devote the majority of their discussions of analogy to the 
causal analogy. With this analogy, a jurist isolates the rationale (‘illa) for the law that 
necessitates (‘illa) the legal ruling (ḥukm) in the original case (aṣl) and then applies this 
ruling to the derivative case (far‘). The jurist thus extends the ruling on the basis that both 
cases share the same quality that necessitates the ruling in the original case. The classic 
example of this analogy is the prohibition of date wine. Jurists extend the Qur’ān’s 
prohibition on grape wine to date wine on the basis of the rationale that the Qur’ān 
prohibits grape wine due to the fact that it intoxicants.  
 With the inferential analogy, one extends the ruling of the original case to a 
derivative case on the basis of some shared legal trait without searching for the 
underlying rationale behind the law. For example, the Shāfi‘īs argue that a minor must 
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pay zakāt on wealth since he must pay the tithe (‘ushr) on land that he owns. Since a 
minor is treated like a major for one form of taxation, he should be treated as such for all 
forms of taxation.321 With the analogy of resemblance, one justifies an analogy between 
several competing analogies on the basis of which analogy encompasses the greatest 
number of similarities between the original case and new case. For example, a slave is 
analogized to freeman since a slave is like a freeman in four respects but like an animal in 
one respect.322 
 Notwithstanding the differences between these three forms of analogy, the role of 
resemblance creates two interconnected problems: 1) to identify a resemblance that 
necessitates a shared judgment between cases, and 2) to restrict the scope of a 
resemblance. In his lengthy critique of the use of analogy in law, Ibn Ḥazm sums up these 
problems by remarking that, “The equality of things does not necessitate the application 
of the same judgment to them,” and, “Everything in the world is similar in some way!”323   
 With the causal analogy, jurists employ a number of methods to validate a 
claimed resemblance between two cases. In his study of uṣūl al-fiqh, Zysow divides the 
methods into formalist, which do not accept uncertainty in the elaboration of law, and 
materialist, which accept uncertainty in the elaboration of law. According to Zysow, the 
materialist methods include the Shāfi‘ī method of positing of the appropriateness of the 
shared rationale and the Ḥanafi method of positing the effectiveness of the shared 
rationale.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 321 Shīrāzī, Luma, pp. 208-209.  
 
 322 Shīrāzī, Luma, p. 209.  
 
 323  Ibn Ḥazm, Iḥkām, vol. 7, pp. 68, 76.  
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In order to validate a resemblance between cases to extend a legal judgment to a 
new case, Ghazālī developed the method of appropriateness (munāsaba), which later 
Shāfi‘ī adopted. With appropriateness, jurists examine whether a cause is consistent with 
the five universal principles of the law; namely, the protection of religion, life, thought, 
lineage, and property.324 Although Ghazālī claims that the identification of 
appropriateness is not subject to capricious whims of its practitioners, other jurists 
disagree and argue that it could lead to uncertainty. The Ḥanafī doctrine of effectiveness 
(ta‘thīr) relates a newly discovered cause to those causes with a certain basis in Scripture 
or consensus. Some jurists even create a phylum of causes.325 However, the method of 
effectiveness inscribes analogies within analogies with the result that one first needs to 
determine a resemblance between the two sets of causes before then relating them to each 
other analogically. Such a procedure in effect should lead to an infinite regress of 
analogies.  
 According to Zysow, the formal methods consist primarily of consistency and 
conversion (ṭard wa’l-aks), and testing and exhaustion (al-sabr wa’l-taqsīm). 
Consistency and conversion validate a cause by showing that every time some trait 
occurs the same judgment is applied and conversely when it does not appear the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 324 Zysow, Economy, pp.  196-204.  For discussions of appropriateness that pattern 
discursively along these lines, see Ghazālī, Mustaṣfā, vol. 1, pp. 416-417; vol. 2, pp. 306-307. For 
further discussions of these five universals, see Muḥammad b. Bahādur al-Zarakhsī, Al-Baḥr al-
muḥīṭ fī uṣūl al-fiqh, ed. Muḥammad Muḥammad Tāmir, 4 vols (Beirut, Dār al-Kutub al-‘Ilmīya, 
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falāsifa fī ‘ilm al-uṣūl, ed. Fawqīya Ḥusayn Maḥmūd (Cairo: Tawzī‘ Dār al-Anṣār, 1977), p. 310.  
  
 325 Zysow, Economy, pp. 204-215.  For discussions that pattern discursively along these 
lines see Ghazālī, Mustṣfā, vol. 2, p. 307; Muḥammad b. Muḥammad Bazdawī, Kitāb fīhi ma‘rifat 
al-ḥujaj al-shar‘īya, ed. Marie Bernand and Eric Chaumont (Cairo: Institut Français 
d’Archéologie Orientale, 2003), pp. 60-62, ¶¶. 113-116; Zarakhsī, Baḥr, vol. 4, pp. 193-195.  
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judgment is not applied. On the other hand, with testing and exhaustion, one marshals all 
the possible causes for a law and then eliminates them one by one until only one cause 
remains.326  
This brief overview demonstrates some of the ways that jurists configure and 
validate a resemblance and analogy between cases. The notion of similarity although 
grounded on that of identity is not a univocal concept. The ways that discourses configure 
their notions of similarity permit different kinds analogies and enlarge or diminish the 
scope of particular types of analogy as we will see. 
 
 
II. The Spectrum of Gharar 
  Previously, we saw that Ibn Rushd al-Jadd and Ibn Ḥazm mock jurists who see 
uncertainty behind every transaction. Nevertheless, Ibn Rushd al-Ḥafīd states that,  
Jurists agree that excessive gharar in a transaction is forbidden 
but if there is a little bit it is permissible. They disagree, 
however, about some things regarding the types of gharar. So 
some attribute a lot of gharar to some transactions whereas 
others attribute a little bit of a licit amount of gharar to them.327 
 
Besides implying that gharar has varying levels, the quotation draws into question any 
objective appraisal of gharar. As we have seen and will continue to see below, the 
different appraisals of gharar reflect the different ways that jurists configure identity, 
resemblance, and analogy.  
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327 Ibn Rushd, Bidāya, vol. 3, p. 1210.  
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While discussing specific transactions, Ibn Rushd, Bājī, Ibn Qudāma, Shīrāzī, and 
Sarakhsī refer to excessive, minor, necessary, and/or unnecessary amounts of gharar..328  
To the best of my knowledge, Ibn Ḥazm does not indicate whether gharar has varying 
levels. His silence cannot reflect the fact that he traces gharar back to only uncertainty of 
the description of good and that of the delivery date. One form of uncertainty in a 
transaction is sufficient to cause gharar in the view of all of the other jurists.  
Perhaps the forms of uncertainty associated with gharar that Ibn Ḥazm recognizes 
do not admit shades of grey. With the delivery date, for example, he requires the exact 
hour of the delivery. Based on his Ẓāhirī and Aristotelian allegiances, he views language 
as a transparent and perfect medium to represent thought and reality. He certainly 
believes this when it comes to fungible goods. Nevertheless, he agrees that a non-
fungible good lacks an objective representation, which draws into question any 
objectivity and the commensurability of language, thought, and existence as we saw in 
the second chapter.329  
Rather, variations in the levels of gharar require the identification of 
resemblances and analogies, a procedure that Ibn Ḥazm openly rejects, but sometimes 
uses to craft counterarguments against opponents. All analogies rely on the ability to 
isolate a resemblance among the shared elements of a group. Nevertheless, there is never 
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329 Ibn Ḥazm, Muḥallā, vol, 9, p. 105, ¶ 1612.   
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a clear line that marks when a resemblance is so minimal that no meaningful relationship 
exists to justify a particular analogy.  
 
III. Ripeness  
a. Date Sales and Privation  
  To begin to appreciate the representation of transactions that have varying levels 
of gharar, we need return to the salam contract and some seemingly arcane agricultural  
sales. As indicated in the second chapter, with the exception of the Ḥanafī, the other 
schools permit the sale of a fungible good like dates by a salam contract, even if it does 
not currently exist at the time of the contract. Jurists permit this contract on the 
presumption that the seller can eventually obtain a fungible good in the market. However, 
the sale of unharvested dates from a particular orchard may have gharar since jurists 
view these dates as unique goods that the seller does not need to replace if they were 
damaged. 
Discussions of the sale of unripe dates from a specific orchard offer important 
insight into the representation of uncertainty and gharar. Unlike the transactions 
discussed in the previous chapters whose referents either exist or do not, crops develop 
and thus change according to jurists. This process of development leads in turn to a 
representation of gharar characterized by varying levels. In order to present transactions 
with levels of gharar, jurists must coordinate epistemic systems associated with 
ontology, epistemology, biological development, and the legal value of acts. We will 
examine each epistemic system individually and then examine how they are combined to 
represent varying levels of gharar. Notwithstanding the use of analogies and 
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resemblances to represent these transactions, the discussions of jurists ultimately rely on 
the privation and affirmation of identity to represent gharar.   
The first epistemic system that jurists employ to represent transactions that have 
varying levels of gharar is a biological schema of the development of dates. According to 
ḥadīths that exist in several different versions, one may not sell the dates of a specific 
orchard until their ṣalāḥ appears, or until the plants yazhū. Some ḥadīth also add that one 
may not sell unharvested grapes until they turn black or wheat until it becomes dry.330  
Although jurists treat the sale of dates, grapes, and wheat as examples of the sale of 
unripe crops, jurists devote most of their analysis to the sale of unripe dates, which 
becomes the basis for the discussion of gharar in the sale of other crops as we will see.  
Returning to the terms ṣalāḥ and zahw in the aforementioned ḥadīth, jurists and 
traditionists are ambivalent about the meaning of these words. Bājī states that these two 
words may either be technical agricultural terms, words from a specific dialectic of 
Arabic, or metaphorical terms that refer to fruit being good and beautiful when ripe.331 
Nevertheless, these terms suggest that dates develop rather than the binary states of 
existence or non-existence. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
330 For examples of these ḥadīths in the canonical collections, see ‘Abd Allāh Muḥammad 
Yazīd b. Bāja, Sunan, (Liechtenstein: Thesaurus Islamicus Foundation, 2000), pp. 321-322 
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331 Bājī, Muntaqā, vol. 6, p. 150.  
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In fact, jurists argue that dates develop in the following seven discrete phases: 
1.The tree produces white blossoms, which are its spadices (ighrīḍ).   
2. The white color vanishes from the spadix. Its seeds grow and turn 
green in the balaḥ phase. 
3.The green then turns red in the zahw phase. 
4.It then turns yellow in the busr phase. 
5. Then it turns a dusky color (kudra). 
6.The dates then ripen and becomes fresh dates (ruṭab). 
7. These fresh dates then are dried (tamr).332 
 
The terms ṣalāḥ and zahw are said to refer to the point when the dates turn either red or 
yellow (for the sake of simplicity, I will refer to this stage as “ripe,” notwithstanding the 
fact that the dates continue to mature after this stage).333 One may thus begin to sell 
unharvested dates between the zahw and busr stages until they are finally harvested. 
 The above schema presents the maturation process as clearly defined stages, 
which enable the categorization of a date on the basis of its equivalence to the standard of 
a given phase. A date, however, does not go from the balaḥ to the zahw stage in the blink 
of an eye. Nevertheless, this typology suppresses the maturation that occurs between 
these discrete stages so as to enable the first mode of analogical analysis of gharar that I 
will now examine.  
Notwithstanding jurists’ recognition of the biological fact that dates develop, they 
need to relate this biological development against the legal existence of crops.  In other 
words, they correlate the previously examined schema of the biological development of 
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333 Bājī, Muntaqā, vol. 6, pp. 142, 145, 149-150; Ibn Ḥazm, Muḥallā, vol, 8, pp. 424-425, 
¶ 1450; Ibn Qudāma, Mughnī, vol. 4, p. 69, ¶.2898; Ibn Rushd, Bidāya, vol. 3, p. 1204; Shīrāzī, 
Muhadhdhab, vol. 3, p. 103.  Bājī also transmits several interpretations that state it is when the 
date turns red. See, Bājī, Muntaqā, vol. 6, p. 145.  
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dates with an ontological schema. According to Ibn Rushd, the sale of crops can 
theoretically occur during four periods in their development: 
1.  Either before they exist or afterwards (qabl an tukhlaq aw 
ba‘d an tukhlaq), 
2.  If they exist, the sale is either after they have been harvested 
or before, 
3. If before they have been harvested, it is either before they 
have ripened or afterwards, 
4. With either one of these, it is either an absolute sale (bay‘ 
muṭlaq), or a sale with a stipulation to leave it to ripen or to 
harvest them prematurely (bi-sharṭ al-tabqīya).334 
  
This typology uses a series of disjunctions to differentiate and correlate crop development 
against potential times when the crop is sold. Although my other jurists do not expressly 
outline this typology, it nonetheless informs their discussions. 
Jurists, then, correlate these transactions with an epistemological schema and the 
legal value of each transaction. For example, jurists prohibit the sales of dates from a 
specific orchard before they exist due to the general prohibition against the sale of non-
existent specific goods (bay‘ mā lam yukhlaq).  Elsewhere in their discussions of this 
issue, jurists claim that the unripe dates of a specific orchard resemble non-existent dates 
with respect to the amount of gharar affecting the sale. Since non-existent dates engender 
gharar, so must unripe dates by analogical extension.335  
The sale of unripe dates and non-existent dates present extreme uncertainty with 
respect to their delivery and their quality and quantity. According to Ibn Rushd, the 
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prohibition against these sales is, “due to the fear of damage (khawf al-jā’iḥa), which 
occurs in most cases (ghāliban) before the fruit ripens.”336 Ibn Qudāma also compares the 
sale of unripe dates to the sale of milk in the udder of an animal and the sale of a fetus.337 
Furthermore, Shīrāzī argues that the gharar that arises from the possible destruction of 
the dates is with respect to the sales contract, totally unnecessary since one could wait 
until the dates are ripe to purchase them.338 Sarakhsī states that these unripe dates are 
unsuitable for human or animal consumption. Since these dates have no utility, he argues 
that they cannot even be considered property that possesses any commercial or legal 
value (māl mutaqawwim).339  
Notwithstanding all of this uncertainty, Bājī sheds some light on why one would 
try to buy these unripe dates. According to him,  
Gharar exists (mawjūd) before and after the ṣalāḥ of the dates 
appears, but the only reason to buy them before the appearance 
of the ṣalāḥ is that the dates are cheaper. So either a third or less 
of them will be destroyed or the dates will be delivered in which 
case they are cheaper. In most cases after the appearance of the 
ṣalāḥ there is a point since the dates have some utility dates (al-
intifā‘ bihā) such as eating fresh fruit.  So for this reason the sale 
of dates after this point in their maturation is licit and the gharar 
is negligible (‘afā ‘an al-gharar).340 
 
In other words, one accepts the high chance of the destruction of the dates and 
uncertainty with respect to their delivery by buying them early in order to save money. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
336 Ibn Rushd, Bidāya, vol. 3, p. 1204. 
 
337 Ibn Qudāma, Mughnī, vol. 4, p. 63. ¶ 2887; p. 70, ¶. 2901; p. 71, ¶.2902. 
 
338 Shīrāzī, Muhadhdhab, vol. 3, p. 102. 
 
339 Sarakhsī, Mabsūṭ, vol. 12:4, pp. 195. 
 
340 Bājī, Muntaqā, vol. 6, p. 144.  
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This passage thus inversely relates value and gharar. There is some evidence that 
merchants engaged in such practices. In a letter from the Cairo Geniza, a Jewish 
merchant warns his son against buying unharvested flax through a pre-purchase contract 
with a full down payment at a cheaper price than harvest price due to the excessive risk 
that this transaction presents.341 
At the other end of the spectrum of crop sales is the sale of harvested ripe dates, 
which presents no uncertainty with respect to the quantity, quality, and future delivery. 
Jurists assimilate ripe dates that are still maturing but unharvested to the harvested dates.  
According to Bājī, by waiting until the dates reach this level of maturity, their quality can 
be known through a visual inspection just as in the case of fully harvested dates.342   
Notwithstanding the permissibility of the sale of ripe dates on the basis of the 
analogy from harvested dates, this does not imply that this transaction has no gharar.343 
Bājī states that,  
Gharar before the appearance of the ṣalāḥ is preponderant, but 
afterwards it decreases and becomes unlikely (yaqill wa-yandur). 
A large amount of gharar invalidates contracts, but a little bit is 
tolerated since contracts being completely safe from gharar is 
impossible.344 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
341 Moshe Gil, ed., In the Kingdom of Ishmael, 4 vols. (Tel-Aviv and Jerusalem: Tel-Aviv 
University, the Ministry of Defense, and the Bialik Institute, 1997), vol 3, pp. 639-640, no. 491. 
For a complete translation of this entire letter, see Shlomo Simonsohn, trans., The Jews in Sicily, 
(New York: Brill, 1997), vol. 1, pp. 195-196, no. 101; for a partial translation of the letter with 
this quotation, see Jessica Goldberg, Trade, p. 102.  
 
342 Bājī, Muntaqā, vol. 6, p. 148.  For the views of the other jurists, see Ibn Qudāma, 
Mughnī, vol. 4, p. 63. ¶ 2887; Ibn Rushd, Bidāya, vol. 3. p. 1203; Shīrāzī, Muhadhdhab, vol. 3, 
pp. 101-104. 
 
343 Bājī, Muntaqā, vol. 6, p. 144. 
 
344 Bājī, Muntaqā, vol. 6, p. 144. 
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Although Bājī does not say so expressly, presumably this residual gharar arises from 
unlikely events such as a sudden blight or storm. From the time that the dates are ripe 
until they are harvested the level of gharar decreases. Later in the section on crop sales, 
he provides a three-tiered typology of the levels of gharar that we examined previously. 
According to him,  
Gharar occurs in transactions according to one of three levels: 
1. A level that is so great and preponderant that it prevents the 
legal validity of the contract completely such as with the sale 
of unripe fruit which must remain on the plant to ripen, 
2. A level that does not reach this extent in terms of the large 
quantity and commonness (lā yablugh hādhā al-mablagh 
min al-kathra wa’l-al-takarrur). So it does not invalidate the 
contract, but it prohibits the immediate cash settlement of the 
contract such as is the case with a wife during her three 
month ‘idda or the waiting period for female slave 
(muwāḍa‘), 
3. A level that is so small and unlikely that it neither invalidates 
the contract nor the stipulation for immediate cash 
settlement, such as with madness or leprosy, which may 
affect a slave a year after his sale, or damage, which may 
occur after the fruit ripens.345 
 
With the exception of Ibn Ḥazm, the other jurists either implicitly or explicitly recognize 
that there are varying levels in the case of the sale of ripe but unharvested dates. For 
highly unlikely events, jurists ignore gharar. In the middle of the spectrum, a variety of 
legal mechanisms are available to reduce the uncertainty, such as withholding payment or 
a waiting period to reduce potential uncertainty. Finally, transactions with excessive 
gharar jurists prohibit entirely. 
 In summary, the sale of unharvested dates reveals the four moments of 
representation: identity, resemblance, opposition, and analogy. The discussion of the sale 	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revolves around the following systems of contraries: unripe and ripe, non-existent and 
existent, uncertainty and certainty, and illicit and licit. Jurists correlate these systems of 
oppositions such that unripe = non-existent = uncertainty= illicit sale; and ripe = 
existent= certainty = licit sale. Notwithstanding the fact that one may sell ripe dates on 
the tree, jurists acknowledge there is gharar, albeit a licit amount, that decreases as the 
dates continue to ripen. The gharar ceases once the dates are harvested.  
Although these four planes are correlated, they can be categorized into two 
groups. Whereas the ontological (existence/non-existence) and legal (licit/illicit) 
contraries are discontinuous contraries, the systems for the ripeness and knowledge are 
spectrums. Jurists map the epistemological spectrum onto the system of ripeness to 
indicate that a transaction can have more or less gharar depending on the level of 
ripeness.  
 
b. Ibn Ḥazm and Wheat Sales 
 In the previous section, I noted that some ḥadīths prohibit the sale of unripe dates, 
grapes, and wheat. Although jurists treat these three transactions as examples of the sale 
of unripe crops, the sales of wheat and dates are not discursively the same. In his 
discussion of wheat, Ibn Ḥazm relies on hermeneutic tools in order to largely sidestep the 
use of analogy that jurists revel in with their discussions of the sale of dates.  
Unsurprisingly, Ibn Ḥazm’s analysis focuses on the ḥadīths, which state that, “the 
Prophet prohibited the sale of dates until they ripen  (ḥattā yazhuwa) and ears of wheat 
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until they are dried (al-sunbul ḥattā yubayyaḍ).”346 On the basis of the word ḥattā (until), 
he reasons that one cannot sell wheat from the time that the ears, sunbul, appear until they 
dry. Conversely, one may buy wheat that is growing in the field before the ears of wheat 
appears.347 In other words, from the perspective of the other schools, he would permit the 
sale of “unripe” wheat and prohibit its sale from the time it is ripe until harvested. This is 
just the opposite position of the other schools with respect to the sale of dates.  
Due to his distinctive hermeneutical approach, Ibn Ḥazm permits the sale of 
immature wheat. Although he discusses this transaction in a section devoted to 
transactions affected by gharar, he does not rationalize his position on the basis of 
gharar. The only uncertainty that arises for him in this transaction is when the buyer does 
not harvest the wheat soon enough so that new stalks of wheat, whose ownership is 
contested, grows. In this case, however, the buyer gets only what he purchased if this can 
be established, or the counterparties share the disputed quantity.348     
Ibn Ḥazm concludes his analysis by stating that the word “sunbul” refers to 
wheat, barley, millet, and any other type of grain. 349  Undoubtedly, Ibn Ḥazm would 
argue that he has not analogized wheat to these other grains since the word sunbul 
denotes these plants too. In other words, he would frame the resemblance between these 
grains as lexical. As mentioned above, jurists discuss the overlap between analogy and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
346 Ibn Ḥazm, Muḥallā, vol, 8, p. 405, ¶ 1432. 
 
347 Ibn Ḥazm, Muḥallā, vol, 8, pp. 404-405, ¶ 1432. For a discussion of ḥattā with the 
following verb in the subjunctive to mean until, see W. Wright, Grammar, vo1. 2, p. 29-30. 
 
348 Ibn Ḥazm, Muḥallā, vol, 8, p. 404, ¶ 1432. 
 
349 Ibn Ḥazm, Muḥallā, vol, 8, pp. 404-405, ¶ 1432. 
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the hermeneutical techniques of ‘āmm and khāṣṣ, or restricted and unrestricted reference 
respectively, in works of uṣūl al-fiqh. For Ibn Ḥazm, however, the resemblance created 
by ‘āmm and khāṣṣ has an objective basis in the language whereas analogy reflects 
subjective appeals to resemblance.     
 
c. Other Crops 
 In the first centuries of Islam, a second agricultural revolution of sorts occurred. A 
variety of new crops and new strands of crops were disseminated not only throughout the 
Middle East, but also Europe. In addition, new agricultural techniques such as 
fertilization and irrigation increased the productivity of agriculture. These changes had 
profound social and economic consequences for society. In particular, the increased 
productivity lead to a surplus of wealth that enabled the growth of cities, state 
bureaucracies, and a caste of scholars like those examined in this study.350   
This agricultural revolution also affected the elaboration of law. Jurists had to 
examine and assimilate these new crops and agricultural techniques to body of 
established law. In terms of gharar, the ḥadīth that discuss gharar due to the sale of 
immature crops mention only dates, grain, and grapes. Jurists thus attempt to analyze 
gharar in the sale of other crops.   
 In the discussion about the sale of dates, we saw how jurists coordinate several 
epistemic systems and analogies to represent the level of gharar associated with a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
350 For further details about this revolution, see Andrew Watson, Agriculture Innovation 
in the Early Islamic World: The Diffusion of Crops and Farming Techniques, 700-1100 (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1983).   
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specific transaction.  Beside dates and wheat, jurists also use analogy to extend the 
discussion of date sales to analyze the level of maturity that other crops must reach before 
their sale. As in the case of dates, jurists discuss the physical traits that differentiate ripe 
from unripe crops, but these distinctions are much more elementary than those used for 
dates. Furthermore, jurists also introduce the edibility (ṭāb) of produce as a criterion to 
define the ripeness of different fruits and vegetables. In fact, Ibn Qudāma states that all 
crops may be sold once they become edible.351  
 For example, all of the jurists discuss the sale of cucumbers. Both Bājī and Shīrāzī 
permit the sale of cucumbers or any type of fruit once they reach their maximum size 
before their sale (yatanāhā ‘iẓamuhu).352  On the other hand, Ibn Ḥazm and Ibn Qudāma 
state that size is irrelevant for determining ripeness.353  Ibn Qudāma claims that his 
position more closely resembles the standard employed for determining the requisite 
level of maturity of dates (ashbah bi-ṣalāḥihi) than the Shāfi‘īs’ position. According to 
him, an analogy from dates indicates that other crops do not have to stop growing before 
they may be sold, rather they simply need to become edible.354  
We saw above that Ibn Ḥazm focuses predominately on grain sales instead of date 
sales. Although the other jurists also discuss the sale of wheat, only Bājī extends this 
principle to discussion of chickpeas, peas, lentils, and fava beans. Like in the analysis of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
351 Ibn Qudāma, Mughnī, vol. 4, p. 69, ¶. 2898. 
 
352 Bājī, Muntaqā, vol. 6, p. 143; Shīrāzī, Muhadhdhab, vol. 3, p. 100.  
 
353 Ibn Ḥazm, Muḥallā, vol, 8, p. 407, ¶ 1434; Ibn Qudāma, Mughnī, vol. 4, p. 69, ¶. 
2898. 
354 Ibn Qudāma, Mughnī, vol. 4, p. 69, ¶. 2898. 
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wheat,  Bājī argues that these crops must be dry in order to be sold.355 Both jurists briefly 
address the sale of flowers. Ibn Ḥazm merely states that the flower must have appeared, 
but Bājī is more descriptive and states that it must emerge from the spathe. Undoubtedly 
his use of the term spathe is meant to strengthen the analogy between dates and 
flowers.356  
Finally, Bājī mentions several different plants that the other jurists do not discuss. 
For example, one may sell sugar cane once it becomes succulent and sweet (ṭāb). As for 
carrots, garlic, onions, and radishes, he states that they are ripe (badā ṣalāḥ) either when 
each piece of produce is complete, can be separated from the plant and has some utility 
(intafa‘a bihi), or when one uproots it and there is no rottenness (lam yakun fī qal‘ihi 
fasād)357 
 
IV. Contagion of Ripeness 
a. Date Sales   
 In the previous section, I examined the first analogy that jurists employ to 
represent several levels of gharar. Excessive gharar occurs when one purchases either a 
non-existent date from a specific palm, or an unripe date.  Jurists analogize immature 
dates to non-existent ones for their legal analysis. Like all analogies, this one suppresses 
some aspects of the individuality of referents to create a general class that subsumes 	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Bidāyat, vol. 3, pp. 1206-1207. Shīrāzī, Muhadhdhab, vol. 3, p. 100. 
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several referents. The previous section did not examine whether each date must be ripe 
before its sale.  
In order to address this issue, jurists employ another analogy to delineate gharar 
across time and space.  Excluding Sarakhsī and Ibn Ḥazm, who does not address this 
issue, the other jurists hold that if fruit of one palm is ripe the same species (naw‘/ṣinf) of 
fruit in the same orchard may also be sold whether ripe or not (for reasons that will 
become apparent I have highlighted these two words). Jurists reason that when some 
members of the species are ripe the rest will soon follow.358  According to Ibn Rushd,  
The ripeness that Mālik meant is with respect to one type of fruit 
in which ripeness exists (wujūd al-izhā’) in some of them as long 
as some of them do not ripen a lot earlier than the rest, but rather 
when the ripening occurs continuously. This is because in most 
cases the time when fruit becomes safe from damage is when it 
begins to ripen continuously without stopping.”359  
 
 
Bājī adds that when some particular individuals of a specific species of dates are ripe they 
are all generally safe from potential damage and “their quality can be known by the 
visual inspection of the ripe fruit (ma‘lūm al-ṣifa bi-ru’yat mā ṭāb minhā).”360 This 
analogy creates a resemblance by suppressing the physical differences between dates. 
However, jurists deny the efficacy of these analogy in case of plants whose individual 
fruits ripen at extremely different times. In this case, since the individuals ripen at 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
358 Bājī, Muntaqā, vol. 6, pp. 147-148; Ibn Qudāma, Mughnī, vol. 4, pp. 67-68, ¶.2894; 
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359 Ibn Rushd, Bidāya, vol. 3, p. 1205. 
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varying rates, the individuals effectively lack any specific identity that would permit an 
analogy.   
  Jurists also must determine how far to push the analogy from individual to 
individual. Bājī and Shīrāzī both state that dates of the same genus may be sold if a 
member of one of the species of the genus is ripe since all members of the genus are safe 
at this point.361 On the other hand, Ibn Qudāma argues that there is no compelling reason 
to assume that members of the same genus will ripen together and provide insight into 
quality of the different species. 362     
 The Mālikīs push the resemblances the furthest to argue that when members of 
the same genus have ripened, members in neighboring orchards may also be sold.363 Bājī 
reasons that all dates of the same genus are safe from potential damage at this point. The 
fact that walls divide the ownership of the land does not increase the level of gharar of 
date transactions in these neighboring orchards.364   
Shīrāzī and Ibn Qudāma, however, reject pushing a resemblance this far to justify 
an analogical representation of gharar across space. Ibn Qudāma states that the 
permission to sell all of the dates of the same type in a specific orchard is to prevent the 
confusion, hardship, and potential harm (ḍarar) that might arise from selling the dates 
piecemeal and to different buyers. However, with different orchards, these potential 
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problems do not arise so that the gharar associated with a particular orchard should be 
considered individually.365  
Unlike the other jurists, Sarakhsī rejects the use of analogy to assess gharar in 
these sales since it undermines the fundamental categories of representation. According 
to him,   
Mālik holds that the existence of the attribute of monetary value 
in some of what is intended for purchase is deemed to be like its 
existence in all  (wujūd ṣifat al-mālīya wa’l-taqawwum fī shay’ 
mimmā huwa al-maqṣūd yuj‘al ka-wujūd al-kull) due to the need 
for this… Thus, he makes what has ripened the analogical base 
(aṣl) for what may later ripen (taba‘an lahu). However, we hold 
that Mālik combined the non-existent with the existent in this 
contract (jama‘a bayn al-ma‘dūm wa’l-mawjūd). The non-
existent cannot be sold in this case and the existent is unknown. 
One may give what does not literally exist a legal existence 
(ḥaqiqat al-mawjūd hukman) on the grounds of necessity since 
otherwise a contract for it would be impossible once it really 
exists. But fruit only permits a contract after it comes into 
existence.366 
 
In the clearest terms possible, Sarakhsī subordinates the epistemological contraries of 
certainty and uncertainty to the ontological contraries of existence and non-existence. 
Sarakhsī, however, deconstructs the positions of the other schools, which he claims 
undermine the fundamental ontological, epistemological, and commercial categories used 
to represent transactions. Ibn Qudāma, Shīrāzī, Bājī, and Ibn Rushd represent the gharar 
of date sales on the basis of the dates specific or generic identity, which suppresses the 
individual differences of actual dates in order to create analogies. By ignoring the 
individual differences among dates in favor of their specific or generic identity, Sarakhsī 	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argues that one collapses the ontological and epistemological categories that coordinate 
the representation of the individual date.  
For Sarakhsī, these jurists live in a topsy-turvy world where the non-existent 
exists, uncertainty is certainty, and the illicit is licit. Needless to say if he thinks each date 
must be ripe before being sold, he would forbid the sale of unripe dates because members 
of a different genus or in a different orchard are ripe.  Nevertheless, Sarakhsī 
acknowledges that sometimes one must endow the non-existent with a legal existence for 
practical reasons. In other words, he admits that discursive practices function to configure 
the existence of referents and knowledge of them.  
According to the other jurists, waiting for each date to ripen creates an inordinate 
hardship of examining each date. In addition, selling one date per sale could lead to 
contested ownership or uncertainty if there were multiple buyers and each date’s 
ownership is not detailed through some system of labeling or record keeping.367  
Although Sarakhsī does not respond to his argument, he would undoubtedly have turned 
it on its head. For the other jurists, one can analogize from the ripeness of some dates as 
long as the rest of the dates ripen around the same time. Sarakhsī would probably argue 
that the fact that all of the dates will ripen soon means that in a few days one will be able 
to sell the dates without the sale having any gharar.  
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b.  Other Plants  
Jurists also examine how ripeness affects the sale of other crops. Although these 
jurists discuss many of the same plants, they have a variety of positions and discursive 
styles that affect the conception of crops and ripeness. Ibn Rushd and Bājī discuss the 
sale of ripe plants systematically by creating a phylum of plants. Ibn Rushd differentiates 
between plants that produce one crop (baṭn) in a season like dates and those that produce 
multiples crops.  According to him, disagreements arise with respect to plants that 
produce multiple crops in a season, which may explain why Bājī does not discuss the first 
type.368  
Regardless of this difference, both jurists differentiate plants that produce 
multiple crops throughout one season and crops that do not. For example, figs produce 
multiple crops but in a discontinuous manner throughout the season. Due to the gap 
between different crops of figs, the counterparties to a transaction can distinguish an 
earlier crop from a later crop of figs. Ibn Rushd thus states,  “One may not in this case 
sell what has not been created with what has already been created (lam yakun bay‘ mā 
lam yukhlaq minhā dākhilan fī-mā khuliqa).”369 As we saw above, Ibn Rushd treats 
unripe dates just like non-existing dates.  
As for plants that produce crops continuously, each crop can either be 
distinguished from other crops on the same plant or not. In the case of leeks and sugar 
cane, the crops grow continuously but are distinguishable. According to Bājī, what has 
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appeared (mā ẓahara minhu) belongs to the buyer, but anything that grows subsequently 
belongs to the seller, who still owns the plant.370 Bājī also examines whether one may 
purchase these future crops at the present.  According to Ashhab, Mālik allows this type 
of purchase with leeks, but forbids it when the future produce grows much later, 
“khilfatuhu takhallafat.” Bājī admits that the common interpretation of this phrase, 
khilfatuhu takhallafat, implies that this transaction is impermissible due to a difference in 
the quality of the future crops.  We might even hazard to say that Mālik prohibited this 
transaction due to uncertainty with respect to the quality and quantity of the future crops. 
Bājī, however, analogizes this sale to those of dates or grain on the basis that some 
members have already reached the requisite level of maturity. This analogy ignores the 
fact that the dates are currently growing on the tree, but in the case of these plants the 
produce does not exist at the moment of the contract. In fact no sooner does Bājī make 
this analogy then he states that one may not sell dates that a tree will produce over several 
years.371 
Notwithstanding this problem, Bājī claims that Mālik permits these sales when 
the future crops are assured (khilfatuhu ma’mūna) and likely to exist. However, the 
counterparties in this case must designate a specific number of harvests,  
That this plant will certainly produce whether that is one harvest, 
five, or more as long the failure to produce crops or their change 
is not feared. This is because this number can be distinguished 
and appraised by the number of harvests and crops. If the crops 
change or fall short of a predefined quality… the seller shall 
return a proportional sum of money to the buyer.372 	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This passage uses probability to assess the gharar and value of this transaction. The past 
history of the plants serves as the basis for future expectations based on the use of 
analogy.373 Nevertheless, Bājī recognizes that this method of analysis may fail to 
accurately predict the future harvest. In such cases, the buyer gets some of his money 
back by determining the value of each harvest that has been completed successfully in 
relation to the total value of the contract.374   
Finally, with cucumbers, eggplant, and pumpkins, which have new crops that 
grow continuously throughout the season, one may sell what has not yet appeared on the 
basis of what has.375 Ibn Rushd clarifies this by stating, 
It is impossible to segregate the initial crop from the last one, so 
it is permissible to sell what does not exist together with what 
does and is ripe (mā lam yukhlaq ma‘a mā khuliqa wa-badā 
ṣalāḥuhu). The legal basis for this is the sale of unripe fruit 
together with ripe fruit. This is because Mālik analogizes gharar 
with respect to the quality of a good to that of its corporeal 
existence (li-anna al-gharar fī’l-ṣifa shabbahahu bi’l-gharar fī 
‘ayn al-shay’). It is as if he holds that the exemption should 
apply to all of the crops of the fruit, by which, I mean the sale of 
unripe fruit on the basis of ripe fruit, due to necessity. So the 
legal basis of his view is that there is unavoidable gharar, which 
is permissible (al-aṣl ‘indahu anna min al-gharar mā yajūz li-
mawdi‘ al-ḍarūra).376 
 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, Ibn Rushd relates certainty with respect to the 
description of a good to that of its existence. Gharar affecting unripe dates is compared 
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to gharar affecting ripe ones on the basis that they share the same conceptual identity. 
This argument thus bridges existence and non-existence through the shared conceptual 
identity of dates. Existence and non-existence are contraries that should only relate to 
each other through a higher concept, but ordinarily Being stands at the summit of 
metaphysical systems. However, just as uncertainty cannot be a true equal to certainty, 
non-existence cannot be a true equal to existence. In this passage, non-existence is 
subordinated to existence in a double analogy. First, the non-existent crop is analogized 
to what already exists.  Second, the quality and quantity of the non-existent crop are 
analogized to the quantity and quality of previously existing crops. Thus the non-existent 
is imbued with determinations that subordinate it to the conceptual identity of ripe crops. 
 The other jurists present more conservative and discursively monolithic views on 
these sales. Both Ibn Qudāma and Ibn Ḥazm state that one may not sell cucumbers, 
eggplants, and jasmine until they appear on the vine. According to Ibn Ḥazm, “One may 
sell cucumbers once they appear on the plant no matter how small since they can be 
eaten. However, one may not sell cucumbers, flowers, and jasmine until they appear (mā 
lam yaẓhar).”377 He then prohibits the sale of these crops or of a second growth of grain 
because, “this is the sale of what does not exist (mā lam yukhlaq) and when it does exist 
only God knows the quality and quantity. So this is forbidden from every viewpoint and 
this sale is characterized by gharar.”378 Like Bājī and Ibn Rushd, Ibn Ḥazm recognizes 
the link between the existence of something and certainty with respect to its quality and 
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quantity. However, in this transaction, he denies any conceptual identity between the 
existing and the non-existing that would allay concerns about gharar.  As for Ibn 
Qudāma, he claims that the Mālikīs permit the sale of the non-existing on the basis of the 
existing due to the difficulty of distinguishing the different growth of crops on a plant. 
He, however, denies the need for this analogy with respect to these plants.379  
 Like Bājī, Shīrāzī recognizes that uncertainty arises when plants produce multiple 
crops such that the sold crop cannot be distinguished from subsequent crops. The 
majority opinion prohibits the transaction because the sold crops cannot be delivered in 
accordance with the contract  (ta‘adhdhur al-taslīm al-mustahaqq bi’l-‘aqd) since the 
seller does not need to turn over fruit that belongs to him. Likewise, due to the 
uncertainty with respect to what belongs to whom, the buyer does not have to accept 
delivery. However, a minority position argues that the good enters the buyer’s possession 
and accrues more fruit as in the case of the sale of a slave who grows while in the 
possession of the seller.380 A more modern analysis of this analogy would be to say that 
fruit compounds similar to the way that money compounds through interest. The 
majority, however, responds by stating, 
This increase of the slave has no legal affect (lā ḥukm lahu), thus 
the seller must deliver the slave notwithstanding growth or 
additional weight. But in the case of these legumes the seller does 
not have to deliver them. So this indicates the distinction between 
these two transactions.381 
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According to this argument, the change in the slave has no bearing on the fact that the 
seller must still deliver the slave to the buyer.  
There are important differences between the discussion of Shīrāzī and those of the 
jurists whom we examined previously. For the other jurists, the central point of their 
discussions concerns the conditions under which they may analogize existence to non-
existence in order to obtain certainty with respect to the transaction and assess the level 
of gharar. Furthermore, the previous jurists either relate any analogy between the various 
date sales and sales of other plants and crops, or they deny that such an analogy can be 
made. With Shīrāzī, the focus switches to the ability to deliver the crop. For sure, the 
ability to deliver something and its existence are interconnected. However, he does not 
focus on the question of whether the crops will ultimately exist. Rather, his concern is 
that once the crops come into existence that they will throw the ownership into 
contestation and hinder the seller’s ability to deliver on the contract.  
 
V. The Sale of Land and Crops  
a. Date Orchards 
As stated in the discussion about qiyās, the challenge with validating any analogy 
is asserting the validity of resemblances between the traits that are claimed to be the basis 
of the analogy. In the previous discussion, we saw how jurists created analogies based on 
the resemblances among the produce of plants to represent the level of gharar. However, 
jurists also discuss the gharar associated with the sale of crops from a specific orchard or 
field through two different sets of transactions. First, the buyer may buy the fruit at any 
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level of maturity if he immediately cuts it off of the palms.382 Ibn Qudāma states that 
cutting the dates off the tree removes all fear of their potential destruction.383  Bājī 
elaborates on this point by stating that this transaction has no gharar since there is no 
possibility for the fruit to increase or decrease—presumably in quantity or quality.384   
Second, jurists agree that if the seller has pollinated the date palms he may sell the 
palms, but keep the dates that grow from his pollination and leave them to mature until 
harvest time unless the buyer stipulates his purchase of the resulting dates in the 
contract.385 In effect, the seller may sell these unripe dates with the palms. The level of 
ripeness of the dates is thus irrelevant in this transaction and the relevant trait for the 
representation of the gharar associated with this transaction is the orchard and pollination 
of the palms. However, Bājī, Ibn Qudāma, and Shīrāzī analogize this sale to that of a 
pregnant animal or slave. Before the trees are pollinated or animals’ pregnancies become 
manifest (kāmin/bāṭin), one cannot except the potential offspring. Thus one could not sell 
a cow that does not appear pregnant with the clause that the seller gets a calf if the cow 
turns out to be pregnant.  However, once the palms are pollinated their “pregnancies” are 
manifestly distinguishable (ẓāhir/tamayyuz), so that the seller may keep or sell them.386 
This analogy relies on the fact that the date palm is a diocecious plant, or to put it plainly 
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each palm is either male or female. In order to maximize fruit production, typically an 
orchard has only female date palms, which requires the manual pollination of each 
palm.387 
However, this argument ignores the uncertainty that arises from the sale of unripe 
dates as we saw above. Ibn Qudāma merely states that one may sell the pollinated palms 
with their future fruit since the possibility of gharar poses no danger in this case just like 
the sale of sheep along with the milk in its udder (lam yaḍurr iḥtimāl al-gharar fīhi).388 
We might speculate that jurists permit this transaction since the fruit represents such a 
small part of the value of the transaction. Indeed, this line of reasoning will appear in the 
following section where I examine the sale of other types of plants.  
This transaction raises many of the same questions as the sale of dates after they 
ripen. Does every tree of an orchard need to be pollinated in order to qualify for this 
transaction? Ibn Ḥazm argues that the seller may only stipulate that he retains the fruit of 
pollinated trees. Furthermore, since the ḥadīth employs the plural for date trees, he states 
that buyer must exercise his right to take the fruit of at least three or more trees.389 On the 
other hand, both Shīrāzī and Ibn Qudāma treat all of the trees as if they were pollinated in 
accordance with the general principle that the imperceptible is assimilated to the 
perceptible (yatba‘ al-bāṭin al-ẓāhir).390 This rule applies to members of the same species 	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to prevent the confusion and hardship that would arise from selling each palm 
individually. Furthermore, Ibn Qudāma explicitly states that this opinion in this instance 
is like his opinion regarding the sale of dates after they have reached the requisite level of 
maturity. 391 However, the views of Ibn Qudāma and Shīrāzī diverge with respect to how 
the pollination of one species of the genus affects other members of the genus. Ibn 
Qudāma claims that the pollination of one species does not affect other members of its 
genus since,  
 
The species are unlike each other and one of them can be 
distinguished (yatamayyaz) from the other. So there is no fear 
of their getting mixed up and resembling each other. Thus, they 
resemble two different genera…so applying qiyās to one of 
them on the basis of the other is invalid due to their 
dissimilarity.392 
 
On the other hand, Shīrāzī argues, when members of the same genus mature together, he 
treats them all as one species for the sake of the sales of entire orchards.393  
The Mālikīs are divided on this issue. According to Mālik, if an equal number of 
palms are pollinated and unpollinated in the orchard, the seller keeps the fruit of the 
pollinated palms and the buyer gets the fruit of the unpollinated ones since the growth of 
pollinated trees can be distinguished from that of the unpollinated ones. However, 
Muḥammad b. Dīnār argues that this textbook case involving an equal number of 
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pollinated and unpollinated palms is improbable (ma‘rifat tasāwiyihimā amr yab‘ud). He 
thus analogizes the legal status of the unpollinated trees to that of the pollinated ones.394  
Finally, this transaction raises interesting implications for the representation of 
referents within discourse about gharar. For jurists, all of the transactions discussed in 
this chapter present the specter of gharar due to the immaturity of the produce from a 
specific orchard. As we saw above, one may not sell only the unripe dates since they are 
non-existent from the perspective of jurists. However, when one sells the orchard the sale 
or retention of these immature dates becomes licit. On the one hand, jurists claim that the 
counterparties can have certainty with respect to the eventual description and delivery of 
the dates by virtue of the palms’ manual fertilization. Indeed, this claim relies on a great 
deal of probabilistic reasoning about the future harvest. Notwithstanding their claim that 
this transaction does not possess gharar, jurists also admit that there is uncertainty with 
respect to the future maturation and harvest of these dates when one sells only unripe 
dates.  
There are two ways to interpret the interaction of the certainty and uncertainty 
within this transaction. The first interpretation is that the palms provide a wider set of 
certain referents such that this certainty associated with palms outweighs the uncertainty 
associated with the unripe dates. Another and the more interesting reading would be that 
the uncertainty associated with the immature dates actually legitimizes the legality of this 
transaction. To say that there is uncertainty associated with these date sales is to 
categorize them as legally non-existent. In this case, their non-existence in relation to the 
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rest of the contract would make them legally irrelevant. Unfortunately, the jurists do not 
provide more information to validate either of these interpretations. Indeed, these 
interpretations may not be exclusive but rather mutually entailed when one considers the 
fact that the palms represent the majority of the value of the sale.  
 
b. Analogy and the Sales of Other Crops 
Finally, Ibn Qudāma, Shīrāzī, and Ibn Ḥazm extend the insights from the 
discussion of the sale of orchards to the sales other types of plants. To do this, Ibn 
Qudāma and Shīrāzī analogize other plants to date palms based on the physical features 
of these other plants that resemble the spathe of a date palm such that occurrence 
pollination of these plant can be assumed. Not surprisingly, their typologies begin with 
dates palms and other plants that resemble dates, like cotton and flowers.395 Ibn Qudāma 
states that,  
The first kind has its fruit in a spathe, which later opens, so that 
the fruit appears, as with dates, which the sunna mentions, and 
we have explained their legal ruling (ḥukmahu). This is the legal 
principle and everything else is analogized and subordinated to it 
(huwa al-aṣl wa-mā ‘adāhu maqīs ‘alayhi wa-mulḥaq bihi).396 
 
According to Ibn Qudāma, once the spathe of the fruit or calyx (kimm) of a flower, which 
he analogizes to the spathe of dates, opens, the fruit or flower belongs to the seller of the 
plant unless the buyer stipulates to take the fruit.397  The second type of plant has fruit 
that neither has a peel nor emerges from a spathe, like figs and berries. When fruits of 	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this type appear they are analogized to the spadix (ṭal‘) appearing on date trees such that 
the seller of the plant may keep the produce.398  
The third type of plant has fruit with one peel that is removed when the fruit is 
consumed, such as bananas and pomegranates. Both Ibn Qudāma and Shīrāzī use 
different technical vocabulary to refer to this type of fruit. Shīrāzī states that this type 
grows within a spathe or calyx (kimm) until eaten. Shīrāzī’s use of the word “kimm” 
makes the analogy between this type of fruit and dates more obvious.  On the other hand, 
Ibn Qudāma simply uses the word peel (qishr). Irrespective of these terminological 
differences, both jurists agree that when it appears, the seller may keep the fruit if he sells 
the tree.399 
The fourth type of plant produces nuts that have two protective coats. Once again, 
the appearance of these nuts is analogized to the spathe or calyx of the previous 
categories. According to Shīrāzī, the shell is like the peel of the pomegranate whereas Ibn 
Qudāma states that nuts are like figs in the second category. However, both schools have 
some dissenters. Some Shāfi’īs analogize nuts to unpollinated date palms claiming that 
the outer shells are discarded just as the spadix is discarded. Thus, one cannot keep the 
crop of nuts growing on the trees when he sells the trees.400  According to Ibn Qudāma, 
Abū Ya‘lā argues that seller retains the nut when the outer shell splits open as when the 
spadix opens on a date palm. However, Ibn Qudāma rejects the analogy between nuts and 	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399 Ibn Qudāma, Mughnī, vol. 4, p. 54, ¶. 2872; Shīrāzī, Muhadhdhab, vol. 3, p.98.  
 
400 Shīrāzī, Muhadhdhab, vol. 3, p.99. The Arabic reads: “istitāruhā bi’l-nawr ka-istitār 
thamarat al-nakhl ba‘d al-ta‘bīr bi-mā ‘alayhā min al-qishr al-abyaḍ…li’l-bā’I‘ ma‘a istitārihā 
al-qishr  al-abyaḍ.  
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the spadix since the spadix splits for the benefit of the plant, but the shells of nuts seldom 
split.401 
Finally, there are other types of fruit that grow from pollinated flowers, like 
apples and peaches. According to Ibn Qudāma and Shīrāzī, if one sells these plants before 
these flowers have wilted (tanāthar al-nawr) and the fruit has started to appear, the fruit 
belongs to the buyer. On the other hand, once the flowers wilt and the fruit appears, the 
fruit belongs to the seller unless the buyer stipulates otherwise. However, Abū Ya‘lā 
reasons that the seller retains the fruit once the flowers bloom since the spadix (ṭal‘) of 
the date palm resembles a flower. Likewise, Abū Ḥāmid Isfirāyīnī, a Shāfi‘ī, argues that 
the fruit belongs to seller even if the flower has not wilted since in effect, 
The fruit has appeared by this budding on the tree and the 
flower covering it is just like dates being covered by the white 
peel after their pollination…the dates with this white peel 
belong to the seller.”402   
 
Ibn Qudāma once again rejects the opinion of Abū Ya‘lā in favor of al-Khiraqī who 
argues that the bud in the hollow of the spadix is not like the flower of a fruit tree. 
Whereas the bud of the spadix becomes a protective skin that covers the dates, the flower 
petals completely wilt and the fruit appears.403  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
401 Ibn Qudāma, Mughnī, vol. 4, p. 54, ¶. 2872. 
 
402 Shīrāzī, Muhadhdhab, vol. 3, p.99. Abū Ḥāmid Aḥmad b. Abī Ṭāhir al-Isfarāyīnī 
(344-406/955-1016) was the head of the Shāfi‘īs in Baghdad. His students wrote ta‘liqas, or 
collections of legal defenses, from him on the Commentary of Muzanī and uṣūl-fiqh. For further 
biographical details, see Shīrāzī, Ṭabaqāt al-Fuqahā’ (Beirut: Dār al-Rā’id al-‘Arabī, 1970), pp. 
124-126; al-Subkī, Ṭabaqāt, vol. 4, pp. 61-76, no. 270. For more details on the role of the ta‘liqa, 
see Makdisi, Colleges, pp.111-128. On page 119, Makdisi mentions briefly the ta‘liqas of this 
jurist.   
 
403 Ibn Qudāma, Mughnī, vol. 4, p. 55, ¶. 2872. 
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Finally, both jurists discuss the leaves of plants and flowers.  According to Ibn 
Qudāma, if the plant has leaves or flowers that are commonly desired they belong to the 
seller once they have emerged from the spathe as when the spadix of the date trees has 
been pollinated. Flowers and leaves that do not emerge from a spathe are retained by the 
seller if they are visible at the time of the sale. The only exception to this general rule is 
the mulberry leaf, which belongs to the seller if the leaf has opened just like fruit that 
grows from flowers. However, this exception applies only to locales where it is 
customary to harvest these leaves (‘ādatuhum akhdh al-waraq).404 According to Shīrāzī, 
his school has two views on the mulberry leaves. The first states that they belong the 
seller if they have opened just like the fruit of all the other types of trees. The second 
view states that these leaves always belong to the buyer since it denies the analogy 
between the leaves and other types of trees. Mulberries are edible fruit like the fruits of 
the other trees. However mulberry leaves are used as food for silk worms.405 
Beyond these fruit bearing trees, Shīrāzī and Ibn Qudāma also discuss vegetables, 
grain, and seeds. Both jurists distinguish between plants that can be harvested multiple 
times, like mint, narcissus, melons, cucumbers, legumes, and clover; and plants that can 
be harvested once, like wheat and barley. To the latter type, Ibn Qudāma adds carrots, 
onions, garlic, and sugar cane.  With plants that can be harvested multiple times, both 
jurists argue that what has appeared belongs to the seller and the rest belongs to buyer.406 
Ibn Qudāma states that the sale or retention of this immature produce poses no 	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405 Shīrāzī, Muhadhdhab, vol. 3, p.97. 
 
406 Ibn Qudāma, Mughnī, vol. 4, pp. 56-57, ¶. 2875; Shīrāzī, Muhadhdhab, vol. 3, p. 99.  
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uncertainty that could materially damage either counterparty since it is like the sale of 
pollinated date trees.407  
As for the sale of land with crops that can be harvested once and then must be 
replanted, there is a slight difference between the jurists. According to Shīrāzī, these 
plants are not part of the sale of the land since their growth is clear (ẓāhir) and they will 
not remain for long. 408  He does not indicate whether the buyer may stipulate that the 
plants be included in the sale. Ibn Qudāma, however, remarks that the buyer may 
stipulate the purchase of the grain at any stage of its growth whether visible or not 
(mustatir aw ẓāhir).  He claims that any uncertainty associated with the incomplete 
maturation of the plants does not pose a chance of material loss (lam yaḍurr jahluhu wa-
‘adam kamālihi).409 Nevertheless, if the buyer does not stipulate the purchase of the crop, 
it belongs to seller who may leave it to mature since the time and rent required for the 
crops to develop can be accurately estimated (taqaddar bi-baqā’ihi) and thus excepted 
from the sale’s value. 410  
This short passage of Ibn Qudāma has two contradictory notions of value. On the 
one hand, he argues for the legality of this transaction on the basis that the uncertainty 
with respect to the plants is immaterial and cannot be appraised. On the other hand, he 
argues for the legality of the seller keeping the grain on the basis that the time and 
implied rent required for the plants to mature is known and can be deducted from the 	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408 Shīrāzī, Muhadhdhab, vol. 3, p. 99.  
 
409 Ibn Qudāma, Mughnī, vol. 4, p. 57, ¶. 2876. 
 
410 Ibn Qudāma, Mughnī, vol. 4, p. 57, ¶. 2876. 
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value of the sale of the land.  Admittedly, it might be easier to value a lease than to 
estimate the value of the harvest, but Ibn Qudāma does not relate these two values.  
Finally, these two jurists discuss the sale of land with seeds planted in it. 
According to Shīrāzī, if one sells land with seeds planted in it, the seeds are not part of 
the sale since they are deposited in the ground (mūda‘ al-arḍ) so they are excluded from 
the sale of the land, like precious metal ore (la yudkhal fī bay‘ihā ka’l-rikāz). On the 
other hand, if one tries to include the seeds in the sale of the land, the school prohibits 
this on the basis that one cannot sell the planted seeds since whether they will grow is 
uncertain. Thus, one may not sell them together with the land.411  
Ibn Qudāma takes a different approach. According to him, with crops that can be 
harvested multiple times and release seeds to ensure the continuity of this process—like 
legumes and mint—the seeds belong to the buyer since they are an integral part of the 
reproductive process. He analogizes these seeds to the trunks of date trees. If these seeds 
were visible (ẓāhir) they would belong to the buyer so it is even more appropriate that 
they belong to him when invisible. In fact this claim is actually the opposite of what we 
found in the previous sections, where the appearance of pollination entitled the seller to 
keep or sell the fruit. Notwithstanding this fact, he claims that the seeds of other crops 
belong to the seller unless the buyer stipulates otherwise.412  
Turning to Ibn Ḥazm, he briefly discusses the sale of other crops and their plants. 
According to him, one may sell cucumbers and bananas together with their plants. 
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Admittedly, he does not comment on the level of maturation these types of produce must 
reach before one sells the plant. Regardless of this oversight, when the one sells the plant, 
he allow it to remain as long as he wants on his land, although the counterparties cannot 
stipulate this in the sale. In effect, the buyer gets to use the land of the seller for free and 
all of the produce until the seller forces him to remove the plants.413   
 
VI. Conclusion 
  Representation relies on identity, opposition, resemblance, and analogy. 
Although an identity equates a referent and thought of it, a schema employs oppositions, 
resemblances, and analogies in order to configure individual representations within a 
larger system. In this chapter, I examined how jurists configure a schema to represent the 
gharar associated with crop sales. The analogies in the analyses of these transactions 
operate on two interconnected planes. First, for the sale of dates from specific palms, 
jurists configure a number of contraries like ripe and unripe, existent and non-existent, 
permissible and impermissible, and certainty and uncertainty in order to analyze the 
gharar associated with these sales. In the case of date sales, the maturation of a date and 
thus all of the dates of an orchard do not fall into the neat contraries of ripe and unripe. 
Rather, jurists argue that dates develop along a spectrum. This spectrum allows for a 
referent that does not fit simply into the ontological categories of either existence or non-
existence. After a date becomes ripe it continues to develop until harvested. However, 
based on several ḥadīths, jurists select a defined point in its maturation and relate that 
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point to the ontological, epistemological, and legal categories. On the basis of the 
resemblance between the ripe date and an existing referent, jurists create an analogy to 
represent the gharar associated with a transaction for the sale of dates of different species 
or orchards. However, the certainty that arises from a ripe date is still less than if it were 
harvested and sold in a cash transaction.  The use of resemblance and analogy thus allows 
for varying levels of gharar. Second, this chapter revealed how jurists employ analogy to 
extend the ḥadīths about dates to other crops. In particular, the resemblance between 
crops is configured primarily in terms of plants’ biological properties that resemble those 
of dates, grapes, and grain. The analogies allow jurist to cut across the differences of time 
and space to analogize the legal status of different sales.    
 Finally, for one trying to understand the relationship between the epistemological 
concerns of uṣūl al-fiqh and fiqh, it seems puzzling that ẓann, or probabilistic knowledge, 
does not play a constructive role in the elaboration of gharar.  However, with the role of 
analogy and varying levels gharar perhaps we have found a partial analog to ẓann. In 
discussions of uṣūl al-fiqh, ẓann lies on a spectrum between the contraries of certainty 
and uncertainty. With the exception of Ibn Ḥazm who accepts only certainty in the 
elaboration of law, the other schools accept ẓann as the basis of rulings. The discussions 
encountered in this chapter seem to conform to this pattern from two perspectives. As 
with ẓann, jurists accept a minimal level of gharar. Furthermore, Ibn Ḥazm appears to 
reject levels in gharar just as he rejects ẓann. 
 One should, however, not push this analogy too far. As stated in the previous 
chapter, the uncertainty associated with gharar arises from a privation of referent and 
thought. In the case of the crop transactions, jurists apply the identity of one date to a 
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larger group of dates to claim that the others will soon safely ripen and thus the 
transactions present an acceptable level of gharar.  On the other hand, with ẓann, there is 
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Chapter Five 
Exceptions and Gharar 
 In this study, I have examined how discursive knowledge directly creates 
uncertainty rather than uncertainty being simply a passive given or a momentary error 
that more thought is destined to overcome. The forms of uncertainty associated with 
gharar do not function in manner contrary to or independent from certainty. Rather, 
certainty creates and defines the uncertainty associated with gharar. To be precise, the 
second chapter examined the forms of knowledge required to define the forms of 
uncertainty associated with gharar. The third chapter analyzed the role of the privation 
that engenders certainty, in the representation of the forms of uncertainty associated 
gharar. Notwithstanding the fact that the privation between a thought and a referent 
engenders the forms of uncertainty associated with gharar, it is always bound to and 
subsumed the aforementioned identity so as to engender valid representations in 
discussions of gharar. Finally, the previous chapter examined how identity, opposition, 
resemblance and analogy create a schema that relates several epistemic systems so as to 
represent varying levels of gharar. Ultimately, the uncertainty associated with gharar 
functions like certainty and fits into a system of rational thought and representation.  
 In this final chapter, I will explore what I refer to as the hermeneutical interaction 
of the referents and the forms uncertainty associated with gharar. According to Muslim 
jurists, the Qur’ān and ḥadīth are the primary sources of God’s Law. Nevertheless, these 
sources present a number of interpretive difficulties for jurists.  In large measure, uṣūl al-
fiqh and hermeneutical concepts, such as the restricted (‘āmm) and unrestricted (khāṣṣ) 
meaning of words, exceptions, and the literal and metaphorical meanings, developed in 
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response to these interpretive difficulties.414 These hermeneutical techniques enable 
jurists to elucidate the comprehension and extension of words and sentences so as to 
validate particular interpretations.   
Interpretive problems are not limited to the Qur’ān and ḥadīth. Questions about 
the comprehension and extension of representations also affect commercial transactions.  
In terms of gharar, jurists analyze the legality of when counterparties except part of a 
good from a transaction. According to a ḥadīth, however, the Prophet prohibited sales in 
which an exception was made to part of the good of the sale (bay‘ al-thunyā) due to the 
gharar that the exception creates. Jurists typically elucidate this prohibition through the 
discussion of several different types of crop, livestock, and slave sales. With these sales, 
the counterparties specify the good, but then except a portion of it for the seller to retain. 
Like the various kinds of exceptions to rules that jurists discuss in works of uṣūl al-fiqh 
and kalām, an exception to a transaction modifies its scope so as to potentially cause 
gharar.  
In the case of these transactions, the exception gives rise to two different types of 
uncertainty that have important implications for any understanding of representation. On 
the one hand, principally in transactions involving animals and humans, the exceptions 
engender the standard privation that I examined in the third chapter. On the other hand, in 
transactions involving fungible non-animal goods like grain and dates, the exceptions 
engender a form uncertainty that I refer to as aporetic uncertainty. 
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word or phrase in the same way that khāṣṣ does.  
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By aporetic, I mean that this type of uncertainty arises from a contradiction in the 
theory of representation that grounds the discussion gharar and the reasons for the 
application of a ruling to specific cases. To be precise, the Aristotelian model of 
representation claims that thought and language convey equivalent information through 
their subordination to reality. Likewise, Islamic commercial law claims that descriptions 
and visual inspections of fungible goods engender commensurable forms of certainty. 
Nevertheless, in the case of transactions of grain or dates, exceptions reveal an aporia in 
which the combination of a verbal description and a visual inspection create uncertainty 
due to the incommensurability of thought and language.  In other words, these 
transactions reveal a specific case in which language and thought are not commensurable 
for fungible goods.   
 
I. The Modalities of Sales and Certainty 
 In their discussions of sales with exceptions, jurists distinguish between sales of 
animals and non-animals. In the case of non-animals, like grain, dates, houses, and bolts 
of fabric, the seller excepts and retains ownership over a portion of the good of the sale. 
Notwithstanding the diversity of goods, the analyses of jurists typically focus on the sale 
of grain and dates, examples par excellence of fungible goods. Before examining these 
transactions with exceptions, we must first examine how one may exactly sell these 
goods without any exceptions. This examination offers important insights into how jurists 
conceive of the representation of these goods.  
Bājī offers a systematic discussion of the sale of dates from a specific orchard. In 
terms of specifying the quantity of dates sold from a specific orchard, Bājī outlines three 
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ways to effect the sale: 1) the contract specifies a quantity, 2) the contract specifies all of 
the dates of the orchard, on the condition that they amount to a specific quantity, based on 
an estimation (bi’l-kharṣ), and 3) the contract merely covers a bulk quantity, such as a 
specific pile of dates, without specifying the exact quantity in any manner (juzāf).415 
  It is tempting to assume that the categories of this typology move from certainty 
to uncertainty in terms of the quantity of the dates, but such an assumption does not hold. 
With the first type of sale, the seller defines the exact quantity of dates covered by the 
contract. Although, Bājī does not detail the mechanics of such a sale or pronounce on its 
legality, he probably intends a transaction in which one sells a small quantity that is likely 
to exist, or an amount that has been harvested and measured. Whatever the case, jurists 
permit this method of sale.  
Bājī focuses on the second and third types of sales.  According to him, Abū 
Qāsim forbids the second type of sale, when the seller estimates the quantity, which is 
then specified in the contract. Qādī Abū Muḥammad states that an estimation (al-taḥarrī) 
of the quantity creates excessive gharar and hazard (khaṭar) due to the promise of a 
specific quantity.416  On the other hand, Bājī permits the third method, the sale of a bulk 
quantity without specifying its exact quantity (juzāf), as long as the buyer visually 
appraises the quantity of the dates.417 Likewise, the other jurists agree that one may sell a 
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416 Bājī, Muntaqā, vol. 6, p. 180, ¶. 1291. 
 
417 Bājī, Muntaqā, vol. 6, p. 180, ¶. 1291.  
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pile of grain or bolt of fabric merely on the basis of a visual inspection, which removes 
uncertainty.418  
It seems paradoxical that a sale based on a visual inspection presents less 
uncertainty than one that promises a specific quantity. However, the role of estimation in 
each transaction is legally different from the viewpoint of jurists. When the seller 
promises that the crop of dates in an orchard or pile of grain has a particular quantity on 
the basis of his estimation, both counterparties treat this estimation as certain for the 
purposes of the valuation of the contract. On the other hand, when the counterparties 
specify the good of the sale simply in terms of the crop of the entire orchard or a specific 
pile of grain, both parties must independently appraise its quantity. This contract does not 
explicitly mention this quantity. Thus, while this sale presents uncertainty about the exact 
economic value of the transaction, there is no uncertainty in terms of the contractual 
good. 
Shīrāzī and Ibn Qudāma offer further insight into the mechanics of the sale of a 
bulk quantity. According to them, the counterparties to the sale of a pile of grain may sell 
it based on visual inspection and either stipulate a price for the entire pile, or assign a 
price to the pile in terms of a unit price. With the latter mode of sale, the counterparties 
may sell the entire pile at a dirham per bushel. The second method thus requires the 
counterparties to measure the entire pile to determine the final price after the conclusion 
of the contract.419 With the first method of pricing, at the time of the contract, there is no 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
418 For further details, see Ibn Qudāma, Mughnī, vol. 4, pp. 76-77, ¶. 2914. Ibn Rushd, 
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419Ibn Qudāma, Mughnī, vol. 4, pp. 93-98,  ¶¶. 2951-2957.  Shīrāzī, Muhadhdhab, vol. 3, 
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uncertainty about the final price of the transaction. On the other hand, with the second 
method of pricing, the final price remains uncertain at the time of contracting up until the 
time when the pile is finally measured. The two methods of pricing may thus lead to 
different final prices for the very same pile of grain. 
Notwithstanding the structural, epistemological, and financial differences between 
these two modes of sales, Shīrāzī asserts their equivalence by stating that, “This sale is 
valid, since the form of uncertainty associated with gharar is eliminated by knowledge 
through analysis just as it is by knowledge through synthesis. Thus, if knowledge by 
synthesis is permissible so is knowledge by analysis.”420  Notwithstanding the fact that 
both schemes of pricing may lead to different financial outcomes for the counterparties, 
Shīrāzī argues that they are legally equivalent since knowledge based on analysis and that 
based on synthesis are equivalent. The equivalence is not based on the equivalence of the 
financial outcomes, but rather on the fact that the referent is deemed to be the same 
notwithstanding the different modes of thought applied to it.  
Finally, with the exception of Ibn Ḥazm, jurists allow one to specify a portion of a 
pile of grain or a crop in an orchard for sale when he is certain that the total has more 
than the specified quantity.421 For example, Shīrāzī permits one to sell a qafīz, a particular 
quantity, from the pile, when both counterparties know that the pile contains two 
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qafīzs.422  Otherwise, the transaction is impermissible since “the good of the sale is the 
remainder, which is unknown after excepting the qafīz.”423  For these jurists, each grain 
of wheat or date in the pile is the same as all other members of the pile. Furthermore, 
these jurists do not distinguish between the interior and exterior of these goods. Due to 
the lack of distinctions in the representation of these goods, knowledge of the exterior of 
the good is a sufficient basis for a valid sale.   
On the other hand, Ibn Ḥazm forbids the sale of a portion of a pile of grain on the 
basis of a specific measure due to uncertainty about the good of the sale. His opponents 
claim that there is no uncertainty since a pile of grain is homogenous. Indeed, Shīrāzī 
states that if the pile is not completely homogenous the seller may specify the exact 
portion that he will deliver to the buyer in the contract.424 In this case, the seller might 
specify to except the left corner of the pile. However, Ibn Ḥazm denies the homogeneity 
of the pile of grain. This is somewhat perplexing because he recognizes that grain is a 
fungible good for the purposes of a salam contract. Ironically, one of the arguments he 
uses in his discussion of this issue is that his opponents contradict their own views on 
other contracts.425 
Ultimately, from a legal perspective, a sale based on a visual inspection and one 
based on a verbal description of the dates or grain seem commensurable since both 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
422 The exact quantity of the qafīz varied across time and space in the pre-modern period. 
In tenth century Baghdad, it was about 45 kilograms. For further details, see Hinz, Masse, pp. 48-
50. 
 
423 Shīrāzī, Muhadhdhab, vol. 3, p. 44.  
 
424 Shīrāzī, Muhadhdhab, vol. 3, p. 41. 
 
425 Ibn Ḥazm, Muḥallā, vol, 8, pp. 429-430, ¶. 1458. 
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methods engender certainty with respect to the quantity and qualities of the goods. It is 
tempting to map the epistemological equivalence of these two modes of sales onto the 
planes of thought and communication in the standard model of representation. 
Admittedly, the perception of a good is not quite the same as thought of it, but perception 
furnishes the information that thought labors upon in the opinion of most Muslim 
scholars. Nevertheless, in the following section, we will see that exceptions to the sales of 
these goods draw the commensurability of language and thought into question.  
 
II. Exceptions in Sales Involving non-Animals 
 With exceptions to sales involving non-animals, jurists typically discuss the sale 
either of dates from a specific orchard or a pile of grain. As we saw in the previous 
section, jurists agree that these goods are paradigmatic examples of fungible goods whose 
value can be assessed on the basis of either a visual inspection or verbal description. 
Nevertheless, when one combines the certainty engendered from a visual inspection with 
that engendered from a verbal description in one transaction by means of an exception, 
the commensurability of the certainty engendered from a verbal description and the 
certainty engendered from a visual inspection breaks down. Keeping with Aristotle’s 
metaphor of knowledge as a picture, one can imagine each mode of purchase as a lens 
prescribed for a specific eye on a person. Separately, each lens may help a person to see 
perfectly. However, when a person combines the lenses and uses them at the same time 
on the same eye they distort the image of what the person is trying to see. In the case of 
these sales, this metaphor would need to include the idea that while the lenses are being 
combined the object is also being divided.  
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According to the jurists, there are four possible ways for a seller to designate a 
portion of the total good to be excepted: 1) an unspecified portion from the total, 2) a 
proportion of the total, 3) a specific measure from the total, or 4) or a specific tree in an 
orchard. All jurists prohibit excepting an undefined quantity from a pile of grain or dates 
of an orchard. For example, one may not say either, “I will sell you this pile of grain 
except some of it,” or, “I will sell you part of this pile.”426 In this hypothetical transaction, 
both quantities are undefined, which causes gharar. 
On the other hand, regardless of whether the counterparties know the quantity of 
the good on the basis of a visual inspection or a verbal description, jurists allow one to 
except a specific proportion of the total quantity. For example, one may except ninety 
percent of the pile from the sale such that only ten percent of the pile is sold. Only Ibn al-
Mājishūn limits this exception to half of the crop, for reasons that Bājī does not 
discuss.427  However, Mālik claims that this sale has no gharar whether the 
counterparties know the exact quantity of the pile or estimate it since, “The intent is 
known and due to this the transaction is devoid of any gharar, and thus it is necessarily 
valid.”428 Likewise, Shīrāzī remarks, “ Whoever knows the entirety of something also 
knows a third, fourth, or any other percentage of it.”429 This opinion is in keeping with 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
426 Shīrāzī, Muhadhdhab, vol. 3, p. 40. 
 
 427 Bājī, Muntaqā, vol. 6, p. 181, ¶. 1291. 
 
428 Bājī, Muntaqā, vol. 6, p. 180, ¶. 1291.  
 
429 Shīrāzī, Muhadhdhab, vol. 3, p. 40. For the discussions of Ibn Ḥazm and Ibn Qudāma 
about the permissibility of excepting a proportion of a good from the sale, see Ibn Ḥazm, 
Muḥallā, vol, 8, p. 431, ¶. 1459; Ibn Qudāma, Mughnī, vol. 4, p. 77, ¶. 2917. 
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his statement about the equivalence of information garnered about a referent on the basis 
of analysis or synthesis. 
Although most jurists permit a sale of the entire quantity on the basis of a visual 
inspection, gharar may emerge when a specific measure is excepted from the total 
quantity that was defined on the basis of a visual inspection. Both Ibn Qudāma and Ibn 
Ḥazm prohibit this transaction due to uncertainty with respect to the quantity of the good 
of the sale.430 According to Ibn Qudāma,  
The good of the sale is known on the basis of an appraisal by a 
visual inspection rather than by measure, but the exception to 
the good is not made on the basis of a visual inspection and thus 
it is unknown how much will remain in terms of the quantity of 
the original visual appraisal.431     
 
Although Ibn Qudāma and Ibn Ḥazm agree that one can obtain certainty either through a 
visual inspection of a good or a description of its measure and quality, the certainty that 
each method engenders is not commensurable when an exception to a transaction is 
involved. Rather, the combination of these two forms of certainty creates uncertainty.  
Neither Bājī nor Shīrāzī is as sanguine as Ibn Ḥazm and Ibn Qudāma about 
combining the certainty obtained from a visual inspection with the exception of a 
verbally defined quantity. According to Shīrāzī, one may except a qafīz from the pile if 
both counterparties are certain that the pile contains two qafīzs. Otherwise, the transaction 
is impermissible since “the sale good is the remainder after excepting the qafīz and this is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
430 Ibn Ḥazm, Muḥallā, vol, 8, pp. 431-434, ¶. 1459; Ibn Qudāma, Mughnī, vol. 4, p.76-
77, ¶. 2914. 
 
431 Ibn Qudāma, Mughnī, vol. 4, p. 77, ¶. 2914. 
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unknown.”432 It is unclear whether Shīrāzī permits this transaction because of a particular 
ratio or due to certainty about the exact quantity of the entire pile and the excepted 
portion. Bājī, however, permits one to verbally except a specific quantity of a crop sold 
on the basis of a visual inspection as long as the excepted portion is a third or less of the 
total. How one would determine that the excepted quantity is less than a third is unclear 
since this implies that the counterparties know the exact quantity of the entire pile.  
Ibn Ḥazm mocks the Mālikī position that one may except a third of the crop by 
using a specific unit of measure. He asks why there is no uncertainty when the excepted 
portion is a third but uncertainty occurs with more than a third.433  For Ibn Ḥazm, who 
sees no middle ground between uncertainty and certainty when it comes to gharar, the 
Mālikī position naturally seems contradictory since it offers no justification for the one-
third threshold and thus implicitly admits that uncertainty could just as well exist when 
less than third is excepted. Bājī justifies this position not in terms of gharar, but 
pragmatic ease. He claims that Mālik permits the exception of up to a third so that the 
seller does not need to measure the entire pile. In this case, the seller measures only the 
excepted portion.434 In reality, if one applied Bājī’s principle, measuring the excepted 
portion will always be less work than measuring the entire pile.  
 Bājī also discusses a more complex transaction in which he identifies the 
uncertainty created by combining sales on the basis of visual inspection and verbal 
description of the quantity. If an orchard contains multiple species of dates one may 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
432 Shīrāzī, Muhadhdhab, vol. 3, p. 44. 
 
433 Ibn Ḥazm, Muḥallā, vol, 8, pp. 431-432, ¶. 1459. 
 
434 Bājī, Muntaqā, vol. 6, p. 183, ¶. 1293. 
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unproblematically except up to a third of each species. However, there is a disagreement 
about whether one may except more than one-third of a specific species but less than a 
third of all of the species in the orchard. On the one hand, Mālik permits this transaction 
by claiming that there is gharar neither with respect to the measure nor the value. 
Unfortunately, Bājī does not explain whether this gharar would affect the excepted 
portion or remaining portion since this distinction would indicate which counterparty is 
adversely affected by gharar. In fact, another position of Mālik prohibits this transaction 
since gharar increases for the buyer who may have had some specific purpose for buying 
the mixed species of the orchard.435  
 Finally, in the case of date trees, one might try to except the dates of several trees. 
Bājī, Ibn Ḥazm, and Ibn Qudāma all state that if one sells the dates of an orchard and 
excepts five trees worth of fruit this sale has uncertainty. However, if one specifies 
(ta‘yīn) the exact trees to be excepted the contract becomes permissible.436  
The central problem that these transactions present is inability to relate the total 
quantity of the good, excepted quantity, and remainder. Unlike the transactions in which 
gharar arises due to a privation, with these transactions, the counterparties are 
supposedly certain of the total good and of the excepted portion. In the previous chapter, 
the sale of immature dates from a specific orchard presented uncertainty with respect to 
ability to delivery them since those dates are not fungible in the jurists’ views.  Although 
the dates of a specific orchard or grain from a specific pile are in a sense unique, for most 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 435 Bājī, Muntaqā, vol. 6, p. 183, ¶. 1293. 
 
436 Bājī, Muntaqā, vol. 6, p. 183, ¶. 1293; Ibn Ḥazm, Muḥallā, vol, 8, p. 431, ¶. 1459; Ibn 
Qudāma, Mughnī, vol. 4, p. 77, ¶. 2916. 
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jurists the problem is not that an exception reveals the non-fungibility of the constituent 
members of the pile or orchard. Rather, the problem for jurists with this transaction is that 
the certainty gained from a visual inspection cannot be related to an exception that 
verbally stipulates a specific quantity. However, this position runs counter to their general 
claim that a visual inspection and verbal description of a fungible good engender 
certainty. 
 
III. Exceptions in Sales Involving Animals  
 As stated earlier, in their discussions of sales with exceptions, jurists distinguish 
between transactions with animals and those with non-animals. Jurists partially model 
their discussions about animal transactions on their discussions of dates and piles of 
grain. With the exception of Sarakhsī, the other jurists consider animals to be fungible 
goods. With animals, one may theoretically except 1) a percentage of it from the whole, 
2) a specific portion of it like the leg or liver, and 3) a measure from an unspecified 
portion. Like an exception to the sale of grain and dates, these transactions with animals 
may exhibit uncertainty, but in this case a privation causes uncertainty unlike the aporia 
in the transactions discussed in the previous section.   
 Most jurists permit the exception of a percentage of a single animal since it 
creates a partnership between the counterparties. 437  Ibn Qudāma states that,  “This 
transaction does not cause uncertainty with respect to the excepted portion or the 
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remainder.”438 Abū Ya‘lā, however, forbids this transaction, which he analogizes to 
excepting the fat of a single animal. According to him, the quantity and quality of the fat 
is uncertain so that its separation in the contract is invalid (lā yaṣiḥḥ ifrāduhu). Ibn 
Qudāma retorts that,  
This excepted portion is defined and its separation from the sale 
is valid so its exception is like that of a specific tree. But 
analogizing the known to the unknown in order to assess the 
illegality of a transaction is invalid (wa-qiyās al-ma‘lūm ‘alā al-
majhūl fī al-fasād lā yaṣiḥḥ).439  
 
 
For Ibn Qudāma, when the excepted portion is a percentage, the total and remainder are 
known. Conversely, the fat cannot be appraised before the animal is slaughtered so that 
the excepted portion and remainder are both uncertain at the time of the contract. Due to 
the different distribution of certainty in both transactions, Ibn Qudāma argues that it is 
incorrect to analogize the exception of a numerical percentage of an animal to the 
exception of its fat.  
The second form of exception, that of a specific portion, raises questions about 
the nature of the object and the excepted portion. First, jurists distinguish between 
animals that can be slaughtered and those that cannot be, such as slaves. According to 
Bājī, one may not except a specific part of a slave due to the inability to deliver it or 
make use it of it (al-intifā‘ bihi). If this exception were permissible, the seller, who 
retains the legs, could order her to standstill and the buyer could not order her to move. 
Although the claims on the body parts of the slave by each party are certain, the 	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combination of these claims creates uncertainty respect to the ability of each party to use 
the slave. 440  This is because a slave is not simply the sum of his body parts, but also the 
sum of the seemingly infinite number of actions that those body parts allow a slave to 
perform. However, these actions cannot be defined due to complex ways that body parts 
interact. In effect, the body parts cannot serve as referents to define these actions or 
provide certainty in terms of the contract. Nevertheless, jurists agree that the entire body 
can serve as referent in terms of the analysis of contracts of hire when one pays for the 
specific acts of labor of another person. Thus, the human body is construed as an integral 
and indivisible unity in some sense for commercial transactions.     
 As for animals that can be slaughtered, jurists distinguish, on the one hand, 
between body parts that can be inspected before the slaughter and have a utility after the 
animal is slaughtered and, on the other hand, those body parts that cannot be inspected 
before the animal is slaughtered. For example, Ibn Qudāma permits one to except the 
head, limbs, and/or hide of an animal. After citing several traditions in defense of this 
position, he says that, “The excepted portion and the remainder are both known just as 
when one sells an orchard but excepts a specific date palm from the transaction.”441 In 
this case, no uncertainty arises from combining a visual inspection with the exception of 
a visible body part on the basis of a verbal description.  
On the other hand, the Mālikīs are divided on the exception of visible body parts 
like the head and trotters. Mālik forbids the exception of visible body parts without the 
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hide such that the seller would keep the meat without the skin. According to Mālik, “It is 
as though the seller sold it already slaughtered, but only after the slaughter can he know 
its full description, which he cannot not know at the time of the sale (ya‘lam min ṣifatihi 
mā lā ya‘lam al-yawm).”442 Uncertainty occurs because the interior is only fully known 
after the slaughter. His reasoning thus creates a privation of knowledge about what is 
under the skin.  
Ibn Ḥabīb, however, permits this position by claiming that, “That the seller 
excepted a specific and visible portion so this does not invalidate the contract. This 
argument is based on the fact that the hide of the body part is excepted with that body 
part so due to this the excepted portion can be inspected.”443 In effect, Ibn Ḥabīb argues 
that the counterparties have certainty with respect to the body part since he construes the 
skin as part of the excepted body part notwithstanding the fact that it is technically not 
included in the exception.      
As for excepting the hide, Ibn al-Qāsim claims that, “knowledge of the 
dimensions, type, and quality is impossible (ta‘dhdhur al-ma‘rifa bi-qadrihi wa-jinsihi 
wa-jūdatihi wa-radā’atihi).”444 For Ibn al-Qāsim, the hide cannot be fully examined until 
removed from the animal. His position effectively creates a privation of the referent. 
Furthermore, he argues that when the seller excepts the hide, he has in fact sold meat that 
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cannot be inspected by the buyer.  On the other hand Ibn Wahb permits these transactions 
since, “knowledge of the excepted portion is possible so its exception is possible.”445  
As for excepting the interior of an animal from the sale, Ibn Ḥazm permits this 
since the interior never leaves the possession of the seller. Thus, the owner does not 
require any more knowledge with respect to the good and the buyer gets the visible part 
so that there is no uncertainty for either counterparty. The only caveat to this permission 
is that the animal must already be slaughtered. 446  Ibn Ḥazm thus makes the somewhat 
counterintuitive argument that by excepting what cannot be examined at the time of the 
sale, both counterparties have certainty. From Ibn Ḥazm’s perspective, the interior of the 
animal has not left the owner’s position so the owner does not require any new 
knowledge about the animal. Or to put it differently, Ibn Ḥazm creates the legal fiction 
that the owner knows the interior of the animal when he sells the visible part of it.  
As for Bājī, he discusses only the sale with the exception of the interior in terms 
of a fetus and reproductive organs of animals (mā fī ẓahr al-fuḥūl wa-laḥm al-fakhdh). 
With this transaction, the seller attempts to retain any offspring that the animal may 
produce. Bājī prohibits these transactions since  “the buyer has excepted from the total 
what we do not know (mā lam na‘lamhu). So we do not know what was excepted or the 
remainder.”447 With this category, the excepted quantity is uncertain so that the total, 
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which was known, becomes unknown. Furthermore, because the seller cannot use these 
parts or take possession of them, he has effectively lost control of his property.448   
Finally, in the case of excepting a measure from the animal without specifying the 
exact body part or location, Mālik once again has two contradictory views. According to 
Ibn Wahb, Mālik prohibits this sale because the part that is sold can be neither inspected 
nor described since it is hidden beneath the skin and unspecified. Ibn Ḥazm also prohibits 
this transaction.449  On the other hand, Ibn al-Qāsim states that Mālik permits this since  
The excepted portion remains in the possession of the seller and 
is not part of the sale. Thus, the contract is not invalidated by 
virtue of the lack of knowledge of the quality of the excepted 
portion that the contract contains (fa-lā yafsud al-‘aqd bi-mā 
yat‘allaq bihi min ‘adam al-ma‘rifa li-ṣifatihi).450 
 
Bājī then argues that if a third or less of its weight is excepted, the sale is valid.451 Like 
the position of Ibn Ḥazm in the previous paragraph, this position construes the interior of 
the animal as remaining in the owner’s position such that he has certainty with respect to 
it.  
 In the case of exceptions from animals, jurists adopt a broader range of positions 
than in the case of dates and piles of grain. In part this diversity is due to the larger 
number of determinations that jurists employ to represent an animal. However, with most 
of these transactions, uncertainty arises because the referents cannot be analyzed 
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adequately. The inability to analyze a specific referent leads to the standard forms of 
privation that cause gharar.  
  
IV. The Excepted Fetus  
 Unlike the previous category of exceptions, which constitutes a constellation of 
complex transactions that vary in subtle ways, the sale of a mother, whether slave or 
animal, in which the seller excepts the fetus is much more straightforward. Ibn Rushd 
forbids this transaction due to uncertainty with respect to the description of the fetus and 
its safe delivery (qillat al-thiqa bi-salāmat khurūjihi). In a similar fashion, Bājī cites an 
opinion of Mālik, who states,  
One should not except a fetus in the mother’s womb when she 
is sold because this causes gharar. It is unknown whether the 
fetus is  male or female, beautiful or ugly, defective or healthy, 
will live or die–all of this reduces the price.452  
 
He explains the prohibition with the following two reasons: 1) the quality and whether 
the fetus is alive are unknown, and 2) the price is reduced to compensate the buyer for the 
increased uncertainty and risk of this transaction.  Interestingly, this reasoning connects 
uncertainty and the price in an inverse relationship. Furthermore, with this transaction, 
gharar clearly arises due to a privation since the fetus cannot be examined. 
Although Shīrāzī also forbids excepting the fetus from the sale, he does not justify 
his position on the basis of any arguments about gharar. Rather, he states that the fetus 
follows the mother due to the general prohibition against separating a child from its 
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mother before the child reaches the age of seven. The fact that he does not invoke gharar  
seems odd since he discusses this transaction in his section on gharar. 
Sarakhsī also forbids this transaction, but within the context of a larger discussion 
of gifts. He first examines when one gives someone the fetus in a slave or animal. 
Although some jurists allow this on the basis of equitable consideration, istiḥsān, such 
that the receiver of the gift may take possession of it once it is born, Sarakhsī states that, 
“The sounder view is that this is impermissible because what is in the womb has no 
monetary value at all (laysa bi-māl aṣlan) and its existence in actuality is unknown (lā 
yu‘lam wujūduhu ḥaqīqatan).”453 In other words, the fetus does not exist from the 
perspective of Sarakhsī, and consequently it does not have a representation or any 
commercial value.  
 As for Ibn Qudāma, he also agrees that one may neither sell nor except a fetus 
from sale. Nevertheless, Ibn Ḥanbal permits this transaction on the basis of an analogy to 
the permissibility of manumitting a female slave but exempting the child. However, Ibn 
Qudāma argues that with manumission uncertainty with respect to the quality and 
quantity of the good and delivery are not considered. On the other hand, these factors 
must be considered in the case of a sale when money is at stake.454 Like Sarakhsī, when a 
property is transferred through a sale, issues of gharar become critical for the analysis of 
the contract but in the case of gift or manumission they are not relevant. The distinction 
that Ibn Qudāma is developing here is probably ethical. In the case of a sale, it is unfair 
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for one party to give or get something without the knowledge required to determine an 
equitable compensation. With a gift, in theory at least, the recipient does not need to 
provide any compensation and so his uncertainty about the value of the gift is not 
relevant.  
 Unlike the previous jurists whose views have been presented above, Ibn Ḥazm 
permits exception of a fetus from the sale of a pregnant slave. His position is in keeping 
with his permitting the owner to except the interior of animal from the sale as we saw in 
the previous section. In fact, he classifies this transaction with a number of other ones 
that he refers to as examples of the sale of the visible without its invisible interior (bay‘ 
al-ẓāhir dūna al-mughayyab fīhi). This class of sales includes the sale of the musk gland 
without the musk, eggshells, coconut shells, beeswax without the honey, the hide of an 
animal without its meat, and fruit without its seeds. According to him, these sales are licit 
since the property belongs to the seller, who may keep it if he wishes. Property that is 
visible can be either inspected or sold. On the other hand, what cannot be inspected may 
be kept since it is not permissible to sell what is uncertain.  
 Although this argument implies that the sale of the interior of something presents 
gharar, Ibn Ḥazm does not venture too far down this road since it would imply that all 
sales of goods with interiors that cannot be inspected have gharar. Indeed, as we saw 
above in his discussion about peels and shells, he allows one to sell goods whose interiors 
cannot be inspected. Ultimately, he concludes this argument by stating that the seller may 
sell any good whether it can be examined or not.455   
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In terms of the fetus, he states that it may be exempted at any point during 
gestation regardless of whether God has endowed it with a soul (nafkh al-rūḥ) or not. 
Nevertheless, he asserts that if the child is born nine months and an hour after the sale, 
the child belongs to the buyer since the mother was not impregnated while in the 
possession of the seller. Ibn Ḥazm does recognize that some jurists consider this 
transaction a paradigmatic example of gharar, but he side-steps this issue with a 
digression into cases of gharar that some claim arise when a person on his deathbed 
engages in commerce. For these jurists, there is uncertainty with respect to delivery of the 
goods specified in the contracts entered into with this sick counterparty. He then cites 
numerous early legal authorities who permit the manumission and/or sale of a slave along 
with the exception of its fetus. The implication seems to be that these legal authorities, 
who otherwise forbid gharar, would not have permitted these transactions if gharar 
affected these transactions.  
The argument of Ibn Ḥazm is somewhat ironic when one considers the fact that a 
page earlier he criticizes his opponents for trying to adduce the views of earlier jurists to 
claim that the transactions of someone on his deathbed have gharar. In that case, Ibn 
Ḥazm states that only the opinion of the Prophet is authoritative.456 Furthermore, his 
argument that one may except a fetus since one may except the interior of other goods is 
a blatant analogy. 
Although the exception of a fetus creates uncertainty in the view of the majority 
of jurists, this uncertainty is not aporetic, unlike uncertainty in the case of the sale of 
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dates or of a visible body part of an animal. Most jurists do not believe that a fetus can be 
known through a visual inspection, unlike the case of sales of dates or visible body parts 




 In this study, I have examined how discursive knowledge defines uncertainty and 
gharar. In the previous chapters, I examined the ways that the uncertainty associated with 
gharar enables valid representations through the conceptualization of specific forms of 
uncertainty. In turn, gharar creates a relationship between the forms of uncertainty and 
referents by means of privation. For jurists, gharar primarily arises when the relevant 
referent of analysis is lacking such that this lack leads to a privation of thought that 
causes uncertainty. However, this privation is modeled on the identity that forms 
certainty.  
In this chapter, I also investigated another example of when discursive knowledge 
creates uncertainty, but the transactions discussed in this chapter have broader 
implications for understanding representation. In the case of a pile of grain or dates, one 
can obtain certainty of the good’s quantity through either a visual inspection or a verbal 
description that conveys its specific quantity. However, the combination of certainty 
based on a visual inspection along with an exception of a specific quantity leads to 
gharar. The uncertainty reveals an aporia, or a contradiction in the model of 
representation that grounds discussions of gharar. This aporia indicates that language and 
thought are not always commensurable when it comes to fungible goods as jurists claim 
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in their discussions of the salam contract. To put it more precisely, a verbal description of 
fungible good does not always provide the same information as a visual inspection.  In 
turn, fungible goods cannot be the univocal and static referents that ground representation 
if language and thought are not always commensurable with respect to them.  
 The second set of transactions–those involving exceptions to the sales of animals 
and slaves–offers further insight into aporetic uncertainty.  In the case of these 
transactions exceptions create the standard privation that causes gharar. Naturally, the 
question arises as to why some exceptions cause an aporia whereas others cause a 
privation. In their discussions of transactions with animals and slaves, the jurists employ 
more distinctions in their analyses of these goods than in their discussions of exceptions 
from the sale of a pile of grain or dates. In particular, with animals, jurists distinguish 
between the interiors, exteriors, and uses of animals. These distinctions enable jurists to 
divide each good into a wider constellation of potential transactions, which have different 
referents for legal analysis. When one can except the interior of a good, the inability to 
analyze it may engender a privation that causes gharar.   
On the other hand, in their discussions of the sales of grain or dates, jurists, with 
the exception of Ibn Ḥazm, conceive of these as homogenous goods that lack any 
distinction between their interiors and exteriors. Without an interior to examine and 
except, knowledge of the exterior provides the only basis for the determining the legality 
of the transaction. Given these parameters for the representation of grain and dates, 
uncertainty can arise only if verbal descriptions and a visual appraisal are not 
commensurable. 
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The use of numerous distinctions to represent animals and the lack of these 
distinctions to describe grain and dates do not conform to form of reality that conveys 
itself transparently to mind of everyone. Rather, the discursive practices that a person or 
group employs determines the representation of reality. One could create a number of 
other distinctions to represent grain and dates, or conversely, one could reduce the 
number of distinctions employed to represent animal. Indeed, in the third chapter we 
witnessed the role of discursive practice in the legal analyses of the sale of goods like 
eggs, nuts, musk glands, and produce. On the one hand, Ibn Ḥazm treats such goods as 
undifferentiated wholes where knowledge of the exterior is a sufficient basis for the 
legality of transactions involving them. On the other hand, Shīrāzī and Ibn Qudāma 
distinguish between the exterior and interior of these goods in their analyses of gharar.  
Taken together, both sets of transactions indicate the role of discursive knowledge 
in defining referents and consequently the forms of uncertainty that arise in the analysis 
of these transactions. The representation of a good is not purely related to either its 
intrinsic characteristics or the subjective values that counterparties place on goods. 
Rather, these transactions reveal how the discursive knowledge in effect configures the 
ability represent and know a good.    
 Finally, although discursive knowledge always defines uncertainty as either a 
privation of certainty in the case of gharar, or the incorrect synthesis of thought and 
referent in uṣūl al-fiqh and kalām, it does not seem that there is an aporetic certainty 
opposed to aporetic uncertainty. It is true that in the case of these various transactions one 
could obtain certainty by excluding the exception or physically separating the piles of 
grain that the contract designates for sale and for exception. In either case, one cannot 
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obtain certainty while continuing to combine these two modes of description that 
separately engender certainty. Rather, this aporetic uncertainty is an irresoluble 
uncertainty within a system of representation. It is uncertainty that draws into question 
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Conclusion 
The Objectivity of Gharar and Uncertainty 
Throughout this study, I have moved in expanding circles in order to examine 
gharar from different perspectives. I began this study by citing Richard Rorty, who states 
that,  
  
To know is to represent accurately what is outside the mind; so 
to understand the possibility and nature of knowledge is to 
understand the way in which the mind is able to construct such 
representations. Philosophy’s central concern is to be a general 
theory of representation, a theory which will divide culture up 
into the areas which represent reality well, those which represent 
it less well, and those which do not represent it at all (despite 
their pretense of doing so).457 
 
At the time, I quoted Rorty as a means to explore the notion of identity that informs the 
conception of representation. I also remarked that although a general definition of 
representation provides a conceptual and terminological starting point for the analysis of 
uncertainty, the analysis of gharar would further problematize this definition of 
representation. It now seems worthwhile to pull together some of strands of this study by 
returning to this conceptually pregnant quotation.  
 If knowledge is the ability to represent accurately and objectively reality, what is 
uncertainty and how does it relate to certainty? In the case of the form of uncertainty 
discussed in works of uṣūl al-fiqh and kalām, it is the inability to represent accurately and 
objectively reality. Nevertheless, gharar is undoubtedly a form of uncertainty that can 
represent commercial transactions in a meaningfully accurate sense. The question thus 
arises as to whether gharar presents an objectively valid representation of reality and 	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more broadly risk? In other words, do gharar and risk have objective existences and what 
does that mean?  
Undoubtedly, there are real dangers and risks awaiting us in the world, but the 
question is complex since any response to it must invoke a model of representation that 
will configure the use of a matrix of terms like objectivity, subjectivity, truth, and error. 
In light of preceding chapters, there are two models that one might use to address this 
question: 1) an Aristotelian model of representation and 2) a discursive model of 
representation. These two models relate to a larger question about the relation between 
language and reality. On the one hand, the Aristotelian model argues for the primacy of 
reality, which mediates thought and the usage of language. On the other hand, the 
discursive model argues that language, or more specifically discourse, mediates thought 
and thus our understanding of reality.   
Throughout this paper, I have drawn on both models of representation to examine 
gharar. Although concerns about how models of representation affect our research and 
intellectual debates might seem like a particularly modern or even post-modern concern, 
in fact one finds the same concerns in the famous debate between the Mu‘tazilite 
grammarian Abū Sa‘īd al-Sīrāfī (d. 368/979) and the Christian logician Abū Bishr Mattā 
b. Yūnus (d. 328/940). In this debate, Mattā unsurprisingly adopts the Aristotelian model 
of representation in order to defend the universality of logic and truth due to their 
contingency on reality. On the other hand, Sīrāfī adopts, at least for the purposes of his 
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debate with Mattā, the discursive model of representation in order to argue for the 
contingency of knowledge upon language.458     
 
I. Objective Risk 
 A claim for an objective form of risk requires a model of representation like the 
Aristotelian model examined in this study. As stated throughout this study, the 
Aristotelian model of representation has several premises. First, reality must act as 
reference point against which the validity of language and thought are measured. This 
model assures the univocality of reality and knowledge through the claim that the 
referents that populate reality have essences that define reality. Second, this model 
presumes the equality of information found in reality, thought, and communication. True, 
languages differ, but knowledge, which is truth, must be the same for everyone since it 
matches reality. Finally, uncertainty and certainty must be two discrete forms of thought 
that do not mix with each other. Although one may progress from uncertainty to 
certainty, these two forms of thought must be essentially different otherwise truth would 
have an ambiguous value.  
These premises ensure that there is an objective reference point against which to 
judge thoughts and statements. Furthermore, the model of representation offers the hope 	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that with enough time and thought we will be able to understand everything as it truly is. 
Conversely, it offers a means to explain uncertainty. In the case of uṣūl al-fiqh and kalām, 
the cause of uncertainty is a mismatch between thought and reality. Nevertheless, for the 
uncertainty associated with gharar and risk to be objective and have valid 
representations, they must have a basis in reality rather than the failings of human minds 
and emotions. In the case of Islamic commercial law, the lack of a specific referent 
creates a privation of thought and that privation engenders gharar. In turn, the privation 
creates a relationship between the forms of uncertainty associated with gharar and 
referents.   
Although it is beyond the scope of this study, modern discussions of financial risk 
implicitly and explicitly adopt some of the premises of the Aristotelian model to 
represent risk. Admittedly, modern discussions of financial risk are very different from 
those of gharar. Specifically, modern discussions of financial risk relate to theories of 
capital allocations whereas gharar relates to the theory of the legality of contracts. 
Nevertheless, one can note some important similarities between the two discourses. Like 
discussions of gharar that conceptualize several discrete forms of uncertainty, 
discussions of financial risk conceptualize several discrete forms of risk, such as market 
risk, credit risk, interest risk, insurance risk and currency risk to name just a few 
examples.  
More importantly, like the Aristotelian model of representation, contemporary 
discussions of risk assert the primacy of ontology in defining the risks that one faces. 
Indeed, the notions of ontology that ground modern discussions of financial risk are 
radically different from those of gharar in some ways. Nevertheless, Nicholas Rescher 
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asserts that, “At bottom risk is an ontological not an epistemological category: it has to do 
with action affecting the chance of mishap itself, not with the recognition or 
acknowledgement of this chance.” 459 Discussions of financial risk define it as possible 
negative outcomes and their chances of realization. Furthermore, this conception of risk 
claims that these negative outcomes have an objective existence that can be measured and 
represented statistically. 460   
Nevertheless, Rescher acknowledges that there is an epistemological aspect to 
risk since one can be exposed to negative outcomes without knowing them or correctly 
assessing them. Furthermore, people prioritize the risks they will examine and address in 
accordance with their personal values. He, however, argues that the discussion of risk 
should focus on modeling these negative outcomes and their objective probabilities 
instead of examining the knowledge and values of actors.461  
 Admittedly, both modern notions of financial risk and gharar enable one to make 
better decisions about commercial transactions. Yet, in both cases, one can only represent 
known-unknowns. Specific forms of knowledge subsume notions of modern financial 
risk and gharar so as to enable representations about very particular situations. One 
cannot make informed statements or decisions about unknown-unknowns, which must 
exist beyond knowledge and representation–otherwise they would be known.  
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 More importantly, the discussions and analysis of gharar have drawn into 
question many of the premises that validate the Aristotelian model of representation. Our 
methods of analysis, descriptions, and concepts mediate our understanding and 
representation of reality in ways that make it impossible to capture any objective essence 
of a referent and reality. As we saw in the preceding chapters, although jurists frequently 
discuss the same transactions and goods, they, in many cases, conceive of the goods and 
transactions in very different terms. For example, the udder of a cow and its future milk 
production can be the site of either uncertainty or certainty depending on whether one 
analyzes the future milk production of a single cow, or uses the law of large numbers to 
analyze a herd’s future production.  
Similarly, jurists from the different schools invoke the same forms of uncertainty 
to prohibit transactions. Nevertheless, the ways that they define each form of uncertainty 
reveals differences that range from the subtle to the significant. These differences reflect 
the different forms of knowledge and reasoning that each jurists employs to conceptualize 
the forms of uncertainty associated with gharar. These forms of thought thus do not 
conform to reality in a simple and univocal fashion as the Aristotelian model of 
representation claims for knowledge to be objective and true. 
   Finally, the Aristotelian model of representation claims that language and thought 
are equivalent in their ability to represent reality. True, the Aristotelian model recognizes 
the fact that the mind abstracts information in order to create more general concepts and 
judgments about reality. Nevertheless, it is ultimately reality that grounds, creates, and 
determines the validity of these abstract thoughts. Yet in commercial law, we saw that 
jurists distinguish between fungible goods, which language can objectively represent, and 
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non-fungible goods, which language cannot objectively represent. In addition, the 
distinction between fungible and non-fungible does not have an objective and stable basis 
in reality as the Aristotelian model claims. To be precise, chapter five showed that the 
sale of grain, the fungible good par-excellence, is illegal when one combines a sale based 
on visual inspection with a verbal exception to sale of the pile of the grain. Although the 
good has not changed in this transaction, combining certainty from thought with that 
from a verbal description creates uncertainty due to the inequality of these two forms of 
knowledge.  
 If one accepts the Aristotelian model of representation and its premises in order to 
save an objective form of risk and gharar, the only way to explain the differences 
between jurists’ descriptions of the same goods and transactions is to invoke negative 
assessments about their ideological commitments. Undoubtedly, the jurists have 
ideological commitments, but so does everyone. Indeed, it is these commitments that 
make the Islamic intellectual tradition so rich and complex.  
In the following section, I will examine another approach to framing and 
answering the question whether risk and gharar can have objective representation. This 
approach saves many of the insights that I have gained over the course of this study from 
employing the Aristotelian model of representation as an analytical framework. At the 
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II. Discourse and Objectivity 
 One of the key arguments of Foucault is that when we analyze a statement we do 
not directly access the thoughts of the one who pronounced it. Furthermore, statements 
do not point to an univocal and transparent reality that we need to simply turn our eyes 
and minds towards in order to understand. Rather, we have only access to discourse and 
its constituent elements, such as the concepts, forms of reasoning, themes, and position of 
the subject as producer and patient of discourse. Nevertheless, Foucault is not arguing for 
a pure an unmediated form of subjectivity that rules over everything. Rather he claims 
that discourse and the repetition of its elements have an objectivity that allows one to cut 
across the standard divisions of knowledge and chronologies that organize scholarship on 
a particular topic.  
 The discussions of gharar examined in this study reveal a discursive regularity. 
The jurists share the same forms of uncertainty to explain gharar. Even in the case of 
jurists who have additional forms of uncertainty that cause gharar, these additional forms 
are clearly derived from the primary forms of uncertainty that all of the jurists share. 
Furthermore, the jurists discuss the same types of transactions in order to elaborate 
gharar. Privation structures the relationship between referent and thought for all of the 
jurists. Finally, the privation is the foundation of a schema that uses opposition, analogy, 
and resemblance to represent gharar in more complex ways.  
Taken together these traits from a unity that differentiates the conception of 
gharar and the forms of uncertainty associated with it from other discussions of risk and 
uncertainty found in other fields.  Admittedly, the jurists differ about many aspects of 
these discursive traits. Nevertheless, the unity allows jurists to debate and articulate their 
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views in a manner that seemed logical, compelling, and significant to members of all 
schools. No jurist invokes a transaction, form of uncertainty, or relationship between 
thought and a referent that differs significantly from this discursive unity associated with 
gharar. In other words, it is within the bounds of this unity that jurists can elaborate 
different opinions and speak authoritatively. Even when a jurist denies an element of this 
discursive unity, such as Ibn Ḥazm does when he rejects uncertainty with respect to the 
delivery as a cause of gharar, he must acknowledge its accepted standing within legal 
discourse by adducing arguments against it. This unity thus has an objectivity that jurists 
must acknowledge in their discussions and analysis of gharar. To the extent that Islamic 
law was enforced– a question that this study sidestepped–this discursive unity would 
have also affected society at large.  Thus, the objectivity of the discursive unity may have 
created an objective social order too.  
 
III. Future Research 
 As stated in the previous section, the discursive unity is a tool that enables 
contemporary scholars to break from given paradigms of scholarship in order to 
configure the contours of their research in new ways. Discourse analysis does not provide 
an objective viewpoint outside of discourse. Rather it works within discourse in order to 
understand and critique it. Likewise, in my dissertation, I employed the Aristotelian 
model of representation and more generally the insights of works of uṣūl al-fiqh and 
kalām to provide a conceptual and terminological framework for the analysis of gharar. 
However, this study revealed the important differences between the forms uncertainty 
associated with gharar and the form of uncertainty defined in the introductions of works 
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of uṣūl al-fiqh and kalām. In turn, the different conceptions of uncertainty offer important 
insight into the functioning of representation.  
 Although this study focused on uncertainty as it relates to gharar, uncertainty is 
part of other fields of Islamic scholarship and deserves further research. Such research 
would offer more insight into the notions of representation that ground other fields of 
Islamic scholarship and how different fields relate to one another. Such research might 
either affirm the standard divisions and hierarchies between fields of Islamic scholarship, 
or it might reveal unexamined relationships and distinctions between them. Whatever the 
case may be, what is certain is any understanding of representation and epistemology 
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